



Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa

Studies in Variation and Identity

Edited by
Yasir Suleiman



 **RoutledgeCurzon**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

DEDICATION

For my mother, 'aṭāla Allāhu fī 'umrihā

First Published in 1999
by Curzon Press
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE

Transferred to Digital Printing 2003

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

Editorial Matter © 1999 Yasir Suleiman

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-7007-1078-7

CONTENTS

Names of Contributors.....	vii
Acknowledgements.....	viii
Introduction.....	1
1 Language and Political Conflict in the Middle East: A Study In Symbolic Sociolinguistics	10
<i>Yasir Suleiman</i>	
2 Why do Different Variables Behave Differently? Data from Arabic.....	38
<i>Enam Al-Wer</i>	
3 Sociolinguistic Reflexes of Socio-Political Patterns in Bethlehem: Preliminary Studies	58
<i>Muhammad Amara, Bernard Spolsky and Hanna Tushyeh</i>	
4 Hebrew and English Borrowings in Palestinian Arabic in Israel: A Sociolinguistic Study in Lexical Integration and Diffusion.....	81
<i>Muhammad Hasan Amara</i>	
5 Pronouns and Self Presentation in Public Discourse: Yasser Arafat as a Case Study	104
<i>Camelia Suleiman</i>	
6 Language Choice, Language Policy and the Tradition- Modernity Debate in Culturally Mixed Postcolonial Communities: France and the 'Francophone' Maghreb as a Case Study.....	122
<i>Hélène Gill</i>	
7 The Status of Berber: A Permanent Challenge to Language Policy in Morocco.....	137
<i>Said Faïq</i>	
8 Comparative Perspectives on Language Planning in Iran and Tajikistan.....	154
<i>John R. Perry</i>	

9	The Story of a Failed Attempt: 1997 Draft Bill on the Correct Use of Turkish Language.....	175
	<i>Çiğdem Balim-Harding</i>	
10	Gender in a Genderless Language: The Case of Turkish.....	190
	<i>Friederike Braun</i>	
11	The Sociolinguistic Connotations of /p/ and /v/ in Cairo Arabic.....	204
	<i>Raghda El-Essawi</i>	
12	Language and Diaspora: Arabs, Turks and Greeks	217
	<i>Jacob M. Landau</i>	
13	Sociolinguistic Meaning in Code-Switching: The Case of Moroccans in Edinburgh.....	234
	<i>Alison Wernberg-Møller</i>	
14	The Arabic Proverb and the Speech Community: Another Look at Phatic Communon	259
	<i>Ibrahim Muhawi</i>	

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume of selected papers has its genesis in a symposium on the relationship between language and society in the Middle East and North Africa held in Edinburgh between 1 and 4 July 1997. I would like to thank the contributors to this volume for revising their papers and for putting up with my queries and requests for changes (and yet more changes!) which, in some cases, have led to contributions that are vastly different from those that were presented at the symposium. I would also like to thank Linda and Toby Morris for all their help in producing the final version of this volume. Thanks are also due to Jonathan Price, Curzon Press for his constant support and encouragement, and to Jane Muhawi.

I am grateful to my wife Shahla who has worked tirelessly to help speed up the production of the final version of this volume at a time when I was heavily engaged in a major research project. My two sons Tamir and Sinan deserve a special word of thanks for allowing me to use many a week-end to finish editing this volume. I hope that one day they will be able to understand and intellectually appreciate what their father - who complained of a sore neck from long hours of gazing at the computer monitor - was doing during their 1998 summer holidays.

Yasir Suleiman

INTRODUCTION

Yasir Suleiman

This is the third volume in a series of studies whose aim is to elucidate the role of language in society in the Middle East and North Africa. The first volume *Arabic Sociolinguistics: Issues and Perspectives* (Curzon Press, 1994) sought to investigate issues of identity, language loyalty and variation as they pertain to Arabic in both the modern and pre-modern worlds. The second volume *Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa* (Curzon Press, 1996) dealt with the role of language in articulating issues of national and ethnic identity in relation to Arabic, Berber, Hebrew, Kurdish, Turkish and a host of Central Asian languages. The present collection of papers builds on the findings and premises of these two volumes by (a) linking the facts of variation in language use to issues of identity, (b) adopting an expanded definition of the Middle East which includes the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, and (c) considering the use of Middle Eastern languages in their diasporic existence. The languages which form the main focus of this volume are Arabic, Berber, Persian, Turkish and, to a lesser extent, English as a language of international communication in the Middle Eastern context. However, the majority of the papers deal with Arabic, with special emphasis on issues of language, variation and identity as they pertain to the Palestinians in Jordan, the Occupied Territories and Israel.

Broadly speaking, current research on the sociolinguistics of Middle Eastern languages, especially Arabic, has tended to concentrate on correlating variation in language use with demographic factors such as education, social class, age, and sex/gender. Some of the papers in this volume, for example those by Amara, Amara et. al and El-Essawi are cast in this tradition. More recently, emphasis on issues of language and identity in the Middle Eastern context has begun to emerge in four ways. First, attempts have been made to link the facts of variation directly to issues of personal and, more significantly, collective identity

in its ethnic and nationalist manifestations. The papers by Suleiman, Al-Wer and Camelia Suleiman in this volume are examples of this orientation. Second, other authors have attempted to link the issue of collective identity in its two guises above to questions of ideology, the debate over modernisation and the formation of the nation-state out of the state-nation. The papers by Gill, Faiq, Balim-Harding and Perry constitute examples of this macro-orientation to the study of language and identity. Third, a few studies have recently aimed to concentrate on issues of language loyalty and identity shift or identity modulation among Middle Eastern and North African communities in the Western world. The papers by Landau and Wernberg-Møller in this volume represent this orientation on the macro- and micro-levels respectively. Fourth, a few scholars have chosen to broach issues of language and identity from a much wider perspective of language in society by using the insights of, for example, feminist theory and folkloristics. The papers by Braun and Muhawi are examples of this orientation in its current embryonic state.

This multiplicity of themes and approaches and their interaction is a characteristic feature of this volume. Papers thus may cross the boundary between one orientation and the other in a manner which shows both the complexity and richness of the study of language in the Middle Eastern and North African cultural and socio-political landscape. To help the reader situate these papers in relation to each other, the rest of this introduction will be devoted to outlining the major points in each of the papers in this volume.

The first paper, by the editor of this volume, sets the scene by touching on many of the issues which are dealt with later by other contributors. The paper deals with the twin concerns of variation and identity, which form the major concern of this collection, by investigating the way they interact with each other on various levels of sociolinguistic interpretation. In particular, the paper argues that the strict adherence to a correlationist approach in studying the facts of variation in Arabic - whereby linguistic variables are statistically linked to demographic factors as probable or putative causes - stops at the level of descriptive adequacy. To proceed beyond this level of accounting for the data a higher order of explanatory adequacy should be aimed at, although this may be seen by the practitioners of the correlationist approach to represent a loss in the quantifiable empirical accuracy yielded by their studies. To show how explanatory adequacy may apply in the field of Arabic sociolinguistics, the paper deals with a

much studied phenomenon in the context of the language situation in Jordan. The paper argues that by adopting various modes of sociolinguistic interpretation it becomes possible to show that a variational feature which is often correlated with gender or sex in the Jordanian language situation starts to assume different socio-cultural meanings that link it to speech accommodation, ethnolinguistic vitality, the idea of variation as a cultural commodity and nation-state formation. On the methodological level, the paper aims to argue that the facts of variation cannot be made to speak for themselves by merely correlating them statistically with relevant demographic factors since it is the point of view from which these facts are studied that ultimately endows them with meaning. In this context the paper under consideration here may be taken to represent a plea to reinstate into the research on the sociolinguistics of Arabic the Saussurean principle in terms of which the "point of view" is said to "create the object" in scientific terms. Put differently, the first paper in this volume argues that the logical positivist bias of the correlationist approach must submit to a complementary teleologically oriented mode of investigation to provide a better understanding of the sociolinguistic landscape of individual languages.

The interest in the language situation in Jordan continues in Enam Al-Wer's paper (Chapter 2) which deals with the behaviour and sociolinguistic meaning of a number of phonological variables in the dialectal profile of Jordan as a newly emerging nation-state. Noting that not all her chosen variables behave in the same way in the Jordanian linguistic landscape, Al-Wer sets out to explain the differences between them by examining two factors. First, she invokes gender and ethnic identity as two explanations for these differences. In setting out these two constructs Al-Wer refers to the role played by social networks and the degree of awareness of the emblematic or indexical nature of the variables as contributory considerations in motivating various forms of variation in Jordan as a country in which citizenship and nationality as forms of identity ascription do not always neatly coincide. Second, Al-Wer discusses the phonetic (articulatory and acoustic) properties of the variables in their systemic configurations as factors which may arrest or promote the diffusion of different patterns of variation, especially with respect to the development of innovative variants. Al-Wer's paper thus has the virtue of remaining rooted in the linguistic facts of variation and their intra-relations while at the same time seeking to link

them to considerations of an extra-linguistic nature from a purely structural point of view.

In their study of the linguistic situation in Bethlehem, Amara, Spolsky and Tushyeh (Chapter 3) provide evidence which confirms the differential impact of education and urbanisation on the emergence of two gendered prestige norms in the Arabic language situation in the city. Thus the move from rural to Standard variants in Bethlehem speech is projected as being more evident among males than females while the preference for urban variants is said to be more evident among females. This raises the important question, yet to be answered, as to why the same social processes of education and urbanisation have led to the development of different gender-based prestige norms in speech. Furthermore, the study by Amara, et. al is interesting because of the evidence it provides of the role of religious affiliation as a factor in motivating different patterns of linguistic variation. In addition, this study shows the low visibility of [g] among West Bank Palestinian males, which contrasts with the high visibility of the same variant among Palestinian males in Jordan. The paper thus provides evidence, albeit indirectly, which in conjunction with the findings of Al-Wer form the empirical basis for the claim made by Suleiman concerning the role of nation-state formation in Jordan as an important factor in promoting patterns of dialect shift and dialect maintenance and promotion.

Amara's paper (Chapter 4) on Hebrew and, to a lesser extent, English borrowings in Palestinian Arabic shows how language responds to changes in the socio-political domain by displaying lexical innovations whose diffusion and integration is linked to demographic factors in a speech community. The paper also shows how the motivation for learning Hebrew among Palestinians in Israel is driven mainly by instrumental considerations owing to the definitional role which the socio-political environment exercises on the nature of the interaction between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. Thus, in terms of identity, Arabic continues to function emblematically for Palestinians in Israel. Amara's paper assumes greater significance when set against Wernberg-Møller's paper on the Moroccan community in Edinburgh (Chapter 12). In both contexts, i.e. Israel and Scotland, Arabic serves as a boundary setting device between the in-group and the out-group as well as between native/traditional discursive domains and foreign ones. This raises the interesting issue of whether the

Palestinians in Israel have become diasporised in their own native land. This is a subject well worth investigating in future research.

Camelia Suleiman's paper (Chapter 5) continues the interest in the Palestinian linguistic landscape but shifts the emphasis from questions of collective or group identity to those of personal identity. In dealing with this topic she uses the insights of interactional or conversational analysis to investigate the presentation of Self in discourse. For this purpose Camelia Suleiman utilises the TV interview format as data and the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat as a case study. To analyse Arafat's use of personal pronouns as an expression of different facets of his identity as leader and partner in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Camelia Suleiman refers to previous studies on the use of pronouns in political speeches in Britain and Mexico, although her findings differ from those yielded by the studies concerned owing to the type of data she uses and the political context that frames them. The fact that the language of the data is English rather than Arabic draws attention to the utilisation of English as an important medium of communication in the Middle East. In addition, the paper highlights two features of the present volume. On the one hand, it signals that the contributions it contains are about language and society in the Middle East and North Africa rather than, strictly speaking, about languages of the Middle and North Africa in their native environments. On the other hand, the inclusion of Camelia Suleiman's paper in this volume is intended to suggest that the proper investigation of the role of language in society can go beyond what is sociolinguistically canonical to incorporate impulses from other allied disciplines. It is this same rationale which underlies the inclusion of the paper by Muhawi (Chapter 14) in this volume.

In Chapter 6 Hélène Gill discusses the role of language in expressing personal and collective identity in the countries of the Maghreb and in France among immigrants from North Africa. In particular she concentrates on the role of Arabic and French as symbols of tradition and modernity in the communities in question. What is particularly interesting about Gill's study is the way it shows how people make sense of, and give expression to, the tradition versus modernity debate in their lives at the macro-level of linguistic attitudes and the micro-level of linguistic choices. This study is also interesting because of the differential pattern it reports between Arabic/French bilinguals who display a positive attitude towards Standard Arabic for national identity considerations, and those with little or no competence

in French who display a positive attitude towards this language for instrumental considerations. It may be suggested in this connection that this difference is an expression of the same phenomenon in that it shows a preference towards the language which is probably less salient in a speaker's life.

Said Faiq's paper (Chapter 7) on the status of Berber in Morocco raises many issues of considerable interest in relation to the role of language in constructing national identity in a context in which unity of the nation state, modernity and tradition compete for ideological influence and, at times, hegemonic political expression. The paper also shows how, in trying to address all these considerations, official language policy makers in Morocco have juggled many contradictions. In order to reduce the potency of the demand to establish Berber as an official language of the state, government policy has had to give official recognition to the distinction between the dialectal form of Arabic and its Standard Arabic counterpart in a way which, at least on the surface, downgrades the latter to the status of *lahja* (variety) and appears to run counter to Arabisation as a national objective and educational-cum-cultural goal. Faiq's paper further shows how language policy in Morocco is entangled with Islam as a binding force in the construction of national unity in the country. This is an issue which certainly merits further investigation.

John Perry's paper on language planning in Iran and Tajikistan (Chapter 8) charts a history of divergence and attempted convergence in these two Persian-speaking countries. By examining reforms and attempted reforms in the alphabet and the lexicon, the paper shows how issues of modernisation and identity are implicated, both from within and without, in the discourse on language. The paper also shows the role of the elite in Tajikistan in promoting and modulating the effect of externally induced language reforms, as well as how the accretions of history cannot be easily dismantled even when identity-driven language conceptualisations are marshalled as forces of substratum restoration. Language carries with it the cultural and political imprints of its own historical experience, which fact is apparent in the case of Persian in Tajikistan in the context of the Latinisation and Cyrillicisation of the script as reflexes of political imperatives of a fissionary and fusionary nature at one and the same time.

In Chapter 9, Çiğdem Balim-Harding shows the continued significance of the language issue in forging national identity in Turkey. Although this topic has been dealt with several times in the

literature, Balim-Harding's paper succeeds in showing the increasing complexity of the issue in hand by linking it to considerations of individual responsibility, morality based economics and increased fanaticism in the face of inevitable language development and evolution. The paper also shows how the politics of language in Turkey at the close of the twentieth century is intimately intertwined with national and economic policy as factors whose cultural consequences challenge the prescriptive language policy dominant in the Atatürk and post-Atatürk era. At the same time it seeks to affect a rapprochement between the pre- and post-Republic periods in an expanded sense of what is culturally and nationally authentic. These attempts at definition and re-definition of collective identity in Turkey make it unlikely that the draft bill of 1997, which is the subject of this paper, will be the last word in this arena. Language in Turkey is therefore set to act as a barometer of the major undercurrents in the ongoing debate about where the country fits in its complex regional environment.

Friederike Braun's paper (Chapter 10) challenges the general assumption among Turkish speakers of the existence of a Turkic tradition of egalitarianism owing to the lack of gender distinctions between males and females in their language. Braun argues that the absence of *overt* gender distinctions in Turkish does not necessarily mean the non-existence of *covert* distinctions of this type which, as she shows, in fact play an important role in the processing and interpretation of sentence structure. Braun's conclusions are based on a variety of empirical investigations whose aim is to study person reference in Turkish. These investigations are informed by a feminist critique of gender bias in languages that lack overt sex based grammatical categories.

The interest in language and gender is further pursued in Raghdia El-Essawi's paper (Chapter 11) on the widespread association in the sociolinguistic literature of prestige in spoken language with female speech which, in the case of Cairo, is assumed to involve the foreign forms of selected phonological variables rather than their native renditions. El-Essawi's paper however goes beyond this limit. In particular it shows how the influence of the interviewer in sociolinguistic fieldwork may yield results which seem to challenge the general assumption concerning the association of prestige with female speech. To resolve this dilemma El-Essawi invokes the pragmatic notions of *power* and *face* in face to face interaction to highlight both the effect of speech accommodation on data elicitation and to suggest

the inadequacy of relying on the correlationist approach on its own to interpret the data in question.

In Chapter 12 Jacob Landau shifts our interest from the Middle Eastern languages in their native contexts to these languages in their diasporic existence. Landau's paper shows that the language situation among Middle Eastern emigrant communities follows the general pattern of language shift from native language maintenance, to bilingualism involving the dominant language of the host culture and, finally, to monolingualism involving the latter alone. Landau also shows how attitudes towards the native language differ from one diaspora community to another and, within each diaspora, from one group to another. Landau further shows how the language issue among Middle Eastern emigrants is affected by a variety of factors, including religious affiliation, proximity to one's native country, localisation and density of the community, the political structure and educational policies of the host community and the prevailing social attitudes towards immigrants in the community in question. By including Greek emigrant communities in his study Landau provides a comparative Mediterranean dimension which helps locate the Arab and Turkish emigrant communities in a much wider perspective. It may be pointed out in this context that an investigation of the language situation among such communities in the Middle East, especially the Arab world, is long overdue.

The analysis of the language situation among emigrants from the Middle East is maintained in Alison Wernberg-Møller's paper (Chapter 13) which deals with the sociolinguistic meaning of code-switching, particularly metaphorical code-switching, involving the small and recent Moroccan community in Edinburgh, Scotland. Wernberg-Møller's study shows how the *we-they* code and the contrast between personalisation and objectivisation - which have been shown to apply in comparable situations - obtain for Arabic and English respectively in the community in question. Thus while Arabic is used to define the community's cultural identity, English is promoted for reasons of instrumental advancement and material progress - very much as Arabic and Hebrew are deployed among Palestinians in Israel. In setting out these ideas Wernberg-Møller approaches her data from a theoretical perspective which is bound to be of interest to studies on code-switching in the Arabic-speaking world, especially in the context of the language situation in North Africa.

Ibrahim Muhawi's paper on phatic communion (Chapter 14) extends the horizons of this volume beyond any narrow conceptualisations of sociolinguistics by incorporating speech act theory and folkloristics, from which he culls various insights to provide an expanded interpretation of phatic communion. Muhawi's initial insight is the inadequacy of interpreting meaning as a commodity consisting of information, which interpretation, Muhawi rightly observes, is ideologically driven and is responsible for branding phatic communion as "small" or "empty" talk. Using data collected from participant observation, Muhawi argues that phatic communion is more complex, and that it serves a variety of functions which include "creating a community of sympathy", the "sharing of subjectivity" and the underscoring "ties of identity". Using Arabic proverbs as a genre to illustrate these points, Muhawi shows how the context of situation and the context of culture contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of phatic communion and to its centrality in the exchange of meanings between interactants.

Ibrahim Muhawi's paper provides a fitting coda to this volume. It closes it by opening up expanded vistas of research interest into the relationship between language and society which go beyond the restricted domain of sociolinguistics as an adjunct discipline to linguistics and sociology. It does so by showing the complexity of the relationship between language and society and of the role of language in society. In a sense, Muhawi's paper provides a highly nuanced rhetorical reminder of the need to replace borders by open-bridges between the disciplines which converge on the investigation of language as a social phenomenon. As such, Muhawi's paper raises questions that are pertinent to a wide constituency of scholars whose interest in language as a social phenomenon intersect, but - in metaphorical terms - do not meet.

and Samaria are all *ideological ways of speaking*.² The same applies to the following terms: the Israeli security zone, the occupied border zone and the 'compromise label' the Israeli occupied security zone when used to designate that area of southern Lebanon which Israel directly occupies or does so indirectly through proxies. In the short term, what is at stake behind these labels is the concern with persuasion by managing public opinion to the designer's advantage. This is why it matters a great deal to the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict whether the proposed Israeli settlement (in 1998) on the outskirts of Arab East Jerusalem is to be known to the outside world as Har Homa, Jabal Abu Ghneim or, in a compromising mode, Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghneim.³ In both the short and long term, the conflict of labels in the Middle East is a deadly serious one. It concerns claims of legality and counter-legality as well as which version of history will *formulate*, rather than just articulate, reality. Language here does not just reflect reality, but *acts* on it, configuring it and shaping it to accord with a given ideology. This is why troop deployment and military action in the Middle East are invariably accompanied by lexical deployment and action. In *the Middle East the gun and the dictionary march hand in hand*, and this is no more apparent than in Israel in which "Hebrew continues to be driven by ideology, and is ... still considered a metaphor for the security of the nation" (Shohamy, 1994).

The aim of this paper is not to discuss these politico-linguistic issues, interesting though they are, especially if approached from the viewpoint of the translational controversy about 'managing versus monitoring' (De Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981; Farghal, 1993; and Shunnaq, 1992) - or 'domestication versus foreignisation' (Venuti, 1995) - in the transfer of the language of broadcasting and the press media from one code, normally English, to another.⁴ Rather, our aim is to consider how political conflicts in the Middle East, whether inter-ethnic or inter-nation in character, involve a host of policies and practices which directly or indirectly involve co-territorial languages and dialects in antagonistic or less than amicable relations to each other. It is however important in this regard not to think of languages or dialects as *disembodied* objects, i.e. as means of communication in isolation from their speakers whose linguistic rights are an important part and parcel, although often a neglected one, of their total human rights entitlement (Coulombe, 1993). Having said that, it is necessary to point out for methodological reasons that our approach in this paper is not based on the notion of linguistic rights, although the denial of

CHAPTER ONE

LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A STUDY IN SYMBOLIC SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Yasir Suleiman*

1. *Politico-linguistic Conflicts in the Middle East: A General Introduction*

Although readers of this paper may consider some of the points which will be raised later controversial, one thing, we are certain, would be non-controversial: the Middle East - especially if we accept its expanded sense to include the Muslim Republics of Central Asia - is an area of political conflicts which have a habit of igniting from time to time with violent consequences. While language is hardly ever the cause of such conflicts, nevertheless it is always implicated in them, whether functionally as a medium of communication or symbolically as a site of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation in games of power relations between contending parties. On the simplest level, we may point to the lexical role of language in the Middle East in constructing highly ideologised versions of reality which may gain wide currency by diffusion through the languages of international communication.¹ In this context, it does matter whether one refers to the 1967 War between the Arabs and the Israelis by that name or as the Six Day War. Likewise, the terms 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War are all ideologically impregnated labels, as are the terms 'Peace for Galilee' and 'Grapes of Wrath' which were used to designate Israeli incursions in Lebanon in 1982 and 1996 respectively. Moving on to geography, the terms West Bank and Gaza, the occupied territories, Arab occupied lands, Palestinian occupied lands, the territories occupied by Israel, the territories, the Israeli administered territories, lands which came under Israeli control in 1967 and Judaea

such rights by the dominant group to the subordinate group or groups in their common territory often succeeds in turning language into a more potent symbol of resistance and counter-mobilisation than it would otherwise be. The situation in Turkey with regard to the language bans on the Kurds in particular are a case in point (Skutnabb-Kangas and Sertç, 1994; Blau and Suleiman, 1996),⁵ as are the bans imposed on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the late eighties and early nineties (Rudin and Eminov, 1990; Balim, 1996). What is interesting about these two situations is the manner in which they graphically display the potency of the 'double standards' syndrome in managing national and international affairs even in the cultural sphere. Thus while Turkey strongly condemns the denial of linguistic and other related rights to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria,⁶ it nevertheless enacts more or less the same policies against Kurdish and the Kurds in Turkey itself, justifying this by asserting that the Turks in Bulgaria are a *national minority* while, at the same time, considering the Kurds in Turkey as no more than an *ethnic group*, if that.

In what follows we propose to concentrate on the linguistic reflexes of one type of political conflict in the Middle East, the inter-ethnic conflict, leaving other types of conflict, especially those of inter-nation variety, for a future study. A defining property of inter-ethnic conflicts from the sociolinguistic point of view is the inter-dialectal nature of the linguistic reflexes they generate, especially the occurrence and distribution of code-switching or code-mixing among members of the speech community in one and the same state territory. In carrying out our investigation we will rely on the data and interpretations generated by previous studies, while using for interpretative purposes what may be regarded as non-canonical explanatory approaches in Arabic sociolinguistics. This is a deliberate strategy on our part for two reasons. On the one hand, studies of this kind are particularly interesting because of the way they integrate the data under investigation with socio-political considerations of much wider applicability as well as with other, less problematic phenomena of the same generic type. On the other hand, by adopting this approach we aim to suggest a different orientation to the study of language in society than has hitherto been entertained, with a few notable exceptions, in the investigation of Arabic sociolinguistic phenomena. In particular, we hope to suggest that there is more to Arabic sociolinguistics than the statistical calculation of the distribution of variables and their correlations with demographic factors, interesting and important

though these lines of functionally oriented inquiry are. More specifically, we hope to encourage other researchers to consider the merits of complementing numerical empiricism with higher order explanatory frameworks which can cast the data in interesting new lights. In the absence of a better term we will designate this orientation *symbolic sociolinguistics*, although functionality and symbolism cannot be totally isolated from each other on the conceptual level.

2. *Linguistic Reflexes of Inter-ethnic Conflict: A Study in Symbolic Sociolinguistics*

In this section we will deal with code-switching in Jordan with respect to the distribution of the dialectal variants of the Standard phonemes /q/ and /k/ among indigenous Jordanians, sometimes referred to as East Jordanians in the literature, and their Palestinian partners who, together, form the two major ethnic/national constituencies of the citizenry of Jordan. The distribution and sociolinguistic significance of these variants have been extensively dealt with in the literature (Abdel-Jawad 1981, 1986, 1987; Hussein, 1980; Sawaie, 1986; Shorrab, 1981; Suleiman, 1993; and Al-Wer, 1999). They will however be given here in a skeletal form for ease of reference.

Roughly speaking, Standard /k/ has two dialectal variants: [k] which occurs in the speech of East Jordanians and urban Palestinian speakers, and [tʃ], as in English 'church', which occurs mainly in rural Palestinian speech. By contrast, Standard /q/ has three variants: the glottal stop [ʔ] which traditionally occurs in the speech of Palestinian urbanites; [g], as in English 'garden', which mainly occurs in the speech of East Jordanians and, to a much lesser extent, Palestinians; and [k] which traditionally occurs in rural Palestinian speech. The /q/ variants as well as the variant [tʃ] of Standard /k/ are very important to any characterisation of the language situation in Jordan owing to their emblematic or stereotypical nature. Thus, traditionally speaking, [ʔ] is regarded as symbolic of Palestinian urban speech, [k] of /q/ and [tʃ] are regarded as symbolic of rural Palestinian speech; and [g] as emblematic of East Jordanian, bedouin speech. We are of course aware that this is an idealised picture of the functional domain of the language situation in Jordan, hence the use of the word 'traditionally' in several places above. However, this picture is not without its symbolic force from a sociolinguistic or sociological perspective. This boils down to saying

that although the above description of the variants and their distribution may not be fully accurate functionally, it is nevertheless highly applicable symbolically. Our interest in this paper is not so much in the functional aspect of language, but in the symbolic and its signifying meanings.

The above patterns of dialectal variation and their symbolic values obtained in Jordan with a certain degree of uniformity before and immediately after the 1967 War owing to the geographical separation of the two major constituencies of the Jordanian citizenry. Any code-switching which may have taken place at the time would most probably have been in the direction of the prestigious urban variety, which is still the case now but only with respect to the speech of the female sex (cf. Amara, Spolsky and Tushyeh, 1999). This perhaps explains and is explained by the attitude towards the urban variety as a 'feminine' dialect (cf. Al-Wer 1999). With respect to the speech of males, we believe that the three dialectal varieties all stood their own ground during the same period with negligible code-switching between them; this is particularly interesting in the context of the rural Palestinian variety owing to its stigmatised nature in comparison with its urban Palestinian counterpart.

This situation started to change radically after the 1970-71 clashes in Jordan between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerrilla movement, which clashes ended with the defeat of the latter and their eviction from the country. Although unrelated to these events, the expansion of the Jordanian urban space, especially the city of Amman as a metropolitan centre, has led to the expansion of the urban variety among female speakers through code-switching. More significantly from our perspective in this paper, however, is the code-switching by urban and rural young and middle-aged Palestinian males to the East Jordanian, bedouin variety.⁷ This is particularly surprising in relation to the urban variety whose speakers stood, in terms of social prestige, at the apex of the social hierarchy in the country.

Clearly what happened in Jordan in the period following the 1970-71 events was a double trajectory of code-switching: one involving female speakers in the direction of what is essentially an urban Palestinian dialect, and the other involving male speakers in favour of the East Jordanian, bedouin variety. This gendered bifurcation of code-switching in Jordan has led many scholars to accept Abdel-Jawad's interpretation (1981, 1986) of this phenomenon as one at whose basis lies the tension between the symbolism of femininity and masculinity

respectively. Naturally, an explanation of this kind was bound to gain currency owing to the fact that it chimes with the well-entrenched views of Arab society as a strongly patriarchal structure.⁸

Abdel-Jawad's solution does not however explain why the code-switching in male speech to the bedouin variety started to emerge as a significant linguistic factor only at the time it did, and not before 1970-71 as the present author can testify on the basis of his experience at the time. If it is truly the case that the bedouin variety is thought to be characterised by masculinity as an inalienable attribute, and, furthermore, if it is truly the case that Arab society, by virtue of its strong patriarchal structures, would favour a masculine sounding variety - whatever that means - for its male speakers, one is bound to ask why is it that the shift to the bedouin variety did not take place at such a massive scale earlier in Jordan? One may also ask why is it that similar shifts in male speech have not taken place in congruent language situations, for example Syria and Palestine where in the latter the rural variety is dominant in relation to the bedouin variety in the Palestinian cultural space? The gendered account of code-switching also fails to explain why the shift in speech markers was in the direction of the bedouin variety rather than, as one might have expected, in that of the socially prestigious urban variety, which is the case in similar linguistic situations in the Arabic-speaking world. Additionally, the above explanation of code-switching in Jordan fails to account for (a) the sudden popularity of the red-checked *kuffiyah* as symbolically relevant East Jordanian head cover for young men in comparison with the black checked *kuffiyah* worn by Palestinians as represented by Yasser Arafat, and (b) the emergence at the time of the boundary setting ethnolinguistic label, *baljikiyyin* (lit. Belgians), to refer to Jordanians of Palestinian origin by East Jordanians (Lator, 1997). For all of these reasons we prefer not to accept completely Abdel-Jawad's explanation in its original form, since, in our view, it stops at the functional level of correlating linguistic variants with demographic factors without exploring the symbolic dimension of language use by investigating the socio-political meanings which make these correlations significant in the way they are. It is this functionally restrictive view, so characteristic of the conduct of research in Arabic sociolinguistics, which on the methodological level provides the motivation for the present paper.

In an earlier paper (Suleiman, 1993), the present author tried to offer an alternative explanation to gendered code-switching in Jordan

by concentrating on the male side of this phenomenon. The main thrust of this explanation was to situate this switch in the context of the events of 1970-71, which gave the East Jordanians the upper hand over the Palestinians in power relations in the country. Government security measures instituted at the time accelerated what could have been a slower shift to the bedouin variety, mainly by making it urgent for non-bedouin speakers, who were mostly of Palestinian origin, to shift to that dialect. Dropping Palestinian speech-markers by Palestinian males in favour of bedouin markers was practised very widely at the time as a *blending* or *invisibility* strategy for 'keeping one's head down', to use a common phrase, although this phenomenon started to assume additional connotations at a later stage.⁹

The aim of this explanation was a limited one. On the one hand, it was intended to show how linguistic change can respond to political events, highlighting in particular the speed with which such change can take place (cf. Amara 1999 for the influence of Hebrew on Palestinian Arabic dialects in Israel). In the Jordanian context, this speed was staggering, resembling a stampede or a *massive group defection* in its initial intensity. On the other hand, this explanation was intended to show that ethnicity/nationality can be a variable in inducing sociolinguistic change, a factor which Abdel-Jawad deliberately ignores, as others have done in their research on Arabic sociolinguistics.¹⁰ In explaining this decision on the part of Abdel-Jawad we attributed it to the confusion between ethnicity/nationality and citizenship in his study, as in similar studies of the language situation in Jordan (Hussein, 1980; and Sawaie, 1986).

Let us now develop this ethnicity based explanation further by considering how it relates to the gendered account it is designed to supersede. In particular, we are interested in exploring, albeit very briefly, how the dominance of the masculine over the feminine in Arabic culture has its symbolic counterpart in the Jordanian social landscape in the status of the East Jordanians as the ethnically dominant group in relation to the Palestinians who constitute the subordinate or minority group in political terms. The main point in this regard is the recognition of the fact that the coincidence of these two elements in the Jordanian sphere is sociolinguistically relevant, since this will enable us to ascribe masculinity and dominance to the bedouin East Jordanian dialect, and femininity and subordination to the urban Palestinian dialect. It further accords with similar cultural phenomena elsewhere in the world, for example where issues of text-linguistic

dominance in translation are expressed in terms of the supremacy of the masculine over the feminine. Thus, the dominance of the source text over its target counterpart in translation has at various times and in different cultural spaces been expressed by reference to the supremacy of the male over the female as a metaphorical trope. As Sherry Simon explains in her *Gender in Translation* (1996:1): "The hierarchical authority of the original over the reproduction is linked with imagery of masculine and feminine; the original [text] is considered the strong generative male, the translation the weaker and derivative female", a view which was evident as far back as the seventeenth century when John Florio declared that "Because they are necessarily 'defective', all translations are 'reputed females'". Similarly, the facts of grammatical gender in language have invariably been articulated in terms of the unmarkedness of the male/masculine and the markedness of the female/feminine categories, thus treating the former as the root or stem from which the latter is to be derived.¹¹ As Simon points out "The grammatical consequences of accepting the masculine as the norm is the humiliating fact that a French sentence such as 'Three hundred women and one (male) cat walked down the street' would have to be put in the grammatical masculine" (ibid.:19).¹²

In terms of this analysis the 'masculine' and the 'feminine' in the context of the language situation in Jordan acquire their symbolic value from their capacity to signal the politically induced situation of dominance and subordination in the country together with their linguistic concomitances. In other words, the masculine and feminine as sociolinguistic attributes in Jordan may be treated as a metaphorical trope for dominance and subordination in the socio-political structures of the society. This is an extremely significant conclusion because it enables us to interpret code-switching in Jordan from a new angle, utilising in this regard relevant insights from speech accommodation theory by Giles, Bourdieu's work on linguistic capital and linguistic markets and, finally, studies on language and nation-state formation (Suleiman, 1994, 1996 and 1997).

To begin with, we agree with Ross in his view that one cannot "define a [subordinate group] in numerical terms but in terms of relative power and structural inequality" (1979:6). This is particularly applicable to Jordan where the politically subordinate Palestinian group are thought to constitute the majority of the population who, nevertheless, may be said to form a "collectivity that is characterised by its powerlessness in deciding its own fate" (ibid.). Relying on Ross

further, we may say that although the Palestinians as a people have a strong, internally generated sense of national self-identification, it is nevertheless true that as a subordinate group in the confines of Jordan their identity is not *entirely* "endogeneously defined by the group itself but is, rather, exogenously defined and ... enforced by the [dominant group]" (ibid.). This description of the language situation explains the use of the term *baljikiyyin* by members of the dominant group to label the Palestinians in Jordan as outsiders,¹³ and the total absence of a corresponding term among the Palestinians to label East Jordanians as insiders or outsiders, or anything else for that matter. Applying the concept of gender markedness in grammatical theory to this situation, it is as though the Jordanians are the male/masculine unmarked category and the Palestinians are the female/feminine marked category. From a social point of view labelling, as Robert St. Clair explains, "provides a way of creating boundary markers and maintenance markers so as to distinguish the insiders from the outsiders" (1978:55). This is why the label *baljikiyyin* is so important in understanding the role of ethnicity in the formation of the nation state in Jordan.

Ross's study of the role of language in mobilising ethnic identity provides further insights which seem to be applicable to the Jordanian situation, although not without modification. In particular we may refer to his statement that "Where members of [subordinate] groups live in close physical proximity to members of the majority and where a patriarchal system of intergroup relations persists, the use of the dominant language ... is most likely" (1979:7). As we have pointed above, this is clear in Jordan from the code-switching in the direction of the bedouin variety by males of Palestinian origin.¹⁴ In addition, the view put forward by Ross that subordinate "roles and identities may be highly stressful and frustrating to many of their holders" (ibid.:8), who may chose to escape from their position by adopting the speech patterns, among other things, of the dominant group, provides a plausible explanation of the code-switching to the bedouin variety by Palestinian males.¹⁵ However, we differ from Ross in that we do not attribute the impetus in the adoption and diffusion of the new code-switches in Jordan to the elite alone, as we have tried to explain earlier when we described the onset and progress of the phenomenon under consideration as a "stampede or massive group defection". As a matter of fact, being traditionally bereft of social and economic power, the non-elite may have had a stronger incentive to code-switch as a measure of self-protection in the period following the 1970-71 events

in Jordan. However, the net result of acts of this type is usually not assimilation, but integration or inter-ethnic acculturation, simply because the dominant group would be generally inclined to resist all attempts to erode their power. If so, then it would be reasonable to expect that new differentiations in speech would emerge in the dominant group to maintain sufficient distance between them and the subordinate group.

Although, to the best of our knowledge, an investigation from this angle has not been carried out in Jordan, nevertheless we believe that the situation on the ground may corroborate the above conjecture. In other words, it may turn out to be the case that because young Palestinian males in Jordan have now started to use the bedouin variety spontaneously, nuances in the bedouin speech patterns of indigenous East Jordanian male speakers may have started to appear, if they have not already done so, to maintain their ethnic distance in a more subtle, but no less effective, way from members of the subordinate group. This would be in line with the observation made by Giles, Bourhis and Taylor to the effect that "If a dominant group perceives that the subordinate group is acquiring their characteristic speech style, which can mean a loss of positive distinctiveness, then it is possible that they will actually change the nature of their own language [in the case of Jordan, dialect] in order to maintain sociolinguistic superiority. What can follow is what [has been] called pursuit convergence, and this can be perceived as a futile exercise by the (pursuing) subordinate group who are subtracting more and more of their own unique identity at every stage." (1977:337). As a matter of fact, I am reliably informed by one of my postgraduate students, Dania Kamhawi, that this is already happening with respect to female speech in Jordan, where the correct and socially nuanced use of English is replacing the Palestinian urban variety as a symbol of *high* prestige as a result of competition at the top of the female social hierarchy. I am also reliably informed by the same person on the basis of her own participant observation that this situation seems to be accelerating at such a speed that the use of French, which is a more scarce linguistic resource in Jordan, is sometimes used to signal even sharper symbols of social 'one up-womanship'. Evidence in support of this may be generated by studies of the language situation in North Africa where English provides the enhanced prestige function served by French in Jordan (Sarah Lawson-Sako, personal correspondence).

Assessing the bedouin variety in relation to the two Palestinian varieties in Jordan from the viewpoint of intergroup relations we can therefore conjecture that the first is characterised by high ethnolinguistic vitality perceptions in comparison with the other two, especially with respect to male speech. According to Giles, Bourhis and Taylor the "ethnolinguistic vitality of a group is that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and collective entity in intergroup situations" (1977:308).¹⁶ Although to the best of our knowledge no ethnolinguistic vitality studies of the language situation in Jordan have been carried out, it may still be possible to offer the following informal observations to characterise the ethnolinguistic vitality of the bedouin variety in relation to the other two.¹⁷

To begin with, we may point out that although indigenous speakers of the Palestinian varieties have numerical superiority in Jordan, and although they have a measure of control over the economic life of the country through banking and the private sector, and, finally, although they are on a par with East Jordanians in the degree of self-esteem they ascribe to themselves, nevertheless their dialects would not in our view be accorded the same level of ethnolinguistic vitality which we believe would be ascribed to the bedouin variety in male speech. In explaining this conjectural disparity in the respective ethnolinguistic vitality of the different dialect groups, we may ascribe the ascendancy of the bedouin variety to the following factors: (a) the sociohistorical prestige of the East Jordanians since the events of 1970-71 alluded to above which, on the Palestinian side, created a past with "demobilising symbols leading individuals to ... hide their linguistic identity thereby diluting the group as a collective entity" (Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 1997:311); (b) the belief in Jordan, both among East Jordanians and Palestinians, that Jordan is the "ancestral homeland" of the East Jordanians only, which factor brands the Palestinians as outsiders - a fact reflected in some of the meanings of the term *baljik/iyyin* and in the absence of any corresponding term to label East Jordanians by the Palestinians;¹⁸ and (c) a high degree of informal institutional support through the media, popular culture, patronage by the highest strata of society and officialdom and, indirectly, through association with the symbols of power in the state, mainly the military, the police and the security services.

Considering these disparities in ethnolinguistic vitality perceptions between the two sets of varieties in relation to male speech, we may now proceed to describe code-switching to the bedouin variety by

Palestinian males in Jordan as a case of accommodationist convergence. More specifically, upward convergence because of the "value and status connotations" (Giles, Bourhis and Taylor, 1977:322) associated with the target variety. This type of convergence is indicative of the unequal power distribution between the two ethnicities, which in socio-psychological terms means that male Palestinians are the ones who are traditionally desirous of seeking the approval of East Jordanians, and not vice versa. It may even be possible to suggest that this convergence both *confirms* and *reinforces* the status quo with respect to the unequal power distribution between the two communities. The fact that East Jordanian males hardly, if ever, code-switch to Palestinian varieties is highly significant in this regard.

To gain an enhanced understanding of male code-switching in Jordan an attempt will be made below to utilise the notions "linguistic capital" and "linguistic market" which are at the very heart of Bourdieu's work on language and symbolic power (1992). Broadly speaking, Bourdieu puts forward the view that the value of a given linguistic product is determined by the linguistic market at which it is to be exchanged. Therefore, anticipatory awareness of the value which the linguistic market is likely to assign to given linguistic products endows the speakers, albeit not uniformly, with the ability to select from their own linguistic repertoire which product to deploy on which occasion for maximum profit, materially or symbolically. From this Bourdieu then draws one of the most interesting conclusions of his research, that of 'euphemised' speech which boils down to saying that self-censorship is the norm rather than the exception in human communication by means of language.

Applying this framework to bedouin variety code-switching by Palestinian male speakers, we can now go beyond the accommodationist view in which explanations of status, approval and social or ethnic mobility are given as primary motivations. To begin with, we can now look at code-switching as an attempt at obtaining a better rate, in material or symbolic terms, for one's acts of speech in what can never be a completely fixed cultural commodities market. Bourdieu's view is therefore applicable to code-switching at times when the intergroup relations are characterised by low levels of tension and threat, as well as at other times when more pressing considerations start to impose themselves. It further explains why the heavily stigmatised rural Palestinian dialect is hardly tendered in the linguistic

market, now as in the period immediately following the 1970-71 events when the rural Palestinian dialect was the object of repressive self-censorship. The combined effect of the social and ethnic pressures on the rural Palestinian dialect meant that it quickly plummeted in value, leading to what may be called 'heavy linguistic selling' on the cultural commodities market. Bourdieu's explanation is also helpful in trying to understand the code-switching in the direction of the urban Palestinian variety on the part of female East Jordanian speakers. In particular, it can allow us to put forward the view that since the female domain in patriarchal societies is not traditionally the site of political and ethnic contestation, in the narrow sense of the term 'political', it follows that the social values of the market are the primary motivating factor behind female code-switching, although the ethnic connotations of intergroup relations are never totally absent from the background situation. Finally, the idea of a cultural commodities market is interesting because it enables us, at least metaphorically, to accept the possibility of 'sharp swings' in the value of linguistic products as happened in Jordan in the wake of the 1970-71 events. The same idea is also interesting because of the transactional nature of the market which creates room for negotiation, ethnically and socially, through the deployment of sociolinguistic capital.¹⁹

In terms of this analysis, male and, particularly, female code-switching in Jordan may be seen as part of a universal phenomenon which obtains in various forms and in different cultural settings. However, female code-switching on the part of East Jordanian women as a case of upward social convergence calls for further comment, especially as it moves in the opposite ethnic direction in comparison with male code-switching. The traditional explanation for this often adduces as the motivating factor women's heightened awareness of social prestige values in society, i.e. their being more prestige conscious than men (Ibrahim, 1986; El-Essawi, 1999). While this may be true, it is not in our view a sufficient explanation because it implies, but leaves unexplained, the existence of two parallel linguistic markets in society, each with its own internal linguistic rates, which are then regulated by the equivalent of the foreign exchange in world economies. In other words, what is lacking in the above explanation is the ability to pinpoint what makes it acceptable for the female linguistic market to have its own autonomous existence in a patriarchal linguistic economy. Our answer to this lies in the marginality of this parallel female linguistic market in patriarchy. This effectively means that the

upward convergence in East Jordanian female speech is regarded as a less valuable commodity in the overall linguistic economy than the corresponding phenomenon in Palestinian male speech. As a result the unequal distribution of power between the two ethnicities remains unchanged, in spite of the two-way ethnic movement in code-switching.

Bourdieu's view that self-censorship or 'euphemised' speech is the norm in linguistic behaviour is interesting because it allows us to explain with greater descriptive economy the targeted nature of code-switching in Jordan. Under this approach, code-switching emerges as one way of speaking among many others on which different factors operate, for example formality versus informality, politeness versus impoliteness, sincerity versus insincerity, etc. In other words, *code-switching in Jordan now turns out to be not an aberration, but a most blatant normality*. It is a style of speaking among other styles which speakers have at their disposal. However, a full understanding of this style would always require relating it to its ethnicity as a motivating source.

Finally, the notion of 'euphemised' speech or self-censorship provides a conceptual bridge which enables us to link the linguistic to the meta-linguistic in studies of the language situation in Jordan. In particular it enables us to understand the reasons behind the statements denying that nationality or ethnicity are operative factors in motivating code-switching. Hence the contradiction in some of these studies between the open statements of denying that nationality/ethnicity is a factor and the internally provided empirical evidence which says it is or, at least, could be (Suleiman, 1993). As practised in these studies censorship is not imposed from above through the coercive activities of the institutional agencies of the state, but from within in recognition of the fact that the price of meta-linguistic assertion that nationality/ethnicity does matter in code-switching may be too high to pay. In this connection, it may even be judged that the present study itself suffers from the effects of self-censorship, conscious or unconscious, owing to the Palestinian ethnicity and Jordanian citizenship of its author.

Let us now consider Palestinian code-switching in Jordan from the viewpoint of the formation of the nation-state in the Middle East. In this context, it may be said that Jordan shares with other Arab countries many of the same processes of nation-state building that have been observed to apply in various parts of the post-colonial world. However,

at the time of its creation Jordan did not share with other Arab countries in its most immediate geographical, political and cultural sphere the possession of significant urban spaces which normally act as the centres of socio-economic pull and cultural diffusion. Put differently, during this period Jordan did not have the equivalent of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut or Jerusalem. It was not until after the annexation of the West Bank by King Abdullah in the wake of the creation of Israel in 1948 that Jordan acquired urban spaces of any historical depth and cultural influence, although this situation began to change very quickly with the rise of Amman as the political, economic and financial capital of the newly expanded kingdom. This process gathered pace after the loss of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, the acceleration of urbanisation as a regional phenomenon and the influx of new populations as a result of extra-territorial political conflicts in the region, notably the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As a result, over the last fifty years the city of Amman grew from a small town of perhaps less than fifty thousand inhabitants to a large city of approximately two million people towards the end of the twentieth century. The same may be said with even greater applicability about all the major urban centres in Jordan during the same period. These features of the political history of Jordan as a new nation-state are of the utmost importance in developing a proper understanding of the sociolinguistic dynamics in the country.

To begin with the nation-state formation perspective on the language situation in Jordan can explain the discrepancy in the sociolinguistic value of the dialectal variant [g] in what is historically the same speech community on both sides of the Jordanian-Syrian border. Thus, while on the Syrian side of the border the bedouin variant [g] lags considerably behind urban [ʔ] in socio-political prestige in male speech, on the Jordanian side the opposite is true, in spite of the fact that the bedouin variant may be ascribed a high masculinity rating in both settings.²⁰ In our view this observation flies in the face of Abdel-Jawad's masculinity-based explanation. But why do Syrian and Jordanian citizens who are blood relatives and have been members of the same speech community until, to borrow a phrase, they became "victims of a map" (Al-Udhari, 1984) behave differently?

The answer, surely, must be sought in the dominant sociolinguistic norms in their cultural settings which, in turn, are moulded by their respective socio-political spaces. Whereas in Syria the major urban centres predated the formation of the state, in Jordan they did not. And

whereas in Syria the political elite who were active in the formation of the state came in the main from the indigenous urban centres with their emblematic [ʔ] speech, in Jordan they did not. In Jordan the political elite who were dominated by [g] speakers at the top, as they still are, could not be associated with rival dominant speech communities in urban centres in the country, simply because such centres did not exist in any meaningful sense until fairly recently. These facts help explain why in the one country, Syria, [ʔ] succeeded in *retaining* its socio-political prestige, while in the other, Jordan, [g] succeeded in *assuming* socio-political prestige in nation-state formation.

In Jordan the 1970-71 events and their political consequences accelerated this process of Jordanisation (cf. Sayigh 1991); they finally confirmed the status of [g] as an emblem of an increasingly East Jordanised nation-state in which others had to fit. Like the national anthem, the flag, stamps, currency, the national airline carrier, the army, border points, the red checkered *kuffiyah*, the singer Samira Tawfiq²¹ and the metaphorisation of the *mansaf* (rice and lamb dish) as a national speciality, [g] became an attribute of the nation-state and the projected national identity associated with it. Code-switching to [g] by male Palestinians thus became symbolic of the need to proclaim allegiance, belonging, loyalty and, ultimately, national identification especially whenever the background situation is characterised by high potency. This however leaves unexplained the reverse code-switching by East Jordanian females to urban Palestinian [ʔ]. But this is not a conceptual problem, since it is the male ethos and its values that are criterial in characterising nation-state formation in the Middle East. In effect, this boils down to saying that while female code-switching in Jordan is socially significant, it is however more or less bereft of any potent ethnic and political connotations, except perhaps for those East Jordanian women who, on the basis of an ideological commitment, decide to read it differently. In such cases, minimal code-switching to the urban Palestinian dialect is applied in speech, and only when the social, as opposed to the ethnic, parameters of the background setting are characterised by high potency.

3. Conclusion: A Plea for Revitalisation

In this paper we have considered, albeit very briefly in some areas, a number of issues relevant to the interaction between political conflict

and language in the Middle East, including the (a) deployment of lexical resources to express ideological agendas, (b) institution of policies of linguistic repression and discrimination to express inter-state antagonisms and intra-state linguistic hegemony, and (c) code-switching as a phenomenon of inter-ethnic conflict and as a reflex of nation-state formation. While the former two may be characteristic of inter-linguistic conflict as a reflex of political conflict, the last phenomenon may be regarded as a case of intra-linguistic conflict borne out of inter-ethnic conflict. In some cases, as in Lebanon in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the picture may be more complicated with inter-ethnic conflict being 'translated' into both inter-linguistic and intra-linguistic conflict. The extent to which this is actually the case would, however, have to await the results of empirical investigation.

Language is an important political resource, a *symbol* of power and a boundary setting device by means of which *fission* and *fusion* in group identification are signalled and maintained in a *relational* manner. The same applies to the dialects of the same language inter-ethnically in situations of political tension and threat, especially those that are, or may become, active at a heightened level. The language situation in Jordan answers to this general description owing to the fact that 'the nationhood of Jordan is especially problematic ... because of the circumstances of its creation and its special relationship with Palestine' (Layne 1994:21).²² Generally speaking, the unequal distribution of power in society often leads to the emergence of patterns of dominance and subordination. These in turn are reflected in the unequal distribution of the linguistic capital in society, with the result that patterns of code-switching and speech accommodation start to emerge and solidify in favour of the dominant group.

The linguistic situation in Jordan conforms to this general characterisation of the interaction between language and political conflict. However, it provides an interesting twist in our understanding of speech accommodation owing to the oppositional patterns in code-switching between males and females. Thus while Palestinian males code-switch to the bedouin variety, East Jordanian females code-switch in the opposite ethnic direction to the urban Palestinian variety. Although on the surface both types of code switching constitute instances of upward convergence, we have nevertheless tried to argue that female code-switching is less salient in inter-ethnic terms because of the social subordination of women in the dominant patriarchy. It is

as though by code-switching to the urban Palestinian variety East Jordanian women add their own gendered subordination to the marginality of the subordinate Palestinian ethnicity. Put differently, female code-switching in Jordan compounds the subordinate status of Palestinian ethnicity, rather than alleviate it, simply because the 'ethnic male' has a power advantage over the 'social female' in society.

In discussing these issues and in putting forward new interpretations of a well-studied phenomenon of the linguistic situation in Jordan we have tried to take advantage of interpretative frameworks which would be regarded as non-canonical in Arabic sociolinguistics. As was indicated in the introduction to this paper, this was a deliberate choice on our part. It is not borne out of perversion, but of frustration at the reluctance to espouse a widening of the disciplinary scope of what is a fascinating field of linguistic inquiry. Should this reluctance to espouse new, non-statistical horizons turn into resistance, there is no doubt that ossification would set in and act in favour of the accumulation of linguistic facts at the expense of the explanatory endeavour which will give them meaning applicable over a much wider and more interesting terrain. More specifically, for Arabic sociolinguistics to make a qualitative leap in our understanding of language in society, a determined effort should be made to combine the functional with the symbolic in this discipline instead of persisting with the predominant restrictive trend inherent in functional or correlational approaches. Hence our reference earlier in this paper to what we have called *symbolic sociolinguistics* as a new dimension necessary for the revitalisation of the study of the Arabic language in its social milieu.

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NOTES

- * The author of this paper is grateful to the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for a research grant which helped him carry out the preliminary research on which this paper is based.
- 1 See Cohen and Kliot (1992) for an interesting discussion of the Israeli ideology of place-names in the Occupied Territories. This paper is very interesting for the range of terms the authors deploy to refer to the Occupied Territories which they refer to as the "Administered Territories" in the title.
- 2 See note 1 above and the following note.
- 3 The battle over place-names in the Occupied Territories, especially in the context of Israel's plans (in 1998) to build a settlement on Jabal Abu Ghneim in Palestinian occupied land, has been commented on in the British press. In an article in the *Church Times* (20 March 1998) Stephen Sizer reminds readers of the political significance of names in the battle over Jerusalem and the surrounding areas: "When Jabal Abu Ghneim becomes Har Homa in the Israeli consciousness, it will ... become part of the [Israelis'] inheritance, to be defended at all costs. And the world will forget Jabal Abu Ghneim soon enough." It is ironic that the same issue of *Church Times* seems to exemplify the beginning of this process in the Western media. Reporting on Robin Cook's (British Foreign Secretary) controversial visit to Jabal Abu Ghneim in March 1998, Gerald Butt, a well-respected Middle East journalist and author of a book on the Arabs (1994), refers to the site and the proposed settlement on it six times: three times as Jabal Abu Ghneim, and three times as Har Homa, in the following order: 1. "Mr Cook underlined the European Union [of which Britain was President at the time] view by visiting *Har Homa*, a controversial new Jewish construction project in Arab East Jerusalem"; 2. "Mr Cook insisted on visiting *Har Homa* - or *Jabal Abu Ghneim*, as it is called by the Palestinians ..."; 3. "[British] Foreign Office officials said they were satisfied that the visit to *Jabal Abu Ghneim/Har Homa* went ahead despite Israeli opposition"; and 4. "Harry Hagopian of the Middle East Council of Churches said that he welcomed the opportunity taken by Mr Cook to acquaint himself with the demographic realities of *Jabal Abu Ghneim*" (emphasis ours). A careful analysis

of these references would show that the name Har Homa has greater legitimacy in Butti's article than Jabal Abu Ghneim. This conclusion is based on the following considerations: (a) Har Homa is the first name for the site in the article, thus giving it greater prominence in textual terms; (b) although the article closes with the name "Jabal Abu Ghneim" in extract (4) above, this does not counter balance the prominence of Har Homa in (a), owing to the fact that the author of this term is a Mr Hagopian, not Butti himself; (c) extract (3) casts doubt on the legitimacy of the term 'Jabal Abu Ghneim' by, first, appending it to Har Homa and, secondly, by weakening the legitimacy of this appendage through the qualifying comment "as it is called by the Palestinians"; and (d) by referring to Har Homa as "a controversial new Jewish construction project" rather than as a proposed illegal settlement, thus reflecting its true status under International Law, Butti provides an exegesis which favours this term and the Israeli claim over the site.

Evidence of the success of the Israeli naming strategy at the highest level may be derived from the following. On 22 March 1998 the author of this paper wrote to Mr Cook (British Foreign Secretary) to express his support and that of between 70-80 signatories for the courage he had shown in visiting the site and highlighting the illegality of settlements on occupied Palestinian land. The term Jabal Abu Ghneim was used throughout the letter. On 2 April 1998 the present author received a letter from a Foreign Office employee, with a Muslim name, on behalf of Mr Cook. In it the term Jabal Abu Ghneim is not used once. Instead the term Har Homa was used throughout (four times).

Commenting on the same issue Robert Fisk, who is probably the best expert on the Middle East in the British media, wrote an article in *The Independent* (10 June 1998) warning against the distorting effect names have on constructing a proper understanding of the Middle East conflict. In this article ("*US media mirror distorts Middle East*") he explains how the use of the labels 'disputed territories' and 'neighbourhoods' to refer to the 'occupied territories' and 'settlements' respectively in the American media reflects an Israeli naming strategy which may, one day, make it incomprehensible to the American public how "a 'dispute' over 'neighbourhoods' [in historical Palestine] is turning into a war".

- 4 Although Venuti focuses on literature in translation, his ideas can be applied elsewhere in translation studies without any significant loss of relevance.
- 5 Little is known in the literature about the position of Arabic in Turkey, although a study of this topic may yield highly significant results from a sociolinguistic point of view.
- 6 Rudin and Eminov explain the extensive nature of the anti-Turkish policy in Bulgaria as follows: "By January 1985 the entire question of Turkish language instruction became moot since the Bulgarian government officially declared that there was no longer any Turks in Bulgaria. Between the end of 1984 and November 1989 the government took additional steps against the use of Turkish language by prohibiting its use in public places. The bilingual thrice-weekly paper *Yeni Isik* and the bilingual monthly *Yeni Hayat* began to appear in Bulgarian only. Turkish-language pages of regional newspapers in areas with large Turkish concentrations were eliminated. The Turkish-language broadcasts on Radio Sofia ceased. Orders were issued to responsible authorities to implement and enforce decrees against the speaking of Turkish in public places and against the use of Turkish names in places of work" (1990:151).
- 7 Code-switching throughout this paper refers to dialectal shifts by young and middle aged speakers. Generally speaking, older speakers show little ethnically (for males) and socially (for females) motivated code-switching.
- 8 The term 'patriarchy' is used in a loose sense here to describe general patterns of a particular type of social structure and their consequences in human behaviour. We are of course aware that these patterns are not static or uniform throughout the Arab world.
- 9 It may however be argued that the two explanations by Abdel-Jawad and the present author are, in the final analysis, synonymous. The way to showing this would be to point to the significant attitudinal correlations which link masculinity, the bedouin dialect and the ethnic status of the speaker as East Jordanian together into one cultural bundle whose counterpart consists of femininity, the urban dialect and the ethnic status of the speaker as Palestinian. Although this analysis does not give priority to gender over ethnicity as a factor in code-switching, it is in our view still defective because it fails to explain the overwhelming importance of ethnicity in motivating the code shifts described above.

¹⁰ Abdel-Jawad writes: "... in this study nationality will not be considered because we are taking our informants from one country, namely Jordan. The origin of the speaker [as a social variable] is taken to mean his cultural/social background [i.e. whether he is of urban, rural or bedouin origin]." (in Suleiman 1993:7). This point will be dealt with later in this paper.

¹¹ It may be argued that the facts of markedness are descriptive artefacts which have little reality in language. That this is not the case is clear from empirical studies on genderless languages whose speakers can classify inanimate objects into masculine and feminine with significant regularity. (cf. Cameron 1992, in Simon 1996). Braun's Paper (1999) provides further evidence in support of this view in relation to Turkish. In this language the absence of overt or structurally significant gender is counterbalanced by the existence of covert gender distinctions.

¹² For two interesting, if controversial, studies of this topic in relation to Arabic the reader may refer to Abū Risha 1996 and Al-Ghadhdhāmi 1997.

¹³ Members of the dominant group elite are active participants in the production of the dominant culture which, according to Ben-Rafael, "consists of a set of values, norms, beliefs, and images that: (1) are characteristic of, and diffused by, the political centre as the ground of societal integration; (2) legitimise the social order by attaching supposedly socially shared meanings to patterns of behaviour models of structures, determining the essence of communication practices within society; [and], (3) involve coercion, and relate to power interests embedded in the setting's divisions" (1994:15-16).

¹⁴ The fact that female code-switching proceeds in the opposite direction is an interesting phenomenon to which we will return later.

¹⁵ Turner and Brown (in Giles, Bourhis and Taylor 1977:320) suggest that two factors contribute to the negotiation of intergroup social identities, which may have an important bearing on the occurrence and ethnic directionality of code-switching in Jordan: "The perceived stability-instability and legitimacy-illegitimacy of the existing intergroup situation. Perceived stability-instability refers to the extent to which individuals believe that their group's position in the status hierarchy can be changed or even reversed. Perceived legitimacy-illegitimacy refers to the extent to which individuals

construe their group's position in the status hierarchy to be fair and just." Approached from the perspective of the subordinate group, the linguistic situation in Jordan may be said to be characterised by a degree of flexibility, as it seems to be underpinned by perceptions veering towards stability and (il)legitimacy at one and the same time. This is reflected in the resort to the bedouin variety by Palestinian males in conditions where the background situation is judged to have "high potency", for example in public settings or where identification with the dominant group is foregrounded to respond to personal needs or the demands of the "immediate situation" (see Herman 1972 for a general discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this kind of situation). This in turn explains why members of the subordinate group may return to their indigenous varieties when the background situation and related factors are judged to have low potency, as on private occasions to express ingroup solidarity. The present author, as participant observer, witnessed on many occasions how Palestinian males, even high-ranking officials of the state, sometimes discard the use of the bedouin variety in favour of their indigenous ethnic speech style or a modified version of it to express their in-group solidarity on occasions when the interlocutor is judged to be of Palestinian origin on the basis of his ethnic speech style. And since there is no reason to believe that members of the dominant group are not aware of this situation, it would be reasonable to advance the view that intergroup relations in Jordan are, in principle, characterised by a degree of tension and uncertainty, thus contributing to the continued significance of speech variety as a signal of in-group membership. On one occasion the President of a university in Jordan started a meeting with the present author by using the [g] variant of (q), but he soon shifted to the [ʔ] variant when he realised that his interlocutor was not a [g] speaker.

¹⁶ According to Giles, Bourhis and Taylor a group's vitality is influenced by a set of structural variables: status variables, including the groups economic wealth, social status, socio-economic prestige and language status; demographic variables, including population numbers and distribution, birth rate, mixed marriages, immigration and emigration rates; and, institutional support variables which cover the representation of the language in the various institutions of the country. The last variable does not

fully apply to the situation in Jordan, at least in the formal domain of language use, because it involves the dialects of one and the same language in a diglossic language situation.

- 17 To the best of my knowledge the only two studies of ethnolinguistic vitality in relation to Arabic in the Middle East (excluding North Africa) are by Kraemer and Olshain (1989) and Kraemer (1992).
- 18 Some of the reasons given to explain why the Palestinians were called *baljik/yyin* in Jordan in the wake of the 1970-71 events reflect their status as "outsiders". The following are some of these explanations as given by Lalor (1997): 1) "*baljik* is derived from the acronym *bā, lām, jīm* (BLJ), in turn derived from the Arabic *min barra li-juwwa*, meaning 'from outside to inside', reflecting the fact that the 'Palestinians are not originally from the region and came from places like Bosnia, Crete and Belgium'; 2) "*baljik* is a corruption of Bolshevik"; and 3) "Baljikā (Belgium) was the country most foreign to [East Jordanians]. They were familiar with the British and the Americans and *baljik* best expressed their antipathy towards the Palestinians...".
- 19 In this connection we may observe how the present Syrian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Fārūq Al-Shar') who come from this border area and, therefore, are indigenous users of [g] code-switch to urban [ʔ]. Had the colonialist map made them East Jordanians, this code-switch is very unlikely to have taken place in their speech.
- 20 See footnote 15 above for an example of this transactional element in code-switching.
- 21 Samira Tawfiq is a Lebanese singer whose name is synonymous with what is called *al-ʔughniya al-ʔurduniyya* (Jordanian song). In the 1960's she was hired by the Jordanian Broadcasting Authority to sing in the local Jordanian (bedouin) dialect. In a recent interview (first half of 1998) on the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), she talked about the training in the local dialect she received and how this was intended to give her songs an air of East Jordanian authenticity.
- 22 In her fascinating study of the dialogics of tribal and national identities in Jordan, Linda Layne writes that the concepts of 'Jordanian' and 'Palestinian' are not only ambiguous in terms of personal identity but in terms of national identity as well" (1994:20). She further writes that "Bedouin tribes have come to

symbolise Jordan's national identity in contradistinction to Palestine's traditionally more settled population and hence the tribal character of Jordan is often used to accentuate the autonomy of the two nations" (ibid.:27). In another place in her book Layne states how the Jordanian "self" is situated in relation to the Palestinian "other" (p. 26)

CHAPTER TWO

WHY DO DIFFERENT VARIABLES BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY?
DATA FROM ARABIC

Enam Al-Wer

Introduction

This article addresses the issue of the linguistic and social correlates of sound diffusion with reference to the variables (q), (θ), (ð) and (ɖ) in the speech of Jordanian women within the framework of the quantitative variationist approach. It begins with a review of the historical events which have determined the demographic and sociopolitical constitution of Jordan. The linguistic data indicate that the interdental variables exhibit the largest amount of variation, probably symptomatic of change in the direction of the stop variants. The linguistic properties of the sounds involved and local identity are principal considerations in the interpretation of the variables' behaviour. If the variation attested manifests itself in actual linguistic changes, the emerging mix represents features of a 'new dialect' which is emerging as a result of contact between indigenous Jordanian varieties and urban Palestinian varieties; the new combination of features is not present in any of the dialects in the original mix, nor is it attested in any other existing variety in the region.

In sociolinguistic studies, it is the norm not the exception that different variables behave differently. The differences can show in the way the variables *pattern* (cf. Labov's well-known distinction between markers and indicators, Labov 1972), or in the *amount* of variation, which is often considered to be symptomatic of how advanced the change is, i.e. the more tokens of the new variant there are the more advanced the change is. If we further ask the question of *why* it is that certain features are ahead of others in the course of language change we stumble upon the *actuation problem* (Weinreich, Labov & Herzog

1968). A plausible answer to this intriguing question is likely to be based on interplay between social factors (the social correlates of linguistic features) and linguistic factors (e.g. the phonetic and phonological properties of the sounds involved).

In pursuit of this issue, I shall put forward proposals which utilise Labov's observation regarding speakers' degree of consciousness of changes and the Milroys' remarks about the effect of the network pressure. The data presented in this article come from empirical research carried out in 1987 in the Jordanian provincial towns of Sult, Ajloun and Karak,¹ on a sample of 116 women (all of whom are of indigenous Jordanian origin) (for more details, see Al-Wer 1991). Four phonological variables have been investigated. These are: (q)² : [g] and [ʔ], as in [ga:l] vs [ʔa:l] "to say"; (θ) : [θ] and [t], as in [θa:ni] vs [ta:ni] "second"; (ð) : [ð] and [D], as in [ðal] vs [Dal] "to remain"; (ɖ) : [ɖ] and [ʒ], as in [(ɖ)ʒa:r] vs [ʒa:r] "neighbour". The variants [g], [θ], [ð] and [ɖ] are characteristic of the local indigenous varieties while [ʔ], [t], [D] and [ʒ] are the innovative variants characteristic of urban Palestinian (and generally urban Levantine) varieties. Below is a sketch of the major sociopolitical events which have affected Jordan over the past 50 years and have had considerable sociolinguistic repercussions.

Background

We start from the premise that a community's sociolinguistic situation is never static. Social, political and economic developments bring about changes in its language pattern. For language researchers, this convention dictates a thorough recognition of the evolution of the social meaning associated with the use of various linguistic features.

The socio-political and demographic shape of Jordan since its establishment as an independent monarchy in 1946 has been largely determined by the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1948 and 1967. For a comprehensive understanding of linguistic variation in the Jordanian community at the present time, it is crucial, therefore, to analyse the linguistic repercussions of these historical developments as well as the political decisions taken since then.

The war of 1948 resulted in the displacement of half a million Palestinians, most of whom sought refuge in Jordan, and the incorporation of the West Bank into the Jordanian Kingdom, thus changing the western borders of the country and trebling the

population, from 500,000 to 1.4 million. The 1967 war caused further economic devastation, an influx of 250,000 more refugees, and the loss of the West Bank. The population of Jordan, excluding the West Bank, increased by more than two million between 1947 and 1979, from 0.5 million to 2.13 million (Department of Statistics 1986).

Dismayed by the loss of their homeland, and the failure of the international community to pressurise Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian territories, the Palestinians militarised their commando movement (later known as The Palestine Liberation Organisation, the PLO) which was initially supported by the Jordanian government and a significant proportion of the population. Gradually, however, the relations between the movement and the state deteriorated, which eventually led to a short but bloody confrontation in September 1970, and resulted in the expulsion of the Palestinian movement from the country. Most importantly, this confrontation also resulted in tension between the Palestinians and those who claimed an indigenous Jordanian origin. As we shall explain later, the perceived long-term impact of this confrontation may have been the cause of a number of strategies adopted at the State level, and which have had a significant sociolinguistic impact.

In July 1989, Jordan renounced its sovereignty over the West Bank, thus reemphasising the status of the PLO, as opposed to the Jordanian State, as the sole representative of the Palestinians. This development may be seen as a political decision which stemmed, in part, from a growing awareness of separate Jordanian and Palestinian identities.

The repercussions of the events outlined above give rise to two major considerations for a sociolinguistic investigation: (i) the role of ethnic identity, and (ii) gender differentiation (as will be explained presently).

The Role of Identity and Gender

The largest Palestinian community in the Arab World is concentrated in Jordan (an estimated 1.1 million in 1987). The political status of the Palestinian war refugees in Jordan also differs from that in the other Arab countries in that they have full Jordanian citizenship including the right to vote and stand for parliamentary elections, which is not the case in the other Arab countries. It should also be emphasised in this context that not all the Palestinian Jordanians are war refugees. A

number of mainly bourgeois urban families have lived in the country since the early years of its establishment, and have enjoyed considerable economic and political power. This is also true of a number of Syrian families.³

The Palestinians in Jordan, the majority of whom settled in urban centres (particularly the Amman-Zarqa area), gradually came to play a major role in shaping and defining the modernisation of the country. Compared with the local population during the 1950's and 1960's, they were better trained to take over business and public sector jobs. These dominant economic and political roles, unsurprisingly, led to the rapid spread of urban Palestinian linguistic features, reinforcing the general perception of urban Levantine varieties as being socially dominant (and more prestigious than the local Jordanian dialects). It is interesting to notice that this has not happened in Lebanon or Syria, where on the whole the Palestinians assimilated to the linguistic norms of the host communities (which were already highly urbanised, with a relatively well-trained and educated indigenous population).

Indigenous Jordanian women responded to the urban prestige norms considerably more than men. It is not clear why women and men responded in different ways but the following analysis, based on the responses provided by the speakers, is plausible. For indigenous Jordanian women, urban Palestinian women represented 'finesse'; they appeared liberated and modern, and were better educated, and hence the way these women spoke also appeared attractive. Although men were also attracted by finesse, elegance and modernity, they would not attempt to emulate them since these are perceived as feminine qualities. As indigenous women increasingly adopted urban linguistic features, these features became associated with female speech, to the extent that the indigenous Jordanian features became perceived as 'tough' and more appropriate for men, while the urban Palestinian features became perceived as 'soft' and therefore more appropriate for women.

During the late 1960's and 1970's, the modernisation process assumed the dimension of a major socio-political transformation which affected the respective roles of the Jordanian and the Palestinian populations in general, and their relations in the urban context in particular. This change can be briefly described as a strategy, albeit undeclared, on the part of the State to include the indigenous population in the modernisation of Jordan.⁴

In the aftermath of the 1970 conflict, which was largely perceived as a conflict between Jordanians and Palestinians and which caused

considerable tension in their relations, it became obvious that the viability of the social and political identity of Jordan depended on the inclusion of the indigenous social groups in development and economic growth, particularly in the civil service sector (also see Sayigh, 1991). Following Jordan's recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, the nationalist movement voiced demands for a larger share of appointments on the grounds that if the PLO represents the Palestinians, Jordan should be a state for the Jordanians. Consequently, during the decade following 1974, indigenous Jordanians increasingly occupied a greater proportion of the posts in the bureaucracy and services.

This process, inevitably, enhanced different feelings of identity, and may have exacerbated the community perception of a Palestinian threat. An urbanised indigenous Jordanian population developed and proceeded to reinstate its own cultural identity in the urban context. Subsequently, this group also assumed a firmer and more secure social and political status, which resulted in a general awareness of Jordanian identity and adherence to local norms of social behaviour, including linguistic norms.

Informally, one observes that the members of the community who were included in the modernisation process and who have assumed political and economic power are those who most conservatively adhere to the local norm of speech. Besides symbolising a Jordanian as opposed to Palestinian identity, the local Jordanian linguistic features also became a symbol of people in power, particularly men.

Women were excluded from the modernisation process, as confirmed by the figures for their participation in the labour force: 7.7% in 1979, with a modest rise to 10.2% in 1982, and to 12.5% in 1985 (Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development 1986-1990). With regard to sectoral distribution, the proportion of working women is highest in the financial and social services, and minimal in senior management, politics, and planning and decision-making. Having been largely excluded from the socio-political developments outlined thus far, women were also excluded from the sociolinguistic repercussions of these developments, thus reinforcing the gender distinctions between urban Palestinian phonological features, as being more appropriate for women, and indigenous Jordanian features, as being more appropriate for men. This leads to a rather interesting situation where features originally associated with rural uneducated speakers have become prestigious for men, whereas for women,

features originally associated with the urban Levantine and urban Palestinian norm are regarded as prestigious and the indigenous varieties continue to be stigmatised.

Despite the sharp gender differentiation observed in Jordan's urban centres, we caution against the polarisation of speakers' linguistic behaviour according to their gender only. The failure to incorporate an ethnolinguistic dimension would entail that language change is always skewed in one of two opposing directions only: a non-local norm in the case of women, and a local norm in the case of men. This would also preclude an adequate account of the speech of a sizable majority of the population (urban Palestinian men, and indigenous Jordanian women), since these groups largely behave in a fashion which is contrary to a pattern based solely on gender.

The combination of gender and local identity as primary factors exerting pressure on women's as well as on men's linguistic behaviour can be represented as in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Convergent and conflicting pressures according to
gender and ethnic identity




Figure 1 is interpreted in the following way: in the case of the group marked PW (Urban Palestinian women) the two types of pressure (gender and ethnicity) pull in the same direction, that of an urban Palestinian norm; in the case of the group marked JM (Jordanian men (of indigenous Jordanian origin)) the two types of pressure also pull in


the same direction, in this case in the direction of an indigenous Jordanian norm; the two remaining groups, however, are under two types of pressure that are pulling in opposite directions: for PM (urban Palestinian men) gender pulls in the direction of an indigenous norm, while ethnicity pulls in the direction of an urban Palestinian norm; for JW (indigenous Jordanian women), gender pulls in the direction of an urban Palestinian norm while ethnicity pulls in the direction of an indigenous norm. One may envisage that the two groups under conflicting pressure would exhibit the greatest amount of variation in their speech.

In fact we have available some data which can be construed in this manner, that of Abdel-Jawad (1986). Most significantly, in this study we notice that urban Palestinian women consistently use the variant [ʔ] of the variable (q) (a stereotypical feature of most urban Palestinian varieties), whereas men from the same group vacillate between the variant [g] of (q) (a stereotypical feature of indigenous Jordanian varieties), as well as the expected variant [ʔ] of (q) (cf. Abdel-Jawad, 1986).

The Data and Discussion

The data represented in Figure 2 below is based on empirical research conducted in the Jordanian towns of Sult, Ajloun and Karak. Figure 2 shows the relative frequency of the occurrence of the local and the non-local (innovative) variants. The different amount of variation shown here is the subject of my discussion below.

Figure 2: Relative frequency of local variants



In comparison with the rest of the variables, we observe a relatively high degree of maintenance of the local feature [g]. The use of the non-local variant [ʔ] in our sample was restricted to a small minority of speakers (10 out of 116 women) six of whom used [ʔ] consistently. In Jordan, as well as in many other Arabic-speaking communities, variants of (q) are used as labels to identify dialects; speakers are

stereotyped as belonging to one or another ethnic group depending on which variant of (q) they use, whereas none of the other variables investigated are used in this manner. In addition to ethnic background, the use of [g] and [ʔ] in Jordan strongly correlate with the sex of the speaker as has been confirmed by previous research, e.g. Abdel-Jawad (1981: 264-266) whose data from Amman show that [ʔ] predominantly occurs in the speech of women whereas [g] occurs most frequently in the speech of men (see also Sallam 1980 and Suleiman 1985). Our speakers also unanimously evaluate [ʔ] as 'more appropriate' for women because it is 'softer', whereas [g] is evaluated as 'tough', 'appropriate for men', and a 'symbol of local and indigenous Jordanian identity'. The adoption of [ʔ] at the expense of [g] is also considered 'ostentatious'. In the Labovian sense, (q) is a classic stereotype, marked by an extremely high degree of salience in that speakers are particularly aware of the use of one or another of its variants.


In his discussion of the diffusion of linguistic innovations as a result of contact, Trudgill (1986:39-57) examines the diffusion of a number of features from London into East Anglia and concludes that salient features diffuse more quickly than others.⁵ Based on this, the variant [g] in our female sample would be the least likely to be maintained, which is the exact opposite of the pattern shown by my data. One type of pressure which influences the behaviour of the speakers' here is represented by the values associated with [g]: a 'male' feature, 'tough', 'unurbanised'; [g] is also localised in the Levant region, with which Jordan identifies itself geographically and culturally. This indicates pressure to conform to a gender identity (or perhaps a 'supra-local identity', L. Milroy 1992), which would push in the direction of [ʔ] rather than [g]. Recall, however, that [g] and [ʔ] in the communities under investigation also carry identity connotations: [g] symbolises local and indigenous Jordanian identity in opposition to non-local and Palestinian identity. This is another type of pressure which pushes in the direction of the local norm symbolised by the maintenance of [g]. These two types of pressure push in opposite directions. The pressure exerted by the local community is an important mechanism which enforces the maintenance of the local norm of speech, as shown by L. Milroy (1987), and Milroy & Milroy (1985). This is a crucial and a strong explanatory tool, but it falls short of explaining how this pressure can be selective, i.e. why the speakers conform to this pressure in the case of certain features but not others. In our data, while the majority of the speakers maintain local [g] they vary between local and

non-local for the rest of the variables. One way in which we can refine the observations in connection with speakers' awareness of their use of variables and the influence of the local community is to propose that the speakers' response to the community's pressure towards the maintenance of its local norm of speech correlates with the speakers' degree of awareness of the various variables. This entails that the variables of which the speakers are not particularly aware (less salient variables, or 'indicators' in Labov's terms) are more susceptible to modification in the context of the local community. This is a 'strategy' followed by the majority of our speakers, which can be viewed as a way of reconciling the two opposing types of pressure. The speakers who maintained [g] but varied between the local and non-local variants for the other variables seemed unaware of the occurrence of non-local features in their speech. As an example, notice the following comment by one of the speakers who used [g] consistently: [bityi: bilha yo: mɛ: n tala: tɛ bti: ʒaʕ tifi ki ʔa: lu ʔu: lna] 'she leaves for two or three days and comes back speaking with [ʔ]'. Interestingly this speaker uses the non-local features [t] (of (θ)) and [ʒ] (of (ɖʒ)) even in this comment which was meant as a criticism of women who abandon the local dialect. As far as this speaker was concerned, 'the feature which symbolised the local dialect was [g] but not [θ] or [ɖʒ]'. However, as mentioned above, some speakers (albeit a minority) did abandon local [g] in favour of [ʔ] and most of these speakers used [ʔ] consistently while alternating between local and non-local features of (θ), (ɛ) and (ɖʒ). If we interpret the behaviour of these women as projecting an identity which gives predominance to gender (and possibly supra-localism and modernism) the alternation attested in their speech in the cases of (θ), (ɛ) and (ɖʒ) also suggests that they are most aware of the use of [ʔ] versus [g].

Variable (ɖʒ)

Figure 2 also shows a relatively low degree of occurrence of the non-local variant [ʒ]. The variable (ɖʒ) in Jordan is not particularly salient: it is never used to identify varieties, and rarely in imitation. Along the lines of Trudgill's criteria above, one can argue that the phonetic differences between its variants [ɖʒ] and [ʒ] are relatively small, in comparison with [ɖʒ] vs [g] in Egypt, and [ɖʒ] vs [j] in the Gulf. Nor are its variants involved in the maintenance of phonological contrasts: the replacement of [ɖʒ] by [ʒ] does not result in mergers, since [ʒ] does

Figure 3: Use of local features by adopters of the glottal stop



not exist as a separate phoneme (in contrast to /f/). A linguistic constraint which might limit the diffusion of [ʔ] in the speech of speakers of indigenous Jordanian varieties is represented by the fact that this sound does not exist in the phonetic inventory of these varieties. The adoption of [ʔ] (of the variable (q)), on the other hand, does not involve this complication since [ʔ] also occurs in most varieties of Arabic as an independent phoneme. Here we have an interesting opposition: a combination of high degree of salience and the motivation (or pressure) to express a local identity accounts for the high degree of the maintenance of the local feature [g], and in the case of (ɟ) low salience and the operation of linguistic constraints also result in a low degree of occurrence of the non-local feature [ʔ]. However, a crucial point to make here is that in spite of the statistical similarity between (q) and (ɟ) concerning the degree of use of the non-local variants, there is an important difference between the two cases: the use of [ʔ] is restricted to a small number of speakers most of whom (see above) used this variant consistently; in the case of (ɟ), however, while there are many speakers who consistently use the local variant [ɟ], there are none who use [ʔ] consistently; in this respect [ʔ] patterns in the same way as the non-local variants of the interdental variables, except that its use is less frequent. Furthermore, there is no simple correlation between adoption of [ʔ] and predominant use of [ʔ]. This is supported by Figure 3, which shows the linguistic behaviour with regard to the rest of the variables of the speakers who adopted [ʔ] consistently. The main point here is that these speakers, like the majority of the speakers, use [t], [D] and [ʔ] variably.

Interdental Variables (θ), (ð)

Variation in the use of the interdental variables (θ) and (ð) involves interdental [θ] and [ð] which are the local variants and their corresponding stop variants [t] and [D] respectively. The interdentals show the greatest amount of variation in our data. A change which involves the interdentals is, of course, not surprising: they are rare sounds in human languages, acquired late by children and are subject to loss or change in many languages (see, for instance, the merger of /θ/-/f/ in southern English varieties and the comments in this regard in Trudgill (1986:53-57)).

The alternation between interdental and stop has become commonplace amongst speakers of the indigenous varieties and of both sexes (though considerably more frequent in the speech of women, see Abdel-Jawad & Awwad 1989). It is also an alternation which seems to be relatively widely accepted, or has become so, on unscripted TV and radio broadcasts. Generally people have grown accustomed to this alternation and do not comment on it. As mentioned above, our speakers were unaware of this alternation, which indicates that the difference between interdental and stop is not salient. An obvious problem with this argument is its circularity: do speakers alternate between interdental and stop frequently because the difference is perceived as less salient, or is the low saliency a consequence of the frequency of this alternation? In order to break this vicious circle we need a definition of salience which is independent of sociolinguistic perceptions. One possibility is to consider the inherent phonetic properties of the sounds involved. In articulatory terms, there is a continuum between dental /t/ and /D/, and interdental /θ/ and /ð/, which essentially involves the degree of pressure of the tongue against the teeth, with corresponding degrees of frication or occlusion. Given that the spread of the stop sounds as variants of the interdentals in indigenous Jordanian varieties is a linguistic innovation, which principally resulted from contact with urban Palestinian varieties, it is instructive at this point to comment on the almost total absence from our data of the sibilant sounds [s] and [ʒ] as variants of (θ) and (ð) respectively, which are also found in the urban Palestinian varieties (as well as in the urban varieties of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, Garbell 1958, Schmidt 1974). Abdel-Jawad & Awwad (1989) also report that they are used by their Jordanian speakers although their occurrence is much less frequent than by Syrians and Egyptians. In other words, what

we have here are two sets of sounds, the stops and the sibilants, both of which are candidates for diffusion, with the stop sounds diffusing far more successfully than the sibilants⁶. In articulatory terms /θ/, /ð/ and /s/, /ʒ/ are distinguished by discrete differences in the position and shape of the tongue, and a high-frequency hiss is characteristic of the sibilant sounds. This means that the acoustic and articulatory properties of the interdentals, the stops and the sibilants suggest greater differences between the interdentals and the sibilants than between the interdentals and the stops. Greater phonetic differences between the variants involved contributes to greater awareness (cf. Chambers & Trudgill 1980, and Trudgill 1986). In addition to high degree of awareness, which, in this case, inhibits diffusion, an exceptionally strong stereotype of the sibilant variants as salient features of non-Jordanian dialects is also involved. Informally, one observes that speakers of Jordanian varieties often use the sibilant variants in imitating Syrian and Egyptian speakers (politicians, news readers). Cases of shunning features because of strong stereotyping are reported in situations of linguistic accommodation⁷, e.g. Trudgill (1986) comments on the non-accommodation on the part of speakers of English English varieties living in the USA to American /æ/ in words such as 'dance' and 'last'. He suggests that 'the vowel /æ/ in this lexical set is too salient an American feature. It is not adopted immediately because it sounds, and feels, too American. The stereotype is too strong' (Trudgill 1986:18). Similar comments are made with respect to speakers of northern English varieties living in the south of England, who, apparently 'would rather drop dead' than change the northern front pronunciation of /a/ in words such as 'dance' to a southern back vowel pronunciation [ɑ:ns] (Trudgill 1986:18). If the socio-psychological barrier that a certain feature is 'too stereotypical' of the speech of a different community can hinder its adoption in cases of accommodation in face-to-face interaction (and by speakers who are highly motivated to accommodate as in the cases reported by Trudgill), there is no reason why the same sort of barrier should not have similar effect in the case of diffusion of linguistic features. Notice that in the case we have at hand, we cannot rely on *loss of phonological contrast* (Trudgill 1986:13-21) to explain the low degree of diffusion of the sibilant sounds as variants of the interdentals since the speakers use a variant ([t]), which results in merger (since /t/ is also a separate phoneme) but not a variant ([ʒ]), which would maintain a split (since /ʒ/ does not occur as a separate phoneme). The variation (and possibly

the change) which involves the interdentals in Jordan seems to be a classic case of "merger spread at the expense of contrast", a phenomenon that is well-attested in many dialect contact situations (Labov, 1972), e.g. /f/ - /θ/ merger in East Anglia, /s/ - /z/ merger in Fronteiriço, and the merger before /r/ of /t/ and /d/ in Belfast (cited in Trudgill 1986).

Finally, the variable [ð] deserves particular attention separately from [θ]. An overview of the contemporary spoken varieties of Arabic reveals that there is no variety that recognises both /ð/ and /D/ as distinct phonemes. To the best of my knowledge, the only variety that has both sounds (in a written form) and maintains a phonological contrast between them is the written form of Classical Arabic. In general terms, the following distribution currently prevails: the major (but not all) varieties spoken in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iraq and Tunisia have the interdental /ð/ only; Moroccan and Algerian varieties have the stop sound, in addition to the sibilant /z/ which is used alternately with the stop sound in Egypt and the Sudan; in the Levant, Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian varieties can be divided into urban varieties, which have the stop and/or sibilant, and non-urban varieties, which have the interdental. In Jordan, the indigenous varieties only have the interdental sound. Thus the lexical set which includes /D/, and the lexical set which includes /ð/ in written Arabic, are both realised with /ð/. These varieties have come into contact with other Levantine varieties, most importantly the urban Palestinian varieties, which have the stop variant in both sets of lexical items.

The fact that the stop variant is a feature common to the varieties spoken in the culturally dominant urban centres in the Levant (Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem in particular), resulted in the *s* of the interdental sound. At the outset of the research, I had expected that [ð] would be the strongest candidate for abandonment, especially since it also lacks associations of local identity. However, contrary to my expectations, the data show statistical similarity in the maintenance of the local variants [θ] (approx 70%) and [ð] (approx 63%). One of the principal considerations in the line of interpretation followed in this paper is the recognition of the importance of linguistic constraints on variation. Bearing in mind that variation in the use of [θ] or [t] for native speakers of Jordanian Arabic principally involves alternation between sounds which already exist in the phonetic inventory, whereas the adoption of [D] would involve the learning of a whole new sound for the same speakers, I suggest that the higher than expected use of the

stigmatised variant [D] is principally related to this phonetic constraint. It is possible, that is, that while the speakers are aware of the stigma associated with the use of [ð], unless they are 'very careful', it is linguistically difficult for them to maintain a consistent use of the stop variant. The behaviour of [ʔ] adopters (Figure 3) with regard to this variable may be interpreted in these terms; these speakers consistently use [ʔ] while varying between [ð] and [D], a combination which is widely used by Jordanians as a subject of ridicule. Additionally, one observes that native speakers of Arabic dialects which have only the interdental variant quite often also read Classical Arabic /D/ as [ð]. In my supplementary data which consisted of recordings from various Arabic radio and television stations, and public speakers, a Jordanian speaker read all occurrences of /D/ as [ð]. The same was true of two politicians (an Iraqi and a Yemeni, whose native dialects also have the interdental variant only). My contention, therefore, is that the use of [ð] by these speakers, and the higher than anti-icipated occurrence of this variant is due to linguistic constraints beyond the speakers' control.

Conclusion

In the first part of this article the analysis emphasises the importance of understanding the complex way in which linguistic, social, political and economic factors interact in influencing patterns of linguistic variation. In particular, the interpretation of data from Jordan cannot (and should not) ignore the impact of the major political events which have determined the socio-political shape of Jordan ever since it existed as a separate state. The events on the other side of the River have caused a social upheaval in Jordan resulting in major demographic changes and the emergence and further manifestation of a local Jordanian identity. The novel aspect of this approach lies in recognising the evolution of the social meanings associated with the use of various linguistic forms. Features which were previously associated with an old-fashioned lifestyle and general ignorance have come to symbolise local Jordanian identity in opposition to features which have come to be perceived as alien, although characteristic of a generally prestigious Levantine norm (cf. Suleiman 1999). The failure to incorporate the repercussions of the Palestinian issue has inaccurately forced the Jordanian situation into a general model of sociolinguistic variation which seems to prevail in a number of other Arabic-speaking communities, namely that of the

urban/rural/Bedouin distinctions. In addition to neglecting the evolution of socio-linguistic correlations, the interpretation of sociolinguistic data in these terms conceals the significance of the notion of identity, and tacitly assumes a course of linguistic change in the direction of an urban norm. Although some of the data presented in this article can be construed in this way, the fallacy of this model is shown by the strong adherence of the majority of the speakers to the local variant [g] of the variable (q). A further crucial detail that studies on variation in Jordan need to incorporate in their analysis is the ethnolinguistic background of the speakers. The failure to do this would confuse linguistic features which are being maintained with features undergoing change. For instance, the occurrence of the stop and sibilant variants of the interdental variables in the speech of urban Palestinian women and men is not a linguistic innovation; rather, these speakers are simply maintaining features which are characteristic of their native dialects (cf. Abdel-Jawad and Awwad 1989).

More generally, the data presented here show that the expression of a local and ethnic identity by women through language strongly indicates the inadequacy of a model that simply relies on gender as the only parameter which influences the linguistic behaviour of women, and restricts connotations of identity to the interpretation of men's linguistic behaviour. A more sophisticated model is needed in order to accommodate the fact that speakers, regardless of their sex, reflect various identities in their linguistic behaviour.

The analyses of the phonological variables discussed in this article reveal considerable differences in the way speakers behave with regard to them: there is more variation in the use of local and non-local variants of the interdentals and, to a lesser extent, the variable (q) than in the case of the variable (q). In interpreting these differences, I have appealed principally to two notions: pressure by the local community as utilised by L. Milroy (1987) and Milroy & Milroy (1985), and the observations made by Labov (1972), Chambers & Trudgill (1980) and Trudgill (1986) concerning the different degrees of awareness associated with different variables. Allowing for the naturalness of certain changes as well as linguistic constraints, I have put forward the argument that there appears to be a correlation between the degree of pressure exerted by the local community, speakers' awareness of alternations, and diffusion of an innovative feature: the greater the awareness the stronger the pressure to maintain the local feature, thus resulting in limited diffusion of the non-local forms. The criteria

followed in determining variable salience are broadly in line with Trudgill (1986). However, in the absence of a definition of salience which is independent of sociolinguistic perceptions we have a problem of circularity in determining the degree of salience. One way of breaking the circle is to appeal to the phonetic and acoustic properties of the sounds involved, an approach which appears to give plausible results for the particular cases investigated here. This approach is not meant to preclude alternative approaches to the intriguing question of 'why is it that speakers adopt certain innovations but not others'?

Finally, on a more predictive level, if the patterns of variation obtained from my research manifest themselves as real linguistic changes in the future, the mixture of linguistic forms witnessed here point to a new dialect in the process of formation. As far as I am aware, no existing Arabic dialect in the region displays the combination of the features [g], [t], [D] and [ʒ].

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NOTES

- ¹ Sincere thanks for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this paper go to Peter Trudgill, Mike Jones and David Britain.
- ² All the symbols used are IPA except the following: [D] emphatic voiced interdental fricative, [D] emphatic voiced dental (or dental-alveolar) stop, and [ʒ] emphatic voiced alveolar fricative.
- ³ Jordan was the first country in the region to be declared an Arab State; it, therefore, became refuge for a number of Arab nationalists from other parts of the Levant, in addition to merchants and tradesmen.
- ⁴ This strategy is often referred to publicly, and by some analysts (see Sayigh 1991) as a "Jordanization process".
- ⁵ Trudgill's criteria in determining the salience of a variable (and thus degree of speakers' awareness) include: overt stigmatisation, involvement in linguistic change, radical phonetic differences between the variants involved, and involvement in the maintenance of phonological contrasts (Trudgill 1986:11; see also Chambers & Trudgill 1980).
- ⁶ The analysis proposed here does not preclude the possibility that the change to the stop and sibilant sounds may be chronologically ordered, i.e. that a change to the stop variants precedes a change to the sibilant sounds (in this regard and on the historical development of the sibilant variants see the discussion in Garbell 1958 and Cantineau 1960).

spoken Arabic are sensitive markers of demographic (e.g. age, gender, education and occupation) and socio-psychological (e.g. identity, attitude) differences in the villages, which have been undergoing drastic changes in all spheres of life as a result of socio-political changes. Two rival patterns emerged. The first and most obvious was an educationally-related change involving the replacement of village vernacular features by forms taken from Standard Arabic (Mitchell 1993; Suleiman 1999). This pattern, true of much of the Arabic-speaking world, concerns the spread of the variety that is being taught in schools and diffused by radio and television. Without at this point venturing to discuss whether this involves a major change in the traditional diglossia, we note that it is nonetheless a sensitive marker of changing identification. The second pattern we noted in these studies showed the existence of resistance to this trend, noticeable especially among younger men, which was marked by strong continued favouring of the vernacular variants. In the Barta'a study cited earlier, these variables differentiated clearly between Israeli and West Bank Palestinians, showing that each group was developing a variety of spoken language that reflected their particular socio-political situations and attitudes. In the current series of studies, we turn our attention from villages to a town, and from an Israeli to a purely West Bank population.

Compared to the villages we studied earlier, Bethlehem in fact presents a more complex sociolinguistic pattern. There is (especially among men) evidence of the same movement towards Standard Arabic as a result of education, with suggestions of resistance among some younger speakers. But, contrasting with this, we found strong evidence of a distinct trend, largely among women and Christians, towards adopting features from the prestigious urban dialect of Jerusalem (Mitchell 1993). These linguistic developments we attribute to the unique socio-political changes that took place in the town in the last century and especially after 1948.

While long a center of interest and pilgrimage for the outside Christian world because of its religious and historical connections, Bethlehem became a major Palestinian city only after 1948, when formerly prominent Arab cities like Jaffa and Haifa were incorporated in Israel and their remaining Arab populations became minorities. Jordan, which controlled Bethlehem and the rest of the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, was naturally interested in promoting the international religious status of the city in order to enhance relations

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIOLINGUISTIC REFLEXES OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PATTERNS IN BETHLEHEM: PRELIMINARY STUDIES

Muhammad Amara, Bernard Spolsky and Hanna Tushyeh

Introduction

This is the preliminary report on a series of studies of the sociolinguistic structure of the West Bank Palestinian town of Bethlehem that will also deal with related questions concerning the emerging language education policy of the Palestinian Authority.¹ In it, we provide a brief introduction outlining the socio-political pattern of the city. This reveals an ongoing transition from its earlier status as a mainly Christian village with international repute for its historical past into an important Palestinian city with a developing Muslim majority. Looking at the sociolinguistic reflexes of this pattern as demonstrated especially in some changes in the phonology of the vernacular Arabic spoken in the town, we present evidence of changing identities and of linguistic markers of the Muslim-Christian division. Looking more closely at social issues, our study confirms that in Bethlehem, as in other Palestinian sociolinguistic communities that have been studied recently, whether directly or indirectly (Al-Wer 1999; Amara 1994; Amara 1996; Sawie 1994; Spolsky and Amara 1997; Suleiman 1999), there are sound changes and other linguistic changes in progress, adding up to an educationally mediated shift from vernacular to standard variants. Of particular interest in Bethlehem is clear evidence of gender and religious differentiation in the distribution of this shift, in resistance to it, and in the development of an alternative prestige standard.

Reporting on earlier studies of the sociolinguistics of Palestinian villages both in Israel and the West Bank (Amara 1986; Amara 1991; Amara 1995; Amara and Spolsky 1996; Spolsky and Amara 1986; Spolsky and Amara 1995; Spolsky and Amara 1997) we noted that a number of phonological, morphological, and lexical variables in

with the western world. During this period, there were major demographic changes, with a flood of refugees to the city from the neighboring villages following the 1948 War and again in 1967. During this half century, as a result of these changes, what was originally a large Christian Arab village (the speech of old people reflects this village origin) grew into a major Palestinian city.

Bethlehem: Historical and Socio-demographic Background

In the wake of the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948, 750,000 Palestinians left their homes and took refuge in neighboring Arab countries and in the eastern part of Palestine (Gilber 1989; Kaiman 1984). This eastern sector, which was later called the West Bank,² was united with the country of Transjordan under the name of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Twenty years later, in 1967, Israel occupied Bethlehem along with the rest of the West Bank and Gaza, and ruled it for nearly 30 years. More recently, as a result of the Oslo and the Cairo agreements of 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians, a Palestinian National Authority was set up in the Gaza Strip and in parts of the West Bank. In accordance with provisions of the Oslo B Agreement of September 1995, Israel withdrew from Bethlehem in January 1996. In the past fifty years, then, Bethlehem has gone from British to Jordanian to Israeli to Palestinian rule.

Notable in Biblical times as the birthplace of David and Jesus, modern Bethlehem originated as the settlement of Christian Arabs in six *ḥārāt* (quarters) around the Byzantine Church of the Nativity, with one more *ḥāra* populated by Muslims who were reputed to have come with Saladdin (Bannurah 1982). In 1535 there were about two hundred Christians and Muslims living in the town. By 1842 the population had reached only two thousand five hundred. Under Ottoman rule, the population grew to a peak of 12,000 by 1913. An eighth quarter was established consisting of Syriac survivors of the Turkish massacres at the end of the First World War (El Ali 1991).

Emigration has long been a major demographic feature of the Bethlehem area, resulting from economic and political concerns. Economically based emigration to the United States started as early as 1854, and trade early took emigrants to Latin America. A second major cause for emigration was the desire to avoid conscription in the last days of the Ottoman rule and the uncertain political situation in

Palestine since then. It was easier for Christians than for Muslims to emigrate. Their concentration in towns, their fluency in European languages resulting from their education in schools run by Western Christian Churches, and the fact that their countries of migration were also Christian all added up to making them more prone to emigrate. The migrant communities were able to maintain their affiliation with families and birthplace, as they tended to emigrate to places where others had gone. The Christian Arabs from Ramallah went mainly to North America, those from Bethlehem to South America, and those from Jerusalem mainly to North America and Australia. This pattern continues to be significant. By 1948, the emigrant communities overseas often outnumbered their mother communities in or around Bethlehem. For example the number of Bethlehemites or those who are of a Bethlehemite extraction in one Latin American country, Chile, exceeds the number of Bethlehemites in Bethlehem itself (El Ali, 1991).

There was a very high rate of emigration during the period of the first World War, so that the population was halved as a result to six thousand by 1921. There was subsequently slow growth during years of the British Mandate, and it again had passed ten thousand by 1946. A thousand Christian and Muslim Arabs from neighboring villages took refuge in Bethlehem following the 1948 War (Bannurah 1982).

Table 1. The Population of Bethlehem in 1948. Source: (El Ali 1991)

Denomination	Number	Percentage
Latin	3625	31
Greek Orthodox	2900	25
Syriacs	1700	15
Greek Catholics	161	1.5
Protestants	250	2
Others	160	1.5
Muslims	2900	25
Total	11696	100

During the period of Jordanian rule, Bethlehem was transformed completely by continued emigration of Christians and immigration of Muslims, so that it lost its Christian majority. By 1961, the population of Bethlehem, including the three adjacent refugee camps, had grown over twenty-two thousand, but this number did not remain stable, so that the September 1967 census conducted soon after the Israeli occupation found only 16,313. There has been sustained growth since then, with a continuing change in the proportion of Christians to Muslims. Before 1948, as Table 1 shows, the Christians constituted three quarters of the population, but now they make up only a third of the population in Bethlehem itself (see Table 2), with significant majorities remaining in the neighboring villages of Beit Jala and Beit Sahour.

Table 2. Population of Bethlehem and neighboring villages in August 1993. Source: Sammour³

Population	Bethlehem	%	Bait Jala	%	Bait	%	Total	%
Christians	14118	37	9381	86	9865	83	33364	55
Muslims	24009	63	1492	14	2064	17	27565	45
Total								
Population	38127	63	10873	18	11929	20	60929	100

To sum up, the present day city developed from a mainly Christian village into its present mixed pattern. Over the last century, and especially during the last fifty years, there has been a notable outflow of Christians and a steady influx of Muslim villagers, leading to a major change in the demographic, social and political balance. At the same time, just like most other parts of the Arab world, the town has been influenced by the spread of centralized Standard Arabic. Paralleling this, as a Palestinian city, it has shared in the wider processes of the development of Palestinian identity. All these changes will be found reflected in the results of our sociolinguistic surveys.

The Sociolinguistic Studies

Our project has involved a number of studies, some of which will be drawn on in this preliminary paper. In the first study, carried out under the direction of Nasif Mu'allim, we collected photos and documents showing the languages used in the city. In the center of Bethlehem, Arabic and English proved to be the most common languages used in signs, with the two being used together in most signs on Manger Square and the adjacent streets most used by tourists. Latin, Greek and Armenian signs appear on the appropriate churches. There continues to be a showing of Hebrew signs that became important during the period of Israeli control and reflect the fact that for some time Israeli visitors were common.

In a second study of languages observed to be spoken in the streets and market places, directed by Judith Muslih, we recorded the language used in five thousand transactions in public places in the center of Bethlehem. The most common language overheard was Arabic (68%), with the second most common, English, being identified in 10% of the transactions. The remaining 20% were divided among a dozen different languages. In 2%, we did not manage to recognize or record the language. The top half-dozen of the minor languages were Italian (4.4%), German (3%), Greek (2.8%), French (2.5%), Russian (2.4%), and Spanish (1.5%), clearly representing the major tourist and pilgrim groups. Because of the political conditions at the time of the survey, we observed only 77 transactions (1.5%) involving Hebrew.

A third important study was conducted during summer 1995 under the direction of Hanna Tushyeh and consisted of the collection of language data from about 650 households in the most important streets and quarters of the city. This gave us some data on some 3300 people, 80% of whom had been born in Bethlehem. More than half were reported to know a language in addition to Arabic, which was the first language acquired by 98% of the sample. Nearly 20% claimed to know more than two languages. The most common second language reported was English: over half claimed to speak it and nearly as many to read it. Some ten per cent said they could speak Hebrew; half that number said they could read it. Twenty per cent could speak other languages, and about half of that read them. Christians in the sample claimed better knowledge of English and other European languages while Muslims claimed better knowledge of Hebrew. Education was the best predictor of English knowledge, while occupation gave the best

account of Hebrew knowledge, with clerks and salespeople showing relatively high levels of ability. The pattern is similar to that reported in the Old City of Jerusalem (Spolsky and Cooper 1991).

These first surveys showed Bethlehem as an Arabic speaking city, with English as its main language for communication with non-speakers of Arabic, a significant amount of Hebrew knowledge reflecting past political and current economic situations, and a sizable level of knowledge of other languages as befits a city with major international pilgrimage and tourism, as well as ongoing relations with emigrant communities.

Sociolinguistic Interviews

More detailed data were collected in the sociolinguistic survey. The main sociolinguistic survey used interviews.⁴ Hanna Tushyeh, Nasif Mu'alim and Judith Muslih, all three residents of Bethlehem, interviewed informally in Arabic a total of 125 people, living in different parts of the city. The subjects were informed that their speech was being tape-recorded. They were encouraged to talk about topics such as the weather, the cost of living and their families. The tapes were transcribed, and a count made of significant variables.

The Nature of the Sample

The sample was balanced for religion (61 Christians and 64 Muslims) and gender (60 women and 65 men), with the cross-classifications also balanced. (See table 3)

Table 3: Make-up of the sample: Religion and Gender

	Men	Women
Christians	30	31
Muslims	30	34

The ages of the people interviewed ranged from 17 to 86 (with one 13 year old), and here too an effort was made to balance for religion. (see table 4).

Table 4. Make-up of the sample: Religion and Age-group

Religion	Age group					Total
	17-23	24-29	30-36	36-50	over 50	
Christian	13	11	10	9	18	61
Muslim	13	14	15	16	6	64
Total	26	25	25	25	24	125

A fifth of the sample had attained no more than the elementary level of education, another forty per cent had completed high school, and forty per cent had some tertiary education. Generally, it was the younger people who had the higher levels of education, demonstrating the drastic improvement in levels of Palestinian education over the past fifty years.

The mixture of occupation was less balanced. The four major categories were housewives (17.6%), followed by academics, students and skilled workers (each 16.8%). There were smaller groups of salespeople (12%) clerical workers (9.6%), unskilled workers (6.4%) and unemployed (4%). The occupational groups were generally matched for religion, except for a greater number of Christian skilled workers (14) than Muslim (7) and of Muslim unskilled workers (7) than of Christian (1).

The Primary Identity Variable

As a first step in studying identities, the people who were interviewed were asked to choose a term to mark their identity. We offered terms that have shown in other studies we have made to be popular choices for identity, from religious or local or national realms: Muslim, Christian, Hamula, Palestinian, Arab or Bethlehem. Seventy out of 125

respondents chose Palestinian, split more or less equally between Christian and Muslim respondents. 31 respondents (24 Muslims and 7 Christians) chose to identify themselves by religion. Another 14 (7 Muslim and 7 Christians) chose Arab. Ten (9 Christians and only one Muslim) chose Bethlehem as their primary identity. Looking at the gender differences, more men (43) than women (27) chose Palestinian; only women chose Christian; and more women (7) than men (3) chose Bethlehem. In these figures, we get the first hints, to be looked at more closely later in the paper, of religious and gender differences.

Sociolinguistic Variables

We analyzed a number of phonological, morphological and lexical variables,⁵ but in this present paper we will deal with two only which reveal significant tendencies.

The variable /q/


This variable is more sensitive than the rest, since it has four variants. As Mitchell (1993:33) notes, "Reflexes of the CA voiceless uvular plosive exhibit greater variation than applies to any other consonant." "The predominantly Lebanese variant [k]," he continues (p.36) for its part, is stigmatized by educated speakers from Jordan, Palestine and elsewhere, though it occurs in the speech of some rural Palestinians. The standard Arabic is [q]. A third significant variant is [ʔ], the urban variant common in cities like Jerusalem. "As a token of metropolitan usage, [ʔ] carries prestige throughout the region but yields in this respect to [q]" (Mitchell 1993:34). A fourth vernacular variant is [g], associated with Bedouin pronunciation (Mitchell 1993). In our studies of Barta'a (Spolsky and Amara 1997), the first two were sensitive in showing the movement from village vernacular towards standard. In studies in Jordan (Suleiman 1999), the Bedouin variant is widely used by Jordanian and Palestinian males (see Mitchell, 1993:38). A recent study by Sawaie (1994) confirms the status of these variants in Jordan. All four variants were observed in the city of Bethlehem.

To look for evidence of sound changes in progress, we consider first the use of the variants by age of speaker

Table 5: Variants for /q/ by age group: average percentage of use in interviews

Age	standard [q] for /q/	village [k] for /q/	urban [ʔ] for /q/	Bedouin [g] for /q/
Under 23	42.4	24.6	23.5	9.5
24-29	38.3	30.0	21.6	10.1
30-36	43.5	41.4	11.2	3.9
37-50	47.9	29.6	14.5	8.0
over 50	30.6	51.3	12	6.1

**Chart 1 /q/ by age
(mean percentage of use)**




From the table and the accompanying chart, we see that the standard [q] is now the most common variant at all age levels except for the very oldest, most of whom used the vernacular [k]. The latter more or less declines with age, the exception being the signs of vernacular resistance with the 30-36 year old group. But equally clear is that much of the shift has been to the urban [ʔ] variant, which is twice as common among those under the age of 30 than it is among

those over. Because school is the primary source of standardisation, we next look at the contribution of educational level to choice of variant.

Table 6: Variants for /q/ by educational level: average percentage of use in interviews

Educational level attained	Variant			
	standard [q] for /q/	vernacular [k] for /q/	urban [ʔ] for /q/	Bedouin [g] for /q/
Elementary	33.7	37.9	12.9	15.5
Secondary	38.2	45.5	12.6	2.7
Tertiary	47.0	22.7	21.9	8.4

Chart 2 /q/ by educational level (mean percentage of use)




The obvious trend is the increase of the use of standard [q] with higher educational attainment, although the resistance in those with high school education in favour of the vernacular form, is also obvious. It is also clear that those with education beyond the secondary level are moving either towards the standard or towards the urban variant. To consider the meaning of this alternative choice, we look next at gender and religion. In Table 7, we report the percentage of each variant chosen by men and women in the interview.

Table 7: Variants of /q/ by gender: average percentage of use in interviews

Sex	standard [q] for /q/	vernacular [k] for /q/	urban [ʔ] for /q/	Bedouin [g] for /q/
Male	47	39	5.4	8.6
Female	33.8	30.5	29.5	6.3

Chart 3 /q/ by gender (mean percentage of use)



The standard variant [q] is highest among male respondents, followed by the stigmatized rural variant [k]. That is to say, men tend to be divided between the standard and the vernacular variants, which together account for some 80%. Some of this vernacular usage among men is presumably the result of the lack of education (the oldest group) but part suggests a resistance to standardization that we have alluded to.


Women, on the other hand, divide more or less equally among the three choices: a third of the time they use [ʔ], the urban variant. The urban variant is rare among men. The Bedouin variant [g] is also rare. This gender difference is particularly striking, suggesting the two genders exemplify quite different patterns of change, the males moving towards the standard and the females towards the urban. Sawait (1994), Al-Wer (1999) and Suleiman (1999) report on related changes in Jordanian usage, where the men (including the more or less 50% of Palestinian origin) now favour the Bedouin [g] variant, while the women (including those of Jordanian origin) show a preference for the Palestinian urban [ʔ].

The variant similarly helps distinguish Christian from Muslim pronunciation, as the next table shows.

**Table 8: Variants for /q/ by religion:
average percentage of use in interviews**

Religion	standard [q] for /q/	Variant		
		vernacular [k] for /q/	urban [ʔ] for /q/	Bedouin[g] for /q/
Moslem	40.2	40.8	9.5	9.5
Christian	41.2	28.9	24.7	5.3

**Chart 4 /q/ by religion
(mean percentage of use)**



The table shows that the urban [ʔ] variant is more than twice as high among Christians than among Muslims, the latter being much more likely to maintain their vernacular [k] usage.


To sum up, our analysis of a single variable has shown clearly a socially marked sound change occurring in Bethlehem, with education causing a movement among males from the vernacular to the standard. There are signs of vernacular resistance to this movement among males. But this pattern appears to be matched by a competing tendency of younger and better educated women (especially Christian) to prefer an urban prestige variant. This pattern is confirmed with other variables.

The variable /th/

From the analysis of the variants of /q/ found in the speech of adult residents of Bethlehem, it appears reasonable to postulate that there are two competing changes in progress, both involving a decrease in the use of the village vernacular (the variant k). One is the educationally motivated increasing use of the Pan-Arab Standard variant, [q]. The second is a contrasting increase in the use of the Palestinian urban variant, [ʔ]. This second tendency is associated especially with the


speech of Christians and women. Not all variables offered the richness of /q/ with its four competing variants, but even those with two-way split are interesting. With /th/, there are two variants, the first [th, as in English *thin*] which occurs in both the vernacular and the standard, and a second, [t], which is the Palestinian urban variant.

Chart 5 /dh/ by age group (mean percentage of use)




As with /q/, the chart of mean percentage of use by the various age-groups suggest that this is also the case of a sound change in progress.

Chart 6 /dh/ by educational level (mean percentage of use)




Here, again, some of the explanation seems to be furnished by the educational effect, with the urban form more in use among those who have continued furthest with their education.

Chart 7 /dh/ by gender (mean percentage of use)




The best explanation of the urban form is again gender, with women strongly favoring the urban form and men using it less commonly.

Chart 8 /dh/ by religion (mean percentage of use)



Religion too is a contributing explanation, with Christians much more likely to use the urban form than Muslims.

Chart 9 /dh/ by primary identity (mean percentage of use)



Finally, we note that the urban form is most widely used by those who choose to identify themselves primarily as Bethlehemites or as Christians, and least among those who identify themselves as Muslims.

Standardization and urbanization

Our analysis included data on a number of other variants which can be considered standard or urban, but the other cases are not so useful in themselves as there is not the three way split (vernacular versus standard versus urban) but more usually a two way split (such as vernacular and standard versus urban). We chose therefore to calculate two indices, one (STDPHON) the average scores for standard phonological variants,⁶ and the second (URBPHON), the average scores for specifically urban variants.⁷

The following table 9 shows the means for these features of selected groups in the survey.

A comparison of the means makes clear the differences between the distribution and pattern of the two variables. Consider first Standard

Phonology. It is significantly higher in the case of both Muslims (t-test, 4.666, 2-tailed significance .000) and Men (t-test, 2.58, 2-tailed significance .011). There is evidence that it increases with education, especially for those who go beyond the high school level. It is however stronger in those between 30 and 50 than in those between 15 and 29, whose level of use is similar to that of people over 50. It is highest among academics and clerical workers, lowest among domestic workers. The effect of education is blurred because of the fact that the women and Christians have chosen the urban variant as they move from the vernacular.

These two effects are reinforced when we look at urban phonology. Christians and women have means twice as high as Muslims and men, and the differences in both cases are highly significant. There is an increase with education, but the urban phonology is a feature of the younger rather than the older subjects. Urban phonology then is highest in domestics and academics.

Social-political Speculations on Sociolinguistic Observations

These reports are preliminary, for we still have to analyze a large quantity of attitudinal data which will enable us, we hope, to fill in some of the gaps and buttress some of the impressions. But we cannot be impervious to the call by Suleiman (1997; 1999) to go beyond simple observation and to consider how the sociolinguistic data we have observed throw light on the socio-political changes going on in Bethlehem. For what the data seem to show is the existence of a sound change moving in two directions, a move from the village vernacular to one of two different standards. The tendency, driven by the pressure of the Pan-Arabic Standard that is promulgated by school and media, towards the Standard form exists, shown most clearly by the reduction in the use of the village forms which were the older usage of both long time and more recent inhabitants of the town. The resistance to this change appears to be the result especially of Christians (and Christian males at that) choosing to continue to assert a Bethlehem identity in the face of the changing demographic pattern. We noted similar resistance to standardization among males in Barta'a, especially those in the Israeli sector (Amara and Spolsky 1996; Spolsky and Amara 1997).

Table 9: Standard and Urban Phonology: Means according to religion, gender, occupation, age, and educational level

	Standard		Phonology		Urban	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Religion						
Christian	30.63	11.12	20.46	14.16		
Muslim	35.29	8.91	10.26	12.01		
Gender						
Female	28.88	10.21	22.20	14.37		
Male	36.84	8.89	8.81	10.41		
Education						
Elementary	32.12	8.80	10.80	12.03		
Secondary	31.37	8.20	14.72	13.60		
Tertiary	35.15	12.65	18.19	14.99		
Age						
17-23	31.13	11.22	21.25	14.39		
23-29	31.96	10.52	18.79	14.67		
30-36	35.33	8.72	12.07	11.52		
37-50	35.98	10.96	12.11	13.14		
over 50	30.69	9.48	11.57	14.17		
Occupation						
academic	38.79	12.24	14.01	15.67		
clerical	35.70	10.19	17.62	10.77		
domestic	29.21	10.13	18.61	15.95		
sales	30.61	7.62	13.55	11.12		
skilled	32.84	7.96	12.82	13.90		
student	30.74	11.76	20.81	13.90		
unemployed	34.89	7.30	2.26	3.00		
unskilled	34.11	8.46	8.56	11.78		
TOTAL	33.02	10.31	15.24	14.01		

The second standard is the prestige form associated with Jerusalem and other Arab urban dialects in the region. Mitchell (1993:5) notes this tendency: "More generally in Arab countries, urban forms of speech are more highly valued than rural counterparts..." There is however the competing pull of the Classical Arabic standard. "As a token of metropolitan usage, [ʔ] carries prestige throughout the region but yields in this respect to [q]" (Mitchell 1993:34). Why Christian in Bethlehem should favour the urban [ʔ] over the standard [q] is fairly obvious, for as mentioned earlier, Jerusalem was a city while Bethlehem was essentially a village, and Christian Patriarchs who are responsible for the Bethlehem churches have their seats in Jerusalem. For Christian males, then, the urban phonology is an alternative way of resisting the Standard while choosing to give up on the vernacular form.

In the case of the women, however, the attraction of the urban form, especially to the younger educated woman, is even stronger, reflecting a tendency already noted in Jordan as well for women's speech to be markedly urban. Because it is so marked (and this is an example of what Labov (1966) called a stereotype), it has taken on a folk meaning, so that the accent is referred to as "soft" and even "effeminate".⁸ Commenting on the differences between male and female speech in the Arabic world, Mitchell (1993:10) remarks that forms are "cultivated by women for their generally recognized association with femininity". The special role of women in Palestinian West Bank and Jordanian society clearly continues to fuel this differentiation.

Social differences, it has long been proclaimed, are likely to be accompanied and reinforced by sociolinguistic differences. Our preliminary studies of Bethlehem, a city undergoing rapid demographic, social and political change, are a new confirmation of the wisdom of this observation.

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NOTES

- 1 Funded by the Netherlands Israel Research and Development Programme, the study is jointly carried out by the University of Bethlehem (with administrative support from the Palestine Centre for Peace and Development), the University of Nijmegen and The Language Policy Research Centre at Bar-Ilan University. This is a revised version of a paper read at the Third Symposium of Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa, Edinburgh, 1-4 July, 1997.
- 2 Sammour, George. Director of the Tourism Authority in Bethlehem. An interview with Hanna Tushyeh on May 18, 1995.
- 3 "West" from the Jordanian perspective.
- 4 For the general approach, see Amara (1991) and Spolsky (1996).
- 5 a. /q/:
[q] Standard Arabic, voiceless uvular stop
[k] non-standard, rural variant of /q/, voiceless velar stop
[g] non-standard, Bedouin variant of /q/, voiced velar stop
[ʔ] non-standard, urban variant of /q/, voiced glottal stop
b. /th/:
[th] standard Arabic variant, voiced interdental fricative. It is also the rural variant of the nearby villages of Bethlehem.
[t] non-standard, Palestinian urban variant
c. /dh/

[dh] Standard Arabic variant, voiced interdental fricative. It is also the rural variant of the nearby villages of Bethlehem.

[d] non-standard urban variant of /dh/, voiced alveolar stop.

d. /'ala/

The percentage of the choice of the standard morpheme ['ala] over the vernacular morpheme ['al].

e. /fi/

The percentage of choice of the standard morpheme /fi/ over the vernacular morpheme /bi/.

f. /-i/

[-i] possessive first person singular (masculine and feminine) pronominal suffix; it is a standard variant. It occurs attached at the end of the word. For example, *kiāb-i* (my book).

[?ili] possessive first person pronoun singular (masculine and feminine). It is the non-standard variant and occurs unattached as in ?ili (for me).

⁶ Some of the variants are clearly standard, such as [q] for /q/ and /'ala/. However, blurring the effect of this variable is that some are both Standard and rural in contrast to urban, such as [k] instead of [ch], and [dh] for /dh/ and [th] for /th/.

⁷ Unambiguously, there were [ʔ] for /q/, [t] for /th/ and [d] for /dh/, [ʒ] for /j/ and [d] for [z].

⁸ Sawate (1994) confirms this judgement as many of his judges considered its use by males as effeminate. There are other cases where prestige urban forms are considered less manly, such as Continental French in Québec.

CHAPTER FOUR

HEBREW AND ENGLISH BORROWINGS IN PALESTINIAN ARABIC IN ISRAEL: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY IN LEXICAL INTEGRATION AND DIFFUSION

Muhammad Hasan Amara

1. Introduction

A primary objective of research in sociolinguistics is to explore how changes in social and political pressures relate to shifts in the pattern of language activity in a speech community.¹ Djite (1992), for example, has analysed the socio-political background to Arabisation in Algeria; Amara (1986, 1991) concludes that shifts in the linguistic repertoire of Israeli Palestinians reflect social, political, economic and cultural change; Spolsky and Cooper (1991) discuss the emergence of Arabic-Hebrew bilingualism within the Arabic-speaking community in the Old City of Jerusalem as a result of political changes taking place since 1967; Myers-Scotton (1993) analyses the use of language as a tool of elite closure in Africa; Modarresi (1993) shows how socio-political change in post-Revolution Iran has resulted in linguistic change; Clyne (1993) discusses the political division of Germany and the consequent debate as to whether two national varieties of the German language can be distinguished.

Hebrew as spoken by Palestinians in Israel has hitherto received relatively little attention from researchers; some examples of relevant research are Amara (1986, 1991, 1995); Amara and Spolsky (1986); Ben-Rafael (1994); Daghash (1993); Koplewitz (1990); Spolsky and Amara (1995); Spolsky and Amara (1997). The study of Hebrew among Palestinians in Israel is, however, of particular sociolinguistic significance owing to the fact that not only do Palestinians constitute the largest non-Jewish minority in Israel, but this same community is

also in conflict with the Jewish majority both in terms of internal affairs and in the wider context of Arab-Israeli relations.

This paper aims to shed some light on the integration and diffusion of Hebrew and, to a lesser extent, English lexical items among Palestinians in Israel. Before dealing with this task below, we will first consider the background to the political and linguistic changes which have affected the Palestinian community during this century, especially since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

2. *The Language Situation among Palestinians in Israel: An Overview*

The Israeli Palestinian community has been undergoing a process of modernisation for a number of decades, and in particular since the establishment of the State of Israel. This modernisation has taken place in the wake of the enormous political changes which the Palestinian people have experienced in the course of the twentieth century. Whereas Palestinian Arabs² formed the majority of the population under Turkish and British rule in Palestine, they were soon reduced to a demographic minority after the establishment of the State of Israel, a minority that is different from the Jewish majority in terms of religion, language, sentiment and ambitions (See, for example, Ben-Amram, 1965; Lish, 1975; Lustick, 1980; Peretz, 1958).

The above changes in the political circumstances of the Palestinians in Israel have been accompanied by many other changes, most notably in the economic and social spheres (Al-Haj, 1987; Ginat, 1980; Rosenfeld, 1964, 1968; Smootha, 1980). Loss and expropriation of farming land forced many Palestinians to find waged work in the Jewish sector (Zureik, 1979). This had an effect on the structure of family units: as the influence of the *hamūlas* (roughly, clans) has decreased, the strength of the nuclear family has increased (Al-Haj, 1987). The dramatic expansion in education and the modifications in such cultural spheres as food, drink, clothing and building are further examples of the pervasive nature of these changes (cf. Amara, 1989).

The linguistic repertoire of Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate (1918-1948) was limited and, to some degree, uniform. This situation can be attributed to the structure of Palestinian society during this period: most Palestinian Arabs were villagers, schooling was not available to all, and contact with the outside world was infrequent since Palestinian society was primarily agrarian. The majority of Palestinians

knew and spoke mainly the local Palestinian dialect(s), whereas limited numbers only knew Standard Arabic and/or English, and even fewer knew and used Hebrew (Koplewitz 1992, Landau 1987).

Over the past few decades the linguistic repertoire of Palestinians has evolved at a rapid pace (see Amara, 1986, 1995). This is evidenced in the lexical domain by the influence of Modern Standard Arabic on the local dialect(s) as a result of the exposure of Palestinians to the Arab media (mainly TV and radio) and the improvements in educational opportunities they have experienced. Thus, some Modern Standard Arabic words have replaced local vernacular words (see Amara, 1986). So pervasive has this influence been that even people with a minimum level of literacy tend to use Standard lexical items in their speech. Palestinian Arabic has also incorporated items from other Arabic colloquials as a result of exposure to the electronic media and, to a lesser extent, travel.

Competence in Hebrew has also increased at a dramatic rate among Palestinians since the establishment of the State of Israel. Benor (1950), the first Director of the Arab Education Department in the Ministry of Education, claims that "Hebrew was introduced into the [Arabic Schools] syllabus not primarily as a decree from on high, but at the insistent demands of the Arabs themselves". Regardless of the truth of this statement, it is indisputable that it was very much in Israel's own interest that the Palestinians learnt Hebrew in order that they be exposed to the culture and heritage of the Jewish majority as a means of developing a sense of Israeli identity (see Al-Haj, 1995). In fact the Palestinians had little choice but to learn Hebrew which, as the dominant language in their socio-political environment, pervades all spheres of life: labour, commerce, government business, higher education, health services, etc.

English has made many inroads into Palestinian society, both directly and indirectly via Hebrew owing to its role as the international language of science, technology and commerce, the popularity of American culture, and the close relationship between the USA and Israel. It is taught formally in Arabic schools in Israel from the fourth grade onwards.

Arabic is an official language of the State of Israel. During the British Mandate over Palestine, three languages were accorded official status: English, Arabic and Hebrew. Koplewitz (1992:32) points out that the "State of Israel deprived English of its preferred status but it did not change the legal status of Arabic as an official language of the

State". Consistent with its status as an official language, Arabic is used in numerous domains. For example, coins, notes and postage stamps carry inscriptions in both Hebrew and Arabic. Arabic may be used in courts of law, and the laws enacted by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) are published in both Hebrew and Arabic. Israeli Palestinian Knesset members are permitted to address the House in Arabic. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority maintains, in addition to its Hebrew and foreign programmes, an Arabic radio programme for much of the day as well as one hour daily of television programmes in Arabic, although this output may be motivated by factors other than the desire to respond to the imperatives of any language policy on the part of the Authority. All the Israeli Palestinian schools use Arabic as the language of instruction in all subjects.

However, the position of Arabic as an official language of Israel, symbolic though it is, has not gone completely unchallenged. As Koplewitz (1992) points out an attempt was made, in 1952, by some right wing opposition parties to establish Hebrew as the exclusive official language of the State. This proposal was rejected by a majority of members of the Knesset. In the Knesset debate on the subject, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stated: "We reject the assumption that one must forbid the Arab citizens the use of the Arabic language if they wish to use it anywhere, including the Knesset (Proceedings of the Knesset, 1952, vol. 12:2550; quoted in Fisherman and Fishman (1975:505)). Yet, in spite of this support at the highest level in the government, and in spite of the fact that Arabic is used in various official domains as mentioned above, Hebrew continues to have the status of the preferred language of Israel. This is shown clearly by two laws: (a) the Citizenship Law of 1952 (paragraph 5a) which requires "some knowledge of Hebrew" as a condition for acquiring Israeli citizenship, whereas there is no such requirement for "some knowledge of Arabic" (c.f. Ben-Rafael, 1994; Hallel and Spolsky, 1993); and (b) the Chamber of Advocates Law of 1961 (paragraph 26(3)) which requires "a sufficient knowledge of Hebrew" for registration as a law clerk (cf. Ben-Rafael, 1994; Koplewitz, 1992), but no such requirement exists for Arabic.

3. *Knowledge and Use of Hebrew among Palestinians in Israel*

Hebrew is acquired by Palestinians both formally and informally. The fact that Hebrew is *the* dominant language of Israel means that Palestinians learn it as a second rather than as a foreign language out of expedience, if not for any other reasons (see Winter, 1981; Hallel and Spolsky, 1993). Hebrew is taught formally in Arabic schools from the third grade, but the influence of informal learning through outside contact with Hebrew speakers in the work place, the commercial sector and governmental offices tends to be more significant (e.g. Reves, 1983). The injection of Hebrew words, phrases and even whole sentences into Arabic is therefore widespread among Palestinians, albeit that the nature and extent of this usage varies from one speaker to another and from one topic to another (see Amara and Spolsky, 1986; Amara, 1995; Ben-Rafael, 1994; Koplewitz, 1990). However, knowledge of Hebrew among Palestinians is not uniform. Thus young people are more competent than older people in Hebrew, and competence among males in the language is on average higher than among females due, mainly, to the influence of the linguistic environment in the work place (see Amara 1986, 1995). In this connection, we believe that the claim made by Ben-Raphael (1994) to the effect that no significant differences in the knowledge of Hebrew exist between the various Palestinian communities (Christian, Druze and Muslims) is in need of modification to reflect what, surely, must be the higher competence in the language among young Druze men for whom military service in the Hebrew speaking Israeli army is mandatory.

The unequal relations between Palestinians and Jews in Israel and the consequent marginalisation of the Palestinian community in the socio-political sphere within an environment of what may be called 'dominant group impenetrability' have meant that the acquisition of Hebrew among Palestinian Arabs has primarily been motivated by instrumental considerations (see Gardner and Lambert 1959, 1972 for instrumental motivation). In practical terms, this means that the learning of Hebrew by Palestinians is seen as a tool, perhaps the most important tool, in acquiring educational, economic and social patterns similar to those of the dominant Jewish majority (see Amara and Spolsky, 1986). Exceptions to this rule are found where Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews live together in mixed neighbourhoods. In situation of this kind, a greater convergence of the Palestinian minority

towards the Jewish majority would no doubt be reflected in improved levels of knowledge and fluency in Hebrew among the former. However, it is unlikely that this would occur as long as the following factors, among other things, continue to define the socio-political environment in which both Palestinians and Jews live and interact with each other: (a) the Israeli-Arab conflict; (b) the definition of Israel as a Jewish state; and (c) the physical separation of Palestinians and Jews in patterns of settlement. One of the results of this state of affairs is the emblematic existence of Arabic as a symbol of identity for Palestinians and the inability of borrowed Hebrew lexical items in this language to exercise a subtractive role on its function as an identity bearing symbol (see Ben-Rafael 1994:176 for similar views).

4. *The Integration and Diffusion of Hebrew and English Terms in Palestinian Arabic*

An examination of the degree of integration and diffusion of Hebrew lexical items among Palestinians in Israel can contribute to our understanding of the nature of Palestinian-Israeli Jewish contact and of the degree of acculturation of Palestinians to the Jewish majority culture in Israel. A similar examination of English terms in Palestinian Arabic would also serve to reveal the extent to which this internationally important language continues to influence Palestinian Arabic, especially since English played the role of the main donor language in relation to Palestinian Arabic³ during the British Mandate period over Palestine (1918-1948). My first comprehensive study on this subject was carried out in 1986 in Zafafa, a village in the Little Triangle, in the north of Israel, with a total population of 3000 (for more details see Amara, 1986).

4.1. *The Investigation*

The study used as subjects a stratified sample selected from the population of Zafafa. A total of 96 subjects were selected and assigned to four age groups (see Table 1). The two older groups were divided according to their education, occupation and outside contact; the two younger groups were divided according to the education and occupation of their parents.

Table 1. Make-up of the sample

Age	6-12	12-15	15-22	22-50
Male	12	12	12	12
Female	12	12	12	12

One method of investigating the integration of borrowed terms into the recipient language is to study the frequency with which lexical items occur in ordinary normal discourse in the language in question. However, since the English items in which we are interested are difficult to collect owing to their low frequency in normal speech, we have used what Mackey calls the availability test - which he defines as "a measure of potential of items in the code" (1970:203) - to obtain information of the required type. In implementing this test, Mackey suggests that if all bilinguals use a particular term, then the term concerned may be said to be 100% integrated in the recipient language; if it is used by only half the respondents, it is 50% integrated, and so on (see Amara and Spolsky, 1986 for a detailed description of this test).

In determining the index of availability of borrowed terms, we first established a set of domains (which Mackey calls 'semantic fields') into which the terms we hoped to elicit would congregate. We then asked the subjects to provide the first ten words they could think of for each of the domains we had established. The number of times a word appeared in the various lists was taken to represent its availability index. The higher the percentage ranking of a borrowed item was the greater its integration in the recipient language was judged to be.

4.2. *Lexical Integration by Domains*

The 1986 Zafafa study is based on the assumption that the pattern of borrowed items from English and Hebrew into Palestinian Arabic will vary according to domain. This is the first assumption of this study. In the traditional domains, where little or no influence from other cultures has been felt, the lexicon will remain entirely or mainly Arabic. In modern domains, there will be extensive borrowing from English and, especially, Hebrew. Mixed domains, which existed before contact with these two languages, but in which change has occurred as a result of

this contact, will show appropriate intermediate levels of integration of English and Hebrew items.

4.3. The Pilot Study


In order to determine which domains should be used in the main study, a pilot study was carried out with 24 subjects, all aged between 15 and 22, selected to reflect divisions of sex, education, occupation and outside contact. Sixteen domains were tested: food (breakfast, dinner, supper), kinship, shepherding, transportation, health, occupations, electricity, games (football, chess), schooling, the construction industry, clothing, body parts, and animals. The results of the pilot study are summarised in Table 2, and selected domains are displayed in Figure 1.

The pilot study demonstrated the stability of the availability test, and clarified that the sixteen domains clustered into three classes: traditional with little or no borrowing; modern with a good deal of borrowing; and mixed with intermediate levels of borrowing. The main study was then designed on the basis of the pilot study. Six of the sixteen domains were selected: two from the traditional domains (kinship and food at dinner); two from the modern domains (electricity and transportation); and two from the mixed domains (construction and health).

Table 2. Results of the pilot study

Domain	Total	Arabic		English		Hebrew	
		No	%	No	%	No	%
Electricity	42	18	43	12	28.5	12	28.5
Football	45	23	51	10	22	12	27
Transport	40	23	58	10	25	7	17
Construction	58	37	64	4	7	17	29
Health	57	39	68	9	16	9	16
Clothing	38	32	87	5	13	0	0
Breakfast	39	31	80	6	15	2	5
Occupation	44	37	84	3	7	4	9
Schooling	40	36	90	3	7.5	1	2.5
Sheep	31	28	90	2	7	1	3
Supper	65	59	91	3	4.5	3	4.5
Dinner	54	51	94	2	4	1	2
Animals	50	50	100	0	0	0	0
Kinship	25	25	100	0	0	0	0
Body parts	35	35	100	0	0	0	0

Figure 1. Integration by traditional, mixed and modern domains (%)



4.4. The Main Study

The results of the main study were analysed using four different methods, each providing a different index of integration. An attempt was made to determine the language source of foreign items appearing in the first twenty words. The first index represented the frequency of Arabic, Hebrew and English items in each domain; the second index the number and average rank of the first ten English and Hebrew items in each domain; and the third index the number and average rank of the second group of ten words of Hebrew and English in each domain - these are treated separately because they are considered less important than the first ten words, but more important than the remainder of the items - and the fourth and final index represented the rest of the items.

The results of the comparison of integration by domains support the first assumption on which this study is based. Two traditional domains are studied: food and kinship. In kinship, no influence from other cultures is found, and the village lexicon remains purely Arabic. In the domain of food, in which 81 items are listed, 73 are Arabic, 5 are Hebrew and 3 are English. No English or Hebrew items appear in the first twenty items on the availability measure. This indicates that the

contact between Arabic and other cultures in this domain is very slight. As a result, there is little borrowing.

Let us now consider the two modern domains of electricity and transportation. In these domains, where there is the greatest cultural innovation, there is extensive borrowing from Hebrew and English. In the domain of electricity, 61 items are reported: 30 Arabic, 20 English and 11 Hebrew. English and Hebrew items, then, represent half of the total items. In this domain, Hebrew items do not appear in the first 20 words, while there are 6 English words in the first 20 lexical items. Hebrew items in the rest of the domain are not highly integrated.

In transport, 54 items are reported. There are 30 Arabic items, 12 English and 12 Hebrew. Hebrew and English items constitute 45% of the total. In the first 20 items, there are 6 English and 3 Hebrew words. In this domain, Hebrew items are less integrated than English items, but Hebrew items are more highly integrated here than in the domain of electricity.

There are two mixed domains in this study: health and construction. These domains were important before contact, but where there has been change as a result of contact, the lexicon shows evidence of broadening in borrowing. In construction, 82 items are reported. Of these, 49 are Arabic, 28 Hebrew and 5 English. In the first twenty words, 3 English and 1 Hebrew item appear. It is possible that English words entered Arabic via Hebrew. The integration of English items in this domain is very low. In contrast, Hebrew items are highly integrated in this domain. The high integration of Hebrew in this domain is easily explained: the majority of employees in the village are construction workers, who work amongst Jews. Observation reveals that the use of Hebrew words pertaining to construction is well established: when subjects talk about this domain, they often resort to Hebrew in preference to Arabic.

In the domain of health, 92 items are reported. There are 51 Arabic items, 31 Hebrew and 10 English. Hebrew and English items thus represent half of the total number of items belonging to this domain. In the first 20 words, 5 English and 3 Hebrew items appear.

In comparison with other domains, Hebrew displays the highest level of integration in the first 20 words in the domain of health. Hebrew items are also highly integrated in the rest of this domain. The reasons for this are clear: the British brought the modern system of health care to Palestine, but after the State of Israel was established, an Israeli system of health care replaced the British one. Today, a large

number of Palestinians in Israel are members of Kupat Holim, the medical health scheme of the Israeli General Federation of Labour. The result of this has been a considerable Hebrew influence on the health component of the subjects' lexicon.

The above data show that levels of diffusion and integration of English and Hebrew lexical items in Palestinian Arabic differ according to domain, thus lending support to the first basic assumption upon which this study is based. This having been established, let us now consider the question of who among the villagers served as the conduits for lexical diffusion.

4.5. *Social Indicators of Lexical Integration*

A second assumption of this study revolves around the view that the level of acculturation among subjects varies according to their educational standard, occupation and degree of outside contact. These three variables were regarded as the main determinants of the degree of integration of Hebrew and English lexical items into the lexicon of individual villagers, as the following results will show. Two further factors, namely age and gender, should also be taken into account, since they interact in various ways with the above variables. Using the domain-based study as a point of reference, then, an analysis was undertaken of the degree to which the relevant demographic variables correlated with the various levels of integration.

We found no significant differences in the integration of English lexical items relative to demographic variables. We will therefore analyse only those data relevant to social differentiation in the use of Hebrew lexical items since the proportion of Hebrew lexical items in use was found to vary significantly with demographic variables.

With respect to age, the 15-22 age group displays the highest level of integration, scoring 113; the oldest age group comes a close second with 106; and the younger age groups (6-12 and 12-15) lag well behind with 65 and 45 respectively.

With respect to sex, male and female respondents in the two younger groups (6-12 and 12-15) give the same number of Hebrew items. In the older age groups, however, a difference between male and female subjects was in evidence: older males gave many more Hebrew items (males 190; females 135). This gap is most in evidence in the domain of construction, and only slightly less pronounced in the

domains of electricity and transport. The scores of female subjects match those of the males in only one domain: health. An explanation for this is perhaps that women's responsibility for the health care of their children causes them to visit medical centres more often than men, thus coming into direct contact with Hebrew speaking staff working in the centres concerned.

A third factor for consideration is education. Differences in educational standard are in evidence only in the two older groups, because the respondents in the younger groups are still in school. In our analysis, we distinguish between those who have had up to eight years of education, and those who have had more.

In the 15-22 age group, subjects who had up to eight years of education give 19 more Hebrew items compared to those who had more than eight years of education. This reflects the fact that half the subjects in the less educated group are construction workers who are in daily contact with Hebrew speakers.

When occupation and outside contact are taken into account as variables, the results are as follows. In the 15-22 age group, on average, over the four domains, construction workers generate the highest number of lexical items (6.2), followed by students (4.5), and then the unemployed (2.7). In the 22-50 age group, meanwhile, professionals give the highest number of Hebrew lexical items (5.5), followed by construction workers (4.7), while housewives give the lowest number (3.3). Only slight differences among the groups have been found concerning the use of English lexical items.

Taking as my basis the 1986 study, I have reached the following conclusions concerning the process of lexical diffusion⁴: (a) The extent of the diffusion of English innovations is related mainly to the status of English as the language of modernity and to its association with the British Mandatory Government in Palestine between 1918-1948. The results of the study vary in this respect according to domain, and speaker characteristics do not appear to be significant. (2) The domains influenced by English are already well established and the ongoing process of acculturation here is slow. (3) Hebrew is now the main source of innovation, not only for Hebrew words but also for words of English origin. And (4) those variations in Hebrew innovations which can be accounted for by social characteristics provide a picture of the ongoing process of lexical diffusion and integration.

5. Social Differentiation in the Use of Hebrew Lexical Items

One of the objects of the 1986 study was to investigate the degree of integration into Palestinian Arabic of lexical items borrowed from Hebrew, and the workings of the diffusion process. In a separate study (Amara, 1991), carried out in the same village, our main concern was the proportion of Hebrew lexical items in Arabic regardless of their degree of integration. In other words, in this second study, no importance was attached to the integration of the items, nor to whether they were code-mixed or code-switched. Instead, the object of this study was to understand social differentiation in relation to lexical variation. The 1991 study also differed from the 1986 study with regard to methodology.

Data for this study were collected in structured interviews, which were conducted after a period of participant observation (see Amara, 1991, 1995). The total number of subjects interviewed was 81. Table 3 summarises the characteristics of the groups, which were further subdivided according to education, occupation, religious observance and contact with Jews.

Table 3. Make-up of the sample

Age	6-12	13-15	16-22	23-50	51+	Total
Male	8	7	9	9	8	41
Female	8	10	7	9	6	40

In the structured interviews, the subjects were requested to answer open-ended questions about work or school, their leisure time, the importance of electricity, and about the village. The duration of each interview was between 35 and 60 minutes. The interviews were taped, recorded and later transcribed. This study was carried out over a period of nine months, from October 1989 to June 1990. The identification of Hebrew lexical items in the Zafafa linguistic repertoire is not a difficult task, although in a very limited number of cases the high level of integration of the items creates difficulties of identification and allocation. The percentage of use of Hebrew lexical items is calculated as the number of Hebrew items divided by the subject's total items. Based on this study we may offer the following conclusions concerning

the interaction between the variables established above and the occurrence of Hebrew items in an individual speaker's linguistic output:

- (1) *Gender*: Use of Hebrew by males exceeds that by females by a factor of three (males: 0.9%, females: 0.3%).
- (2) *Age*: Young adults use the highest number of Hebrew lexical items. There is also a sharp differentiation in the use of Hebrew according to age group: children (0.1%); young teenagers (0.2%); young adults (1.3%); adults (1%); older adults (0.6%).
- (3) *Education*: The highest level of use of Hebrew is found among those attending University (0.7%), followed by those at high school (0.4%), then by illiterate participants (0.4%), with the lowest incidence being among those still at elementary school (0.1%). Higher education seems to be one factor leading to increased use of Hebrew items, but other factors must be taken into account to explain increased use by those who have had no education.
- (4) *Occupation*: Labourers have the highest level of use of Hebrew items (1.5%), followed by professionals (0.7%), with housewives lagging far behind (0.1%). Since labourers come into extensive contact with Jews, we may conclude that contact with Jews is another variable which should be taken into account.
- (5) *Contact with Jews*: Our results show that the more extensive a speaker's contact with Israeli Jews, the greater the incidence of use of Hebrew items in his or her speech. Those who come into contact daily with Israeli Jews use most Hebrew items (2%). Those who do not come into contact with Jews use the least number (0.2%).
- (6) *Religious Observance*: To investigate the role of religion as an independent variable in the use of Hebrew borrowed items, I divided the population into five categories: (a) non-religious: those who perform no religious duties; (b) minimally religious: those who perform certain duties, for example fasting; (c) observant: those who fulfil all the obligations of Islam; (d) religious: those who, in addition to fulfilling obligations, follow the *shari'a* in most areas of life; and (e) very religious: those who, to a greater extent than group

(d), strictly observe the injunctions of the *shari'a* and try to apply it to all possible aspects of life, and, in many cases, try to impose their beliefs on others.

Initially, it was expected that the population of the village would range from minimally to extremely religious groups. However, no cases of groups (a) or (e) were found to be represented in the sample. Our results therefore show that although the observant group (c) leads in the use of Hebrew items, the differentiation among the various groups is not pronounced: group *b* (0.6%); group *c* (0.8%); group *d* (0.7%). These differences are not statistically significant, which leads us to conclude that religion is not a particularly relevant factor in the process of lexical integration and diffusion among Palestinians.

5.1. Multiple Regression Analysis

A multiple regression analysis was then used to investigate the relative significance of each social variable in explaining the use of Hebrew lexical items. This showed that contact with Jews was the most significant variable in the use of Hebrew lexical items (explaining 32.2%), followed by gender (explaining 37% altogether), then occupation (explaining with contact and gender 39.7%). The T significance of the remainder of the variables was as follows: age (.2844), education (.3310), religion (.8844).

5.2. Hebrew Item Use according to Speech Styles

Our data show interesting results with regard to the use of Hebrew across the following speech styles: the *careful* style collected in the interviews, the *less formal* style used in village language and the *intimate and casual* style ascertained through participant observation. Labov (1966) defines casual style as "the everyday speech used in informal situations, where no attention is directed to language" (100). In Zafafa, the casual style is used in everyday speech at home, with neighbours, and with other acquaintances. The intimate style is used in the most informal situations, but characteristically with very close friends and members of one's immediate family.

The highest incidence of Hebrew lexical items is observed in the casual style (3.4%), then in the intimate style (1.7%), with a lower incidence in the careful style (0.6%). Two different forces appear to be at work here: on the one hand, Hebrew is avoided in the careful style because of the requirements of formality in Arabic discourse which occasion a pull towards Standard Arabic (see Amara, 1991). Its avoidance in the intimate style is perhaps a marker of solidarity. The value of Hebrew is recognised only in the casual style.

6. Recent Studies

Barta'a is a Palestinian village which in the wake of the 1948 Arab Israeli war was divided into an Eastern (Jordanian) and a Western (Israeli) part.⁵ Recent studies carried out in this village (see Amara and Spolsky, 1996; Spolsky and Amara, 1997) using structured interviews and participant observation corroborate the findings of the Zafafa studies discussed above. In the Barta'a studies, a total of 81 villagers were interviewed by three different interviewers.⁶ Forty were from Eastern Barta'a and 41 from Western Barta'a, half men and half women. Nineteen were born before 1948, 30 between 1948 and 1967, and 32 after 1967. The villagers from each part were approximately matched in terms of educational standard, with about 10 at each of elementary, junior high school, high school, and tertiary level. Occupations were also matched. A range of religious observance was represented in both samples, as were different degrees of contact with Jews. In this study, we will present our findings concerning the integration and diffusion of Hebrew lexical items in Arabic in relation to the Israeli part of the village only:

- (1) *Gender*: Males use the highest proportion of Hebrew words (2.2%), consistently utilising more borrowings from Hebrew than their female counterparts (0.6%). Those who score highest are younger men (3.9%), and those who score lowest are older females (0.3%).
- (2) *Age*: Youths use the highest number of Hebrew words (1.9%), followed by adults (1.3%) and then by older adults (0.7%). Use of Hebrew, then, decreases as the age of subjects increases; or, the older the respondent, the fewer Hebrew words he uses.

(3) *Education*: Use of Hebrew is most pronounced among university-educated respondents (2.6%), and least pronounced among illiterates (0.6%) and those with elementary education (0.5%).

(4) *Occupation*: Borrowings from Hebrew are most common among workers (2.1%) and professionals (2.5%) and least common among housewives (0.5%). This corroborates the findings of Amara's (1991) study in Zalafa, where work outside the village was regarded as the most plausible explanation for increased use of Hebrew lexical items.

(5) *Contact with Jews*: The more extensive a respondent's contact with Jews is, the higher the incidence of Hebrew borrowings in his speech. Those who come into contact daily with Israeli Jews use Hebrew most (2.5%). Those who have only rare or occasional contact with Jews use Hebrew least (0.7%). As in the Zalafa village the two main groups that act as conduits for the diffusion of Hebrew lexical items are professionals and construction workers.

Conclusion

The above discussion shows that the main source of linguistic innovation in Palestinian Arabic is Hebrew. English plays a secondary role in this process, which role it sometimes exercises indirectly via Hebrew as an intermediate donor language. The prestige of Hebrew stems from the association of Israeli culture with progress. Israel is regarded by the Palestinians as a modern and technologically advanced country, and as militarily superior to its Arab neighbours. These factors have impelled young Palestinians to learn Israeli patterns of behaviour as a means of development. Thus, young Palestinians read Hebrew newspapers and watch Hebrew television programmes. Nevertheless, different values are attached to Arabic and Hebrew. Israeli Palestinians are aware of the value of Arabic as a rich, beautiful and prestigious language; learning Hebrew is therefore, for them, a means of achieving standards of socio-economic development similar to those found among Israeli Jews in the social, educational and economic spheres (Amara 1986). This implies that Palestinians in Israel learn Hebrew for practical or instrumental reasons rather than integrative ones. This

orientation among Palestinians is related to the nature of Palestinian-Jewish relations in Israel in which the Jewishness of the state, the Israeli-Arab conflict and the patterns of separate settlement for both communities play an important role.

The evidence presented in this paper supports the assertion that sociolinguistic patterns reflect and transmit social and political changes. The ongoing process of modernisation in Israeli Palestinian society has led to the development of a relatively heterogeneous social structure, and this is reflected in the relatively low conformity to a single dialect or language among Palestinians. However, that same heterogeneity is constrained by the nature of the relationship between the Palestinian minority and the Jewish majority. It is in this context that Arabic plays an important role in identity conceptualisation for Palestinians in Israel.

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NOTES

- 1 The author of this paper wishes to thank Professor Yasir Suleiman for his many valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
- 2 Many identity constructs are used to refer to Palestinians in Israel. The Israeli establishment prefers the term Israeli Arabs, or Arabs in Israel. Others refer to them as Israeli Palestinians, or Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Nowadays, the widespread term among Palestinians is Palestinians in Israel, or the Palestinians of 1948.
- 3 In his pioneering study of language spread Cooper (1983) identifies as one of the major tasks of the new field the demonstration of the nature and extent of the process of diffusion. A spoken language variety presents a particular challenge, for the collection of evidence is much more difficult than when dealing with written sources. However, spoken language varieties are most susceptible

to change, since they are often free of the conservatism characteristic of written language. The Arabic language, which displays a wide gap between the Standard Classical variety and the local vernaculars, would seem to offer a particularly inviting case for study. Moreover, the rapid modernisation and increasing cultural contacts of Arab villages in Israel present ideal conditions for a study of the phenomenon.

⁴ For more details, see Amara and Spolsky, 1986.

⁵ Barta'a is a Palestinian village in the Ara valley, in the hills of Samaria, midway between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean. It lies approximately 15 kilometres north of the Israeli town of Hadera, and 25 kilometres south of the Israeli town of Afula and of the West Bank town Jenin. The Rhodes armistice agreement, signed in 1949 by the newly independent State of Israel and the newly named Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, arbitrarily drew a border through the middle of Barta'a. For the next twenty years, the village fell under two separate jurisdictions, with Eastern Barta'a under Jordanian rule and Western Barta'a under Israel. After the Six Day War of 1967, the village was again reunified when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

⁶ Some effects of these differences are discussed in Spolsky and Amara, 1995.

Livingstone and Lunt 1994); (b) since television is the most modern stage on which Self presentation as performance can be enacted (Goffman 1959), and since politicians are assumed to have an image of Self they wish to present, it follows that television interviews can serve as an effective platform for the delivery of the image concerned; (c) by virtue of their relying less on memorised texts and scripted language than political speeches television interviews are thought to be more spontaneous (Goffman 1981, b; Hutchby 1996) and, therefore, more likely to 'give off' information about Self through spoken strips of activity; and (d) since only very small portions of political speeches are normally shown on television due to 'sound bite' techniques, and since larger portions of television interviews are generally broadcast it is assumed that the latter are particularly suitable as data for the kind of research we will embark on here.

Theoretical Background

Self for Goffman is a social and interactional product rather than an individual psychological construct. Goffman sees the display of Self as performance in which the interlocutors are interested in both what others think of them and what they want others to think of them. Thus, in Goffman's own words (1959:252-3) Self is a "performed character, not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited". Goffman (1967:5) is further interested in the aspiration of individuals to be portrayed positively, which aspiration he encompasses within the notion of *face*:

...*face* may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes - albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

Goffman is interested in the dramaturgical effect of Self presentation. He makes a distinction between information we 'give'

CHAPTER FIVE

PRONOUNS AND SELF PRESENTATION IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE: YASSER ARAFAT AS A CASE STUDY

Camelia Suleiman

Preamble

This is a sociolinguistic study of the pronominal choices made by politicians in television interviews using Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), as a case study.¹ I argue that the selection of personal pronouns by politicians reflects aspects of Self they portray to the public (whether intentionally or unintentionally). In conducting this research I will rely on Erving Goffman's concepts of *Self* and *footing*, and his participation framework in which the notions of *principal* and *figure* are deployed to argue that Arafat's choice of pronouns in English television interviews is seen to be commensurate with his power (imagined or real) and his capacity (or lack of it) to resolve outstanding issues in the Middle East peace process. For this purpose I classify Arafat's Self presentation under four *footings*: authority, legitimacy, responsibility, and peace making.

Studies on the use of pronouns to gain an insight into the ways politicians present Self has so far tended to concentrate on political speeches as data (see Maitland and Wilson 1987; Wilson 1990; De Fina 1995). This study departs from this trend by investigating data drawn from television interviews in their capacity as well-defined speech events in which an interviewer asks questions and an interviewee answers them (Al-'Aridi 1986; Blum-Kulka 1983). The choice of television interviews is motivated by the following factors: (a) the popularity of this medium in the political arena as a means through which politicians can communicate with the public with the aim of exerting influence over them (see Brekle 1989, Lakoff 1990,

voluntarily to other people about ourselves and information which we 'give off' involuntarily, or at least we pretend it is not voluntary (Goffman 1959). The information 'given' and 'given off' determines how Self is presented. This presentation of Self is strongly bonded with the social roles we play in any particular interaction. Thus, Goffman is not concerned with the definition of Self consistently across time but rather with the roles that people play at different occasions as social actors (cf. Goffman 1974).

Self as a performed character in social interactions is transformed in Goffman's later work into the concept of *figure* in his participation framework. In this context, Goffman treats language as one of the many resources that allow a glimpse into the underlying social order. His main interest here lies in "how the organisation of social life (in institutions, interactions) provides contexts in which the conduct of self and communication with others can be made sense of" (Schiffman 1994:105).

Central to Self presentation in Goffman's approach is the concept of *footing* which signifies the alignments and stances which interlocutors take towards theirs' and others' utterances in a given speech activity. Thus, a change of *footing* would lead to a change of alignments and stances. Goffman mentions a number of indicators of the change of alignments and stances, including those of prosody, code-switching, the use of pronouns, and shifts in tone, no matter how slight these may be. Changes in *footing* may be studied by investigating how the participants locate themselves in relation to an utterance. Thus, an utterance may be used as a vehicle for expressing the speaker's beliefs or sentiments, or it may be treated as a channel through which information passes from the speaker to the hearer as in normal news broadcasting.

The main aim of the participation framework is to deliver a proper understanding of the production and reception of utterances, which cannot simply be reduced to a simple mechanical relationship between the speaker and the hearer. Reception of an utterance can be ratified or unratiated (as in overhearing and eavesdropping). The production of an utterance is related to the following entities: *animator*, *principal*, *author*, and *figure*. The *animator* is the one who utters the words; the *author* is the one who is emotionally responsible for the utterance; the *principal* is the one whose beliefs are involved in the utterance; and the *figure* is the image of Self one wants to convey. Thus, *figure* is the product of the other three facets of participation. In the study which

will follow, the only facet of the participation framework to vary is the *principal*. This variance causes a change in *footing* and, consequently, in *figure* or projected Self.²

Pronouns and the Projection of Self

Within the participation framework pronouns constitute significant markers of changes of alignments and stances. Since the seminal work of Brown and Gilman (1960) on how pronouns index the social relations of power and solidarity in a communicative act, the study of pronouns in use has been a fruitful area of research (see De Fina, 1995; Maitland and Wilson 1987, Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990; Wilson 1990). Brown and Gilman (1960) deal with idealised situations of pronominal use which they categorise according to the degree of intimacy between interlocutors and to their social status. Maitland and Wilson (1987) and Wilson (1990) show how British politicians' use of pronouns enables particular interpretations of what they say to emerge. In particular these researchers believe that the pronominal choices of made by British politicians are explicable on a scale whose outer limits are defined by involvement and distance, which implies that individual variations between politicians do exist.³ De Fina's (1995) study of political speeches in Mexican Spanish builds on Maitland and Wilson's and Wilson's involvement-distance scale to argue that politicians choose pronouns to communicate the following messages: involvement with the topic, identification with certain groups or people, and commitment to the speaker's own words (De Fina 1995:379). By relating pronouns to *footing* within participation framework I hope to show in this study how Yasser Arafat's choice of pronouns in English television interviews relates to his political power and capacity (real or imagined) to resolve recalcitrant issues in the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. In particular this study will depart from De Fina's findings by showing that it is not Arafat's commitment to his own words, his identification with certain groups, or his involvement with the topic he addresses that matters, but his power to change the course of the events he is talking about. The same applies to Maitland and Wilson's notions of involvement and distance which in this study must give way to the notion of power as an interpretative concept.

Data Analysis

In this research we have relied on two interviews. The first interview between Yasser Arafat and Yael Dan (Israeli TV broadcaster) was twenty-six minutes long and was broadcast on 21 August, 1996 on Channel 2 of Israeli TV. The second interview between Arafat and Larry King on *Larry King Live* (CNN) was twenty-two minutes long and was broadcast on September 13, 1993 just after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).⁴ As mentioned earlier, the use of pronouns by Arafat as a means of presentation of Self in these interviews congregated around the following *footings*: authority, legitimacy, responsibility, and peace making.

Arafat's Authority

The interviews reveal that Arafat uses the pronoun *I* whenever he wants to talk about his authority as the leader of the Palestinians and as Israel's negotiating partner, something former American President Jimmy Carter avoided in order not to sound autocratic (Wilson, 1990). In the following excerpt Dan asks Arafat if he can make peace with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

Example 1: ⁵

D: And you can do it with Netanyahu?

A: He is trying to avoid to meet me now.

D: And you will meet him soon?

A: *I I am wa I am the most important figure in the Middle East dilemma, in the Middle East equation.*

If we look closely at this excerpt in terms of the production format of the participation framework, we will see that Arafat portrays himself as the *principal* and the *author* of the utterance. Thus, he projects a *figure*, or image of Self, as one who has the power and the capacity to change things in the Middle East.

Arafat's sense of authority and power is also underscored in his interview with Larry King as in the following example:

Example 2:

K: Well, people are saying that you've changed. You were much harder-line, you were much more militant. Is it ageing? Is it a happy marriage? Is it...

A: Not to forget, *I am the man who gave the approval for Sadat for the joint Arab delegation in Geneva with PLO representation. And it is me who gave the approval to Gromyko, for your information, before coming here to see Mr. Vance. The approval of 242- It was in '77-*

K: Before Sadat? Before camp David?

A: Yes. Yes. Yes, before Camp David. So I am a pragmatic man.

By projecting himself as the *principal* and *author* of his utterances above, as signalled by his use of the pronoun *I* and its variant *Me*, Arafat portrays a Self which is powerful and authoritative, so authoritative in fact that he seems to envisage himself to have been the one who gave Sadat and Andrei Gromyko the approval they needed to proceed with the search for peace with Israel in 1977.

Arafat's Legitimacy

The interviews reveal that Arafat uses the pronoun *I*, but in a passive capacity, when he talks about the legitimacy of his leadership. Here the agent who gave him power is not himself, but the Palestinian people.

Example 3:

D: What I am asking what power do you have now since you gave up terror. You gave up violence. What power...?

A: Do you think my power is from terror?

D: What power do you have now?

A: I am not to forget that ... I am, *I have been elected by the Palestinian people. I am representing the Palestinian people. And I am, I had been elected in the PNC [Palestinian National Council], uh* also, not only that. I am not alone. Our Palestinian people are with us. The the Arab world is with us.

Arafat here is the *author*, but not the *principal*, as the sentence structure is in the passive. His power as an agent is derived from the fact that the Palestinian people elected him. The projected Self, or *figure*, he depicts here is that of someone who does not have the power, or capacity to act or rule independently. The pronominal use of *I* in a passive capacity here prompts a *footing* of legitimacy based on democracy while, at the same time, portraying a *figure* of someone who believes in the legitimacy of his rule.

In another example from the interview with Dan, Arafat says that the source of his power "is the choice of my people":

Example 4:

D: How come you became the one and only leader for *filistin* [Palestine] [sic]. How did this happen? What do you think? What is your secret power? What is your secret of of survival, what what is it?

A: *This is the choice of my people, not my choice. My people is* [incomprehensible].

We notice in this example the total lack of agency on Arafat's part. He uses the demonstrative *this*, and avoids using the first person pronouns. Again he depicts a *figure*, or Self, that is elected by the people but without power over their decisions. This mode of Self presentation has the effect of stressing the democratic manner in which Arafat was brought to power after the Oslo Accords with Israel.

Arafat's Responsibility

A third aspect of Arafat's Self can be seen in his taking responsibility with others for the fight against terrorism in the Middle East. When asked by Dan in the following excerpt about what he would do to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel (implying that Hamas is conducting these terror attacks to stop the peace process), Arafat uses the pronoun *We* and its variant form *Our* to refer inclusively to himself and to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as the agents in the fight against terrorism. By dividing the *principal* into himself and the PNA, Arafat projects the fight against terrorism as a shared or collective responsibility in which he is a partner, implying in the process the existence of a national consensus on the issue to allay the

fears of Palestinians who may accuse him of being solely responsible for this fight in the interest of Israel.

Example 5:

D: Signing this agreement, and since then you have taken lot's of very difficult and I should say brave decisions, do you have, do you regret any of it? I think from even your point of view you should regret the fact that you didn't do enough to prevent the horrible terroristic attacks that happened in Israel and maybe were the reason, one of the reasons for the political upset in Israel.

A: Look. Let us speak frankly. *We have done all what we can do.* And you can ask.

D: Not from the beginning.

A: No, from the beginning.

D: From the beginning?

A: From the beginning. And don't forget that *we had started* in a very very difficult conditions. Because when *we had arrived* all *we* had received our territories, were all *our* infrastructures had been completely destroyed. And *we are starting from there*, from everything. You have to to remember that *we are doing all our best*....

By using the collective *We* above Arafat implies that fighting terror is something which requires the collective effort of the PNA, since it is beyond his ability to carry it out single-handedly. Hence, the *principal* of this utterance is not Arafat on his own, but both Arafat and the PNA. This position is maintained in the following excerpt from the *Larry King Live* interview:

Example 6:

K: How about when it comes from-How about Abu Nidal, people on your side of the fence?

A: Oh, *Abu Nidal or the others, they* are a part of *our* troubles. And Abu Nidal is not a Palestinian category or figure. He is - You know, he is working with some other elements everywhere.

Here Arafat refers to Abu Nidal and other Palestinians who oppose him in making peace with Israel by the pronoun *They*. By using this pronoun and *Our* Arafat depicts his opponents as a group that is separate from him and the rest of the Palestinian people. By using these pronouns Arafat does not present himself as the *principal* for the utterance, thus projecting a *figure* or image of Self who stands against these groups, though not alone. Put differently, by using the above pronouns Arafat takes a *footing* of partial responsibility towards fighting terror.

Arafat as Peace Maker

Arafat portrays himself as *the* peace maker and leader who, by being totally in charge of the peace process, can bring peace to the region. Arafat presents a Self that is loyal to the cause of peace in spite of the many obstacles facing the peace process. His use of the pronoun *I* in the following excerpt with Dan is similar to that in the *footing* of authority dealt with above.

Example 7:

D: You wanted us to wait?

A: To wait what?

D: For you? To stop Abu Ayyash. You didn't do it.

A: Terror against terror. Peace is not pressure than anything else.

When the massacre had done in the in the mosque of Hebron,
I continued the peace process.

By using the pronoun *I* Arafat projects himself as the *author* and *principal* of the utterance and, therefore, as a *figure* who has both the power and capacity to bring about peace. The use of the pronoun *I* is indicative of that power and capacity. The same *figure* is involved in the next segment where Arafat talks about his participation in the peace process.

Example 8:

D: What was the hardest moment for you in your life? Can you tell me?

A: The hardest moment?

D: Yes.

A: *When I had decided to follow up the peace process*. Because because it became ...

D: When was it? Oh to go with it

A: To go with it?

D: to sign it?

A: Not to sign it, *to go to Madrid*. It wasn't easy,

D: Uh.

A: but after that, after many discussions in the Palestinian leadership we had agreed upon by majority, but not by *uh* unanimously.

D: I could think of the hard time you had in Lebanon, during the war.

A: No, it was not a hard time!

Even though Arafat physically did not go to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, he portrays himself as the central figure in the Palestinians' decision to participate in the conference, a fact reflected in the use of the pronoun *I* in the first italicised string above.

The same *figure* emerges in the interview with Larry King (example 10), a *figure* that is different from the one presented in the preceding section.

Example 10:

K: Yes. The decision to lean forward to shake hands with Mr. Rabin, did you know were going to do that?

A: Yes.

K: In the morning, did you know it?

A: Before that. *I am coming here not to play. I am coming here to shake hands* with my previous enemy, but now we have to coordinate in the future for the sake of our two people.

It is clear from the above excerpts that Arafat believes that it is within his capacity as a leader to achieve peace, to go to Washington and to shake hands with Rabin. Later in the interview with King, Arafat stresses his central role in the peace process *footing* by repeating the pronoun *I* and its counterpart *my* in the following excerpt:

Example 11:

K: This is not a new Arafat?

A: No, *I* am a pragmatic. *I* am not dealing for my self. *I am dealing for the sake of my people*. Where is the future of *my* people, where is the interests of *my* people, *I* will follow it. *I* can understand now, we are in the new order after the end of the Cold War.

The *figure* of Arafat as the *principal* and *author* in the above example contrasts sharply with the *figure* he presents in the following excerpt from the Dan interview. Here Arafat projects an image of Self that is agentless with respect to the thorny issues of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and in relation to the status of Jerusalem.

Example 12:

D: I wanna ask you, what are you going to do, if this government is not gonna fulfill the decision to redeploy Hebron. What are you going to do? What are you going to do if uh the settlements will expand, what are you going to do?

A: You have to remember that *it is agreement*. *It is not a bilateral agreement*. This agreement is international agreement. *It had been in Oslo 1, and Oslo 2*, had been signed under the supervision of President Clinton, and another agreement had been signed under the supervision of President Mubarak.

In this excerpt the lack of agency on Arafat's part is signalled by the absence of any personal pronouns, making him the *author* but not the *principal* of his own utterances. This in turn is indicative of the fact that the resolution of certain issues in the peace process is seen by Arafat to require the involvement of other actors since it is beyond his capacity alone to resolve these issues. This lack of agency gets even clearer in the next excerpt:

Example 13:

D: Chairman Arafat, I wanna go further. Tell me, we all know that you are not gonna be satisfied with what was agreed upon in Oslo. You do want a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital city. Right?

A: With East Jerusalem.

D: You do want it. Right? Now, please

A: *This* is a Holy place.

D: I know. Did you get any promise from any Israeli, any promise concerning Jerusalem? Did you?

A: No.

D: Nothing at all.

A: But we had agreed upon, and there is a letter of guarantees from the American administration since we went to Madrid that Jerusalem has to be left for [incomprehensible]... discussion

The use of the demonstrative pronoun *This* above and the avoidance of the use of any personal pronouns clearly indicates the lack of agency on Arafat's part when he talks about the City of Jerusalem. In the interview with Larry King Arafat projects a stronger agency over the issue of Jerusalem.

Example 14:

K: You're doing very well with the poor language, very well. There is maybe a misconception, but you have talked over the past two days about going to Jerusalem. Mr. Rabin doesn't seem to think that you're going to Jerusalem. Help me on this.

A: He's speaking about his Jerusalem. *I* am speaking about *my* Jerusalem.

K: We're thinking about two different places.

A: Yes. And ask the American administration.

K: What do they say?

A: They said that you can't accept the annexation of Jerusalem who had been occupied since - or what had been called the Arab Jerusalem, or the Holy City of Jerusalem.

K: So when you say, 'I will be back in Jerusalem,' you don't mean-

A: I am speaking about this Holy - the Old City, where the holy places are there: Christians and Moslems -

K: And Jews.

A: And Jews - no doubt.

Arafat's stronger agency in the above excerpt may be attributed to the circumstances of the interview of which it is a part. The fact that Larry King interviewed Arafat right after the signing of the Oslo Accords probably meant that Arafat was more optimistic about the prospects of a compromise solution over the city. He probably reasoned that the seemingly active involvement of the Americans as sponsors of the peace process and Rabin's willingness to place the issue of Jerusalem on the agenda for future negotiations offered the prospect for an agreement over the final status of the city. This explains Arafat's construction of a shared agency in relation to Jerusalem in which, in addition to himself, both the Americans and Rabin are partners. In the interview with Dan Arafat is more vague about his agency, reflecting his powerlessness in relation to the issue of Jerusalem in the wake of the election of the hardline Likud-led coalition government in Israel in 1996.

Conclusion

The use of pronouns in the *footings* of authority, legitimacy, responsibility and peace making in the two interviews dealt with above reveals a distinctive presentation of Self on the part of Arafat. The variation in Arafat's use of pronouns, and thus his *footings*, reflects the varying degrees of power and capability he sees himself to have over the course of events in the Middle East process. Tables 1 and 2 present a quantitative picture of pronoun use in each interview.

Table 1: The Dan Interview:
Number of Pronouns Used in Each *Footing*

	I/Me	We/Us	(I)+ Passive	They	It (Dummy) /This	Total
Authority	23	1	0	0	6	30
Legitimacy	7	4	4	1	2	18
Responsibility	33	21	9	3	8	74
Peace-Making	16	8	3	3	27	57
Total	79	34	16	7	43	179

Table 2: Larry King Live Interview:
Number of Pronouns Used in Each *Footing*

	I/Me	We/Us	(I)+ Passive	They	It (Dummy) /This	Total
Authority	36	3	0	1	3	43
Legitimacy	0	5	1	1	0	7
Responsibility	0	0	0	3	0	3
Peace-Making	25	37	4	2	14	82
Total	61	45	5	7	17	135

Table 1, and 2 show that overall Arafat uses the pronouns *I* and its variant *Me* the most in both interviews. When Arafat is speaking about his authority he uses the pronouns *I* and *Me* extensively in both interviews (23 and 36 times with Dan and King respectively). Arafat also uses *I* and *Me* frequently with Dan (33 times) when he is presenting himself as a responsible leader.⁶ Since the issue of peace making is in focus in the interview with King, Arafat also uses *I* and *Me* 25 times. However, in the interview with Dan, Arafat's use of *I* and *Me* in reference to peace making occurs 16 times only. The legitimacy of Arafat's rule is less of a personal issue in the interview with Dan

(only 7 tokens of *I* and *Me*), and not at all an issue in the interview with King.

As far as the pronoun *We* and its variant *Us* is concerned, we notice that they are used 21 times in the interview with Dan in the responsibility *footing*, but not once in the interview with King, perhaps because this *footing* receives little attention in the interview in question. In contradistinction, *We* and *Us* occur 37 times when King discusses peace making with Arafat. This reflects the relevant weightings of the two *footings* concerned in the two interviews which, as suggested at the end of the preceding section, is to some extent related to the state of the peace process at the time of the interviews. However, the overall use of *We* and *Us* in the two interviews (34 tokens in the Dan interview, and 45 tokens in the King interview) is lower than that of *I* and *Me* (79 tokens in the Dan interview and 61 tokens in the King interview).

The dummy *It* and the demonstrative *This* are used by Arafat more frequently in the Dan interview (43 times) than in the King interview (17 times) in connection with the peace making *footing*. In both interviews Arafat uses *It* and *This* most in connection with peace making (27 and 14 times with Dan and King, respectively). This may be attributed to the fact that Arafat felt that the future of the peace process was less clear at the time of the Dan interview than he did at the time of the King interview. *It* and *This* are also used, but less frequently, in connection with the legitimacy and responsibility *footings* in the interview with Dan.

The interviews also show that *I+passive* and *They* are less frequent in the two interviews than the pronouns dealt with in the preceding two paragraphs. Yet these pronominal structures confirm the general findings of this study concerning Arafat's four different *footings*. Thus Arafat's use of the *I+passive* structure in the responsibility *footing* suggests that he considers this responsibility to be a joint affair in the fight against terrorism.

On a scale of personal commitment - what is within Arafat's capacity and power and what is not - one can observe that the use of the pronoun *I* is the most committed. *I* is used when Arafat is the *principal* and *author* of the utterance. When his agency is weaker he moves gradually to the less committed *We*, then the less committed *They* in reference to the American administration and their role in the issue of Jerusalem. Arafat also uses the passive voice with *I* whenever he wishes to project an image Self that is less powerful and capable to influence events than is otherwise assumed. Lastly, the least committed

of Arafat's pronominal choices is the total avoidance of personal pronouns. In situations of this kind he uses the demonstrative *This* and the dummy *It*.

Arafat's stylistic use of pronouns is scalar in form, ranging from the action he believes he is most capable of doing and to which he is most committed to the action he thinks he is least capable of doing or to which he is least committed, as follows:

I	We	I+Passive	They	It(dummy) / This
Most powerful				Least powerful
Most capable of doing				Least capable of doing
Most capable to commit				Least capable to commit

This scale is similar to the scale proposed by Maitland and Wilson (1987), and Wilson (1990) in their studies of the pronominal choices in the speeches of British politicians. However, both authors consider this scale to be a function of the scales of involvement *versus* distance. In Arafat's case, the scale relates to whether he is committed and able to do things or not. Arafat's pattern of pronominal use in the two interviews studied here reflects a presentation of Self that is explicable in terms of this scale.

We are of course aware that these findings require further research to ascertain the consistency with which Arafat deploys pronominal choices in the manner suggested above. In particular further research is needed to compare Arafat's pronominal choices in English with the same in Arabic. The fact that Arafat's use of pronouns in the above interviews seems to accord in broad terms with the results obtained in other data involving other politicians using other languages may be taken to lend support to our findings here.

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NOTES

- ¹ I would like to thank Dr Colleen Cotter, Russell E. Lucas and Fr. Daniel O'Connell for their help in writing this paper. I am particularly grateful to Professor Yasir Suleiman whose input into this paper has been instrumental in significantly reshaping it.
- ² Note also that a change of *footing* for Goffman represents a change in the frame of events (see Goffman 1981, a:128). Frames are the "organisational and interactional principles by which situations are defined and sustained by experience" (Schiffrin 1994:104). Goffman does not explain further what he means by change in the frame of events. Thus, hypothetically different *footings* may compose one general frame. For example, a joking frame may consist of different *footings* depending on the speaker's attitude towards the utterances making up the frame concerned.
- ³ Maitland and Wilson (1987) and Wilson (1990) adapted Rees' (1983) model for the use of pronouns, with the basic assumption that the most inward pronoun is *I* and its variants *Me, My* and *Mine* followed by *You* (direct address), *One, You* (indefinite), *She, he* and *They*.
- ⁴ The Oslo Accords, signed at the White House in Washington DC in September 1993, gave Palestinians limited self-rule in Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza, excluding Arab East Jerusalem which Israel annexed in 1967.
- ⁵ In the transcripts Arafat is referred to as (A), the Israeli interviewer Yael Dan as (D) and the American interviewer Larry King as (K).
- ⁶ Since the two interviews do not deal with exactly the same set of themes, the *footings* of responsibility and legitimacy do not arise in the interview with King owing to the fact that this interview focused on the newly signed peace accords with Israel.

stamp of official urgency: the post-independence regimes have held a dual discourse, inscribing French/Standard Arabic bilingualism in the postcolonial administration and in the school system in the name of development and modernisation, while, *at the same time*, advocating 'Arabisation' as a sacred goal, essential to achieve proper emancipation from the after effects of colonisation.

It has often been claimed that language policy twists and damages cultural evolution and that the resulting linguistic change depersonalises entire populations by forcing them against their will into an alien mindset or into a cultural no man's land. It is also possible to argue, on the other hand, that other factors are at play, at the more fundamental level of the individual speaker and their personal strategies. This paper will attempt to put things into perspective. It will look at the interaction between language policy and individual choice among populations of Maghrebian culture, in the context of this French/Arabic dilemma; it will suggest that the spread of French and of bilingual practice after independence followed the same patterns as any language change in a multilingual society. It will point out, however, that this was made especially painful by the contradictions of official discourse which have inflamed the language issue by creating a guilt-inducing conflict of loyalties for individual speakers.

2. *Language Policy: its Past Record in the 'Francophone' Maghreb*

It is hard not to be impressed by the spectacular results of cultural and linguistic normalisation under the French republican system, both at home and in its former empire. Similarly, it is hard not to note the spectacular increase in the number of bilinguals in the Maghreb since the French left and the independent government's generalised bilingual education - or indeed the progress of Arabisation in schools in Algeria once the authorities abandoned the bilingual approach, particularly from the late 1970's onwards. On both sides of the Mediterranean, the use of French was equated with the need to modernise, to partake of Western European socio-economic development. Modernity, in this context, is strongly associated with the movement of ideas of the European Enlightenment, and especially those of the French Revolution. Arabic was, in the context of the Maghreb, linked to the assertion of Arab-Islamic identity.

CHAPTER SIX

LANGUAGE CHOICE, LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE TRADITION-MODERNITY DEBATE IN CULTURALLY MIXED POSTCOLONIAL COMMUNITIES: FRANCE AND THE 'FRANCOPHONE' MAGHREB AS A CASE STUDY

Hélène Gill

1. *Introduction*

Linguistic and cultural identity, language as a token and as a marker of cultural or national unity are themes which have grown in visibility in the postcolonial era. This preoccupation is not a novelty: it had, for instance, troubled nineteenth century Europe, where it inspired some energetic and far reaching policy making. In practice, the efficiency of language policy, for good or bad, can appear to be a foregone conclusion. The jacobine inspired reforms of the French Third Republic were a prime example of the potency of voluntarist language planning ruthlessly applied from the top, and in many ways, these methods directly influenced language and education policies in the Maghreb after independence. It should be noted at this juncture that the French republican pattern of cultural domination is quite different from the British approach, in that it constantly refers to a universalist message which is, amongst other things, a denial of ethnicity. This fact seems to prove another point: it illustrates the effectiveness of associating the campaigning language with a collective ideal; it becomes the language of national unity and authenticity, but it can also be the language of progress, of liberty, of civilisation itself.¹

In this context, the twin abstract constructs of tradition and modernity have both been used liberally, either in opposition to each other, or, paradoxically, simultaneously. In the Maghreb, this paradox was taken to extremes. It concerned the advocacy of two separate languages, in the pursuit of polarised aims, but both with the

The ideology behind the politics which started with the first French revolution had inherent in its radical political project a vast, ambitious and equally radical *cultural agenda* of language unity. Inherent in this project was also a conviction of its universal value. This project could not, however, be properly implemented until some eighty years later, when the campaign for the eradication of minority or dissident cultures and dialects was seriously undertaken - with staggering success. It is not insignificant, therefore, that this period of cultural normalisation in France, which has been described by regionalist critics as a form of internal imperialism, coincided with the main phase of expansion of the French empire overseas. It was a relatively small step to extend the campaign of cultural unity to the four corners of the empire. The great figure of contemporary politics, Jules Ferry, was at the same time the main promoter of overseas expansion and the founder of the state primary school system, *l'école républicaine*; the modernist universalism which sanctioned the elimination of regional idioms, also inspired the assimilationist theories which attracted many proponents of overseas expansion, especially on the left; aspiring school teachers with insufficient qualifications to be posted in France could opt to be sent to the colonies. In contrast to the poor success of the religious missions, secular French and 'Franco-Arab' schools flourished in all three North African possessions, and spread the modernist Republican message, together with fluency in the French language among a sizable proportion of the local urban elite. For evident budgetary reasons, it was never the intention of the French state to educate, and therefore 'modernise' the entire population of its North African colonies and protectorates, nor to extend the school system, *l'école coloniale*, to both sexes. However, it did produce a post-conquest elite of a certain distinctive cultural make-up, some of whom, significantly, were called at the time *les évolués*. The word itself suggests, or so it seems, that an intensive, accelerated exercise in applied cultural engineering, on darwinian evolutionary lines, had taken place through the medium of French schooling. The top end of the colonial education system thus succeeded in developing, in one generation, a category of Maghrebians who spoke French with native fluency, and whose intellectual and artistic tastes, attitudes and mannerisms were often indistinguishable from those of their counterparts in metropolitan France. Furthermore, most of the leaders of the independence struggles were French speaking or bilingual. Bourguiba, the 'Supreme Warrior' of Tunisian independence,

spoke good Arabic but was also a French law and literature scholar; many of the leaders of the Algerian FLN only spoke broken Arabic; some could not read or write it.

Once in power, it is no wonder, therefore, that this class of French-educated leaders set out to modernise the states they inherited from colonial rule along ambiguous lines (Grandguillaume, 1983). Throughout the sixties, countless official speeches justified the perpetuation of French/Arabic bilingualism in education, and the use of French in commerce and in a large part of the administrative system. These moves multiplied exponentially the number of fluent and partial French speakers, since until then, schooling of any kind had been restricted to an elite 12% or so of the native population (Moatassime, 1992:23). Though there were pressing material grounds to reform education in this way, the bilingual system was repeatedly justified in the name of modernist goals such as social progress and economic development. The new, highly centralised education systems were derived from the French model. They relied on a large supply of young French nationals to staff their schools and universities. Over the years, these were gradually replaced by locally trained teachers, but the structure remained, with some alterations, and so did the habit of teaching some essential subjects in French.²

It was, arguably, in order to compensate for the continued reliance on the language of the former coloniser that the authorities embarked simultaneously - and paradoxically, on ambitious 'Arabisation' programmes, by gradually substituting standard Arabic for French in areas where French speakers still had a monopoly. In Algeria, where Arabic-educated staff had been hardest to find, Arabisation was suddenly intensified in the 1970's by bringing in a cohort of teachers from the Middle-East to face baffled students, without transition. Elsewhere, the Arabisation process has been painfully slow.

Official discourse insisted that the use of French was meant to be purely instrumental. By contrast, Modern Standard Arabic, the national language, was promoted as the spearhead of Arab-Muslim authenticity, the only identity recognised as legitimate in the postcolonial era. In all three countries, meanwhile, the general public was bound to deduce that if French had to be kept on as the key to social progress, Arabic must stand for the past, for nostalgia, for a warm but backward-looking sense of authenticity. Furthermore, the slow progress of Arabisation, and the scarcity of genuine job outlets for the graduates of 'Arabised' courses have contributed to the cultural and linguistic polarisation

which can be witnessed today. This equivocal system awarded a quasi-sacred status to the Arabic language - a claim which, in many ways, chimed in with suppressed but forceful voices from these countries' oppositions. But in actual fact, Arabic was left to languish in the camp of the traditionalists, only, in time, to be brandished as the emblem of radical religious and/or identity politics. Thus, the schizophrenic discourses of the past three or four decades have defined two factions in Maghrebian society along a mythical tradition/modernity divide. This state of affairs has been denounced in studies on bilingualism in the Maghreb throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Many authors present the problem as reflecting an unequal transaction whereby cultural influence from the modern, dynamic West is passively absorbed by traditional cultures. Studies often point to the responsibility of language policy initiatives by postcolonial governments (Moatassime, 1982:38-39; Fitouri, 1983:71-75). What is certain is that the contradictions between identity-enhancing official discourse and language practice on the ground, threaten to flare up into social protest whenever economic circumstances cease to be favourable. At any given time, meanwhile, bilingual speakers are faced with the necessity to choose between, on the one hand, developing their competence in the language of economic progress, the language of membership of what remains a cosmopolitan social elite - and, on the other hand, their sense of belonging to a wider, though less culturally, and socially, mobile community.

3. *Language Choices and Individual Strategies: The Role of the Speaker*

At individual, 'grassroots' level, language choices in every day situations, and language shift in terms of the preponderance of one language or another in a complicated context of bi- or trilingualism, follow subtle mechanisms which reflect personal situations and strategies. These strategies may straddle the tradition-modernity divide, or they may express it according to the speakers' own perceptions. They are, obviously, influenced by language policy in terms of official encouragement or discouragement, and in terms of the availability of second language training and development. But they respond to more pragmatic and immediate motivations. They are likely to be prompted by an objective configuration of options and of circumstances of which

language policy is only a factor, rather than by a governments' mission statements or by a major clash of civilisations.

In this domain, the study of language choices by individual speakers has shown how choice is motivated on the ground. One such study on Morocco by Abdelali Bentahila published in the 1980's confirmed that speakers modulate their language choice according to the expectations of interlocutors and according to the kind of information or materials available through each idiom. Broadly speaking, it found that respondents associated French speech with categories which it labelled as: *modern, educated, open minded, important, and resemblance desired*,³ whereas the same speakers speaking in Arabic were given such labels as *religious, sociable, emotional and entertaining*. It also found that the language preferred by a majority of educated bilingual Moroccans when it came to reading books and newspapers was French. As for self-expression, almost half preferred French, as opposed to a third who preferred Arabic (Bentahila 1983: 52-72). These findings confirm those of two surveys conducted earlier in Tunis by Zohra Riahi and Habib Ounali (1970) which showed that Tunisian '6th formers' and students overwhelmingly preferred written materials and media products in French and tended to write spontaneous notes in that language too (Riahi, 1970:152-153). A small scale informal study based on a questionnaire, conducted in Carthage in 1993, showed similar preferences in language choice for educated young adults (Gill, 1996:116). The author of one of the earlier surveys, however, noted that a group session had produced some sharp exchanges among her respondents, with the minority who preferred books and films in Arabic denouncing the others for betraying their Arab identity (Riahi, 1970:150).

The same survey suggests that French is used with bureaucrats in order to impress, but also to ensure prompt and proper service, and to create a distance which erases all trace of familiarity (Riahi, 1970:132-134; Ounali, 1970:205). With the police, however, Bentahila noted that a Moroccan bilingual would naturally speak Arabic, in order to claim good citizenship and group loyalty, confirming the association of Arabic with national identity and authenticity - as well as compliance with official policy attempts to encourage 'Arabisation'. Similarly, when in doubt, i.e. with a complete stranger, Arabic would be used spontaneously, as an unmarked alternative, in case the interlocutor does not know French, or may have negative attitudes towards its use. In conversations among educated friends, on the other hand, French or a

French-Arabic mixture was often the norm (Bentahila, 1983:56-57). A more recent study concerning Morocco yielded very similar responses on language use, to a deliberately similar set of questions.⁴ Bilingual respondents from a provincial town in Western Morocco, said that they used French at work (in 42% of cases), with bilingual friends (35%), and in 'other situations' (44%). In interviews, these 'other situations' turned out to mean reading (books, newspapers), as well as letter writing, and of course watching films and French-language TV (Marley & Zitouni, 1996:184-185). Interestingly, this study also includes non-bilingual, and even a few illiterate respondents. When asked if they would like to learn French and why, these monolingual dialect speakers replied overwhelmingly 'yes': to get a better job (44%), to get to know another culture (44%), for 'other reasons' - again mainly for access to the French-language media - (37%).⁵ The majority of respondents thought that the best language for the future of Morocco was... 'several languages', with this option scoring far better than Standard Arabic or French on their own. This absence of prejudice towards multilingualism is, according to the study, particularly clear among the less educated. It concedes on the other hand that the more educated among the bilinguals tend to favour Standard Arabic out of nationalist sentiment. At the same time, it notes that on the whole, those who know French are "conscious of the advantages attached to the ability to use it, [and] would not be willing to give it up, even if they are otherwise outraged by its presence as a reminder of colonialism" (Marley & Ould-Dada, 1996:198-199, my translation). Even in contemporary Algeria, where Arabisation in schools has been conducted most effectively, and with increased vigour since the late 1970's, Khaoula Taleb Ibrahim notes in a very recent study: "The use of French still prevails in business life... French language newspapers and magazines have the largest circulation... TV broadcasts in French, originating both from home and from abroad remain preponderant, and still get high ratings" (Taleb Ibrahim, 1997:44-45, my translation). A curious state of affairs, to say the least, in the present political climate, and in the face of what Taleb Ibrahim terms "the official position of denial" (Ibid.:45) of the authorities concerning the status of this residual but effective second language.

From these remarks emerges a confused socio-cultural picture at individual speaker level - reflected in language choices and attitudes - which betrays signs of uneasiness with bilingualism involving French: feelings of split loyalties, self-questioning and self-censorship.

Ultimately, it shows how, on the ground, choices guided by a commonplace wish for self-valorisation somehow conflict with loyalty to one's country - a country whose post-independence leaders made that choice available to the people in the first place.

4. *Personal Strategies: Self-image, Class and Life-style*

Changes in language practice occur in times of socio-economic change, for reasons of adjustment by the speakers to the new circumstances and to the new image of themselves which they wish to project to listeners and interlocutors: a new set of speakers re-interpret and put to their own functional use connotations of social, identity and status which are commonly associated with the different idioms available. Obviously, in the Maghrebian context, it is not a question of French wiping out in the long term the use of Arabic and first language idioms and dialects for the entire population. Rather, it is the spread, in the postcolonial era, of bilingualism involving French, versus monolingualism, or, to date, any other language combination.

The social shift involved in this context is of course the post-independence drive towards economic development. This effort was, from the outset, strongly dependent on economic networks mediated through French language practice. The use of French was, moreover, still suffused with the same connotations of prestige and efficiency as in colonial days. Indeed, for some, independence could be said to have cleansed the language from its direct association with the coloniser. Furthermore, the drive towards development and the huge jobs shake up that it produced, along with urbanisation, the tertiarisation of the economy, and the departure of the colonial elite created large numbers of white-collar job vacancies in a system designed to operate in French. French/Arabic bilingualism was the passport to such jobs and the rising post-independence generation was ready to be trained to take up the challenge. This situation fuelled a strong aspirational logic. Bilingualism was linked to the desire for an urban lifestyle, for a sophisticated self-image referred to in the fieldwork findings, for job security and a relative sense of affluence. All this contrasted with the harshness of life in the rural hinterland, and with the much higher unemployment rates suffered by those with insufficient French, even those with valid qualifications from newly Arabised courses in schools and universities. The aspirational dynamic

worked because it was internalised by a large section of the population, at least by those who felt they had a chance to reach middle-class white-collar status.

Adults would naturally wish to secure the way of life associated with bilingualism for their children. Many use French at home, at least in the form of a French/Arabic mixture in conversations with their families and on the telephone in order to confer on the children the advantages associated with bilingualism. The role of bilingual mothers is essential in this respect. Many are especially keen to make sure their daughters grow up bilingual and are aware that education is essential in order to evade the harshness of their own or of their mothers' life experience. For many women, French is the language of access to a 'public' life as opposed to a housebound existence in the service of the family. It is the only language option on offer which refers exclusively to life ambitions outside the home, because it is of no use there, whatsoever. It can therefore be, in itself, an affirmation of individuality (Bessis/Bellassen, 1992; Gadant, 1995). Generally speaking, furthermore, French undeniably retains, among female speakers, its full role of connoting overt prestige in its everyday use (Lawson-Sako and Sachdev, 1996). On the other hand, it is interesting to note that some 'Islamist' women are assigning the same role to 'Classical' Arabic. This medium gives them access to the mosque and to the holy texts as scholars of Islam. As in the case of French, it can be used as a means of escape from traditional family duties and from the power of their fathers and brothers (Gadant, 1995:227-8).

As in all situations of language change, marriage strategies are crucial, and here again the role of women must be stressed. For girls, apart from the postponement of marriage until the end of their formal education of which French is an essential component, there is the hope of a white-collar job, as a secretary or a teacher. Furthermore, there is the prospect of marriage to a bilingual man. This is perceived to mean a greater chance of life with a partner with a more 'open' outlook, and an escape route from the old harsh, secluded lifestyle. Again mothers have an important role to play: it is their task, traditionally, to look for suitable marriage partners. It is often up to them, therefore, to look for a 'nice' middle-class bilingual man, with a good white-collar job, for their daughters. As a consequence, bilingualism indirectly affects marriage prospects, which are of crucial importance in the Maghreb where unemployment of young males is an immense problem. All these

dynamics reinforce the stereotype of the monolingual bitter young man, uncompromising in his home life, as an undesirable marriage partner. As already suggested, these developments follow familiar patterns of language choice and language change as observed in Central Europe and in the case of regional languages (Gal, 1979; Burton, 1993).

Meanwhile, the surveys, like the more synthetic studies by A. Moatassime and C. Fitouri, warn that the linguistic divide is a complex and capricious one which runs not just between social classes or between groups divided by ideology but between generations, and between members of the same family, even between successive phases of the same individual's life story. Moreover, to describe it in terms of a French/Arabic dichotomy may be a smokescreen: it leaves out in the cold the huge numbers of monolingual Berber or dialect speakers, most of them illiterate. The real 'grassroots' are therefore confined to the margins of the tradition/modernity debate. Without access to 'proper' standard Arabic, they have no language choice at all which might provide them with any kind of personal strategy of self-valorisation. This language barrier has been one of the constants of collective life in the Maghreb since time immemorial: written idioms - French, but also, though less successfully, Modern Standard Arabic - play rival but identical roles (Moatassime, 1992,30:31). They function as a means of reproduction of the social hierarchy, in the Bourdieu sense (Bourdieu/Passeron, 1970). To come back to the tradition/modernity debate, meanwhile, no-one is suggesting that dialectal Arabic should be promoted as a national language, either in the name of authenticity or progress.

5. *The Maghrebien Diaspora in France: 'Second' and Subsequent Generations*

The cultural and linguistic scene in the diaspora of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in the French *banlieues* has also been marked by a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction: it suffers, with small nuances affecting policy from time to time, from a constant tension between an official discourse of assimilation which refuses the option of multi-ethnicity, and the everyday reality on the ground of ghettoisation and failure of the traditional integrating role of the schools. These contradictions have been exacerbated by two factors: the enduring historical memory of the Algerian war, and the rise in

unemployment from the late 1970's. Because of these circumstances, the formidable machine which had frenchified millions of provincials and successive waves of immigrants in one generation began seriously to malfunction. The result is a crisis of identification which creates a chaotic, and at times explosive situation. It marginalises a significant proportion of the younger generation, whose surnames attract discrimination in employment and whose nationality, in some cases, remains in doubt until they reach eighteen because of recent changes introduced in French nationality laws.

Families of Maghrebian origin have to confront a cross-cultural situation involving a very heterogeneous cultural mix, since they tend to live in areas with high concentrations of migrants, but not necessarily in communities of the same nationality. In all cases, their children are bombarded by conflicting and highly sensitive perceptions, at home, in their neighbourhoods and in the wider community of Arabic, Berber and French. Their language choices are mainly influenced by the dominance of French and the need to be articulate in French in order to find employment. At a deeper level, however, these language choices are also a function of the children's personal rapport with their parents' native language (often also their own first language) and culture, and of their relationship with their parents themselves. This is why the greatest potential for conflict arises at the time of puberty, after a latent period where the family was able to exist in relative autonomy alongside the influence of the school. Often this period also coincides with a re-think within the family, when the plans to return to the home country are finally abandoned.

The resulting conflicts are then bound to be mostly expressed in French, i.e. in a language which the parents have not succeeded in mastering to a high standard. More than likely, it is the father who is the most fluent (and he is not always the most receptive to compromise). According to a survey of 1994, 16% of Algerian fathers and more than half of mothers said that they spoke 'no French, or very broken French'.⁶ It must be said, however, that most female immigrants came to France long after their husbands settled there. In fact, Maghrebian mothers make huge efforts to use French with their children schooled in France, and the rate of abandonment of the native language is higher among women than men over an equal length of stay.⁷ Generally, transmission of the native language across the generations is most likely in the poorest families (except for the few well off, highly educated expatriates, at the other end of the scale).

It is obvious, therefore, that the future of native Maghrebian idioms in France is bleak. According to one recent study, only one in seven children of Maghrebian origin living in France cite Arabic or Berber as their mother tongue (Tribalat, 1996: 203). An original initiative to organise classes in community languages for pupils of African or Asian origin was introduced in state schools from the 70's onwards. It ran into difficulties, amid accusations of stigmatisation and because of the suspicion that the authorities were really preparing these children for a hypothetical return to the countries their parents came from.⁸

Faced with the near impossibility of preserving or reviving Arabic, and even more so Berber, teenagers of the second and subsequent generations can only express their difference linguistically by resorting to slang. Slang is common among young people of all periods of history, and of all social classes, especially among the males (Bourdieu, 1991:95-96). However, the slang of the *banlieues* in the 1980's and 90's has become a striking mode of expression of their alienation from mainstream society, the language of hate. It does not just insert some terms of *franglais*, or words derived from Arabic or Berber into the oldargot of the French working class. It becomes a code, and expresses their difference, their 'otherness' through a lexis which sweeps away all the recognizable phonetic and semantic components of the language (Begag, 1997).

6. Conclusion

The interplay between French, various forms of Arabic and Berber in Maghrebian communities has, over the years, been strenuously manipulated by language policy in order to effect changes in language practice. In recent history, policies in the Maghreb have taken the form of bilingual education and Arabisation, while in France the policy has been one of assimilationist integration. On an individual level, meanwhile, language choice is governed by the need, or the will, to adapt to socio-economic circumstances. At the level of the wider community, Bourdieu has shown how linguistic exchange functions as a market, according to the laws of supply and demand (Bourdieu, 1991). Demand tends to be motivated by notions of economic gain, social prestige, and self-valorisation. Indeed, it is thus possible to contemplate, that English may in a fairly distant future, seriously challenge the position of French in the Maghreb as a vehicle of

Western-style communication. The English language is progressing in business. There is no doubt that it will benefit, just as everywhere else, from the 'globalisation' of English, as well as from the negative, colonialist associations which cling to French for part of the educated population - all factors liable to exert influence on linguistic markets. So far, however, the uses of English have remained mainly instrumental, and the situation is only beginning to change (Arkoun, 1991:134). Nevertheless, it remains the case that until now in the Maghreb, in the light of the post-independence 'new deal', the French language has been associated in the minds of the speakers themselves with modernisation - if not necessarily with modernity in a mythical sense - at least with modernisation because of its ability to deliver individual prosperity and emancipated lifestyles. From the point of view of 'supply', the French language was made more widely available by linguistic and educational planning. It is, of course, impossible to estimate how much change would have occurred anyway, regardless of language policy: even if the authorities had not encouraged bilingualism, the medium-term consequences would not have been the disappearance of French. More likely, it would have meant the persistence of French, but reserved for an even smaller minority. Conversely, if French becomes a socio-economic irrelevance in the long term, it will disappear anyway (like Welsh, Breton, etc. in spite of efforts to revive them). It is, therefore, easy to overestimate the role of language policy in 'alienating' the culture through the continued use of French.

More problematic, however, is a situation whereby language policy is at odds with socio-economic reality, such as an Arabisation programme in the absence of economic outlets for Standard Arabic speakers. The same could be said in France of an assimilationist system which trains well-spoken school leavers who suffer unacceptable levels of discrimination on the job market. This is especially painful in both cases, in the absence of any clear political vision from the top, which would give collective meaning to the social evolution. The resulting crises should be seen as an illustration of the importance of making language policy accompany socio-economic change rather than *create* it. They should also warn of the perils of identifying idioms with ideologies.

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NOTES

- 1 See, in particular, Abbé Grégoire. 1792. *Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d'anéantir les patois et d'universaliser la langue française*, published in France by order of the Convention Nationale, 16 Prairial, an II.
- 2 A very detailed account of the process of postcolonial educational reform is given, in the case of Tunisia, in Nouredine Sraieb. 1974. *Colonisation, décolonisation et éducation*. Tunis: Institut des Sciences de l'Éducation/Paris:CNRS.
- 3 I.e. triggering a wish, in the respondent, to identify with and/or emulate the self-image projected by the speaker.
- 4 The Marley and Ould-Dada paper specifically states throughout that one of its aims is to compare and contrast its findings to the Bentahila survey.
- 5 Broadly corresponding scores for Standard Arabic were, respectively: 28% (to get a better job); 33% (to communicate with more people); 21% (other reasons). Marley and Ould-dada, 1996:186.
- 6 INSEE figures (Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques) quoted in *Le Monde*, 10/6/1994.
- 7 According to INED (Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques) figures quoted in *Le Figaro*, 21/12/93.
- 8 See comments on the ELCO initiative (Enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine) in Jacques Barou (1995) *Enseignement des cultures d'origine: ambiguïtés et contradictions*. In *Hommes et migrations* 1990:16-21.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE STATUS OF BERBER: A PERMANENT CHALLENGE TO LANGUAGE POLICY IN MOROCCO

Said Faïq¹

Introduction

The twentieth century has been characterized by an obsession with nationalism, often on the basis of one state per ethnic group per language. The First World War ended with the then US president Woodrow Wilson putting forward the idea of *national self-determination*. The rationale behind the notion was that many smaller states - each with a shared historical, linguistic and cultural identity - had to be created out of the rubble of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires in order that a more stable world might be established. In practice, the ideal of the nation-state was never achieved, thus confirming Wilson's Secretary of State concern that the concept of self-determination was 'loaded with dynamite' and that it would raise hopes that could never be realized and would ultimately cost thousands of lives.

In the application of the concept of self-determination, language has played a prominent role in the justifications of communities of speakers for their own nation-state. But the study of the relationship between language and nationalism has proved to be difficult because the issues of ethnicity, identity and nationalism are complex. This complexity has been heightened since the end of the Second World War, in particular, by the American and European obsession with monolingualism and the one-nation, one-language perception that led to what Pennycook (1994:136) further adds that:

... an almost unquestioned premise of Western linguistics has been that monolingualism is the norm both for communities of speakers and for individuals, with bi- or multilingualism taken as an exception and often stigmatised through its connections to minority groups, the Third World, and English as a Second Language Learners.

Yet, this single-minded approach of the West to issues of national identity has rarely been available to non-Western communities without wars and conflicts, particularly in the case of the Middle East and North Africa. This, in large part, is because the West has always perceived the issue of the identity of others as irrelevant and at best supportive to its own; in Edward Said's (1993:362) words: 'Identity, always identity, over and above knowing about others'.

It is this self-centred, single-minded approach to linguistic and cultural identity which post-independence Arab states inherited from the West and later adopted in their own language policies. The Western attitude to the aspirations of ethnic minorities in the Arab World, in particular, has been camouflaged in a veil of exoticism and occasional envy of the multiculturalism and multilingualism some Arab states enjoy. Western sociologists have invented the *composite* concept to refer to the capacity of a diverse community, within one politically delimited state, to integrate otherwise disparate and irreconcilable elements. Likewise, Western historians and politicians have coined the term *segmentary* to refer to the state in which ethnic groups with clearly defined functions co-exist together.

Given all this, Morocco, to the outside observer, basks in peaceful linguistic and cultural harmony. In fact, multiculturalism and multilingualism are acknowledged in this country, without ever having effectively shaped official policies. Arabic monolingualism remains the central feature of these policies, and matters of identity and ethnicity are acknowledged in whispers. Nonetheless, the linguistic situation in Morocco, over the past six years or so, reveals a fascinating and dynamic sociolinguistic picture. Yet the fascination could turn sour if the status of Berber and the attitudes of Arabs in the country towards Berber were not analysed rationally and processed carefully. In particular, observers should be aware of the dangers if the official policy continues to cast Moroccan identity in exclusively Arab and Muslim terms, thereby denying Berber and its speakers the chance

and/or right to claim officially contributions to the national cultural identity.

Modern, post-independence Morocco has struggled to unite the three strands that make up its identity: its Berber origins, its Arab-Islamic culture and its modernising tendency. This struggle has led to three often conflicting discourses: the Berberist, the Arab-Islamist and the modernist. Of the three, it is the Berberist discourse that has suffered most from injustice and censorship. The state uses Arabic and French to the exclusion of Berber, and no serious attempts have been made to rectify the situation. The official line has always been that one is dealing with three dialects and not three languages. The Berber activists, however, argue that Morocco was Berber before becoming Arab and that for centuries Berbers have shown willingness to learn Arabic, it being the language of the Qur'an and Islam, but few Arab Moroccans have shown a similar willingness to learn Berber, unless this is for survival purposes.

For the Moroccan Berber speakers, language is the most significant indicator of the vitality and validity of their existence as a group within an officially monolingual Arabic language context. This is in line with Suleiman's (1996:25) argument that:

... the formation of national consciousness exploits language communicatively and symbolically, often allowing these two functions to come together into full focus for *motivational* and *task-oriented* effect, especially in those instances of language use where the symbolism becomes the substance of communication in a way which forcefully displays the power of language. (Suleiman's emphasis)

It is precisely this power of language as the carrier of cultural identity and the *real-linguistik* of Morocco which the Berber activists in this country have used in their endeavour to secure official recognition of Berber as a national language. Unlike their parents, grand-parents and ancestors who opted to remain rebellious and isolationist during Roman times and for a long time after the Arab conquests, post-independence Berber leaders in Morocco, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, have raised the stakes and now seem determined to gain national status for their language in the face of the hegemony of Arabic. Their new tactics and efforts have paid dividends. The King of Morocco, the highest authority in the country, announced in August 1994 that the Berber dialects and spoken Moroccan Arabic

should be given a certain degree of status and a place in the educational system, at least at the primary level. For the Berber activists this was not full recognition, but it was the beginning that they have awaited for 38 years. Nevertheless, even this merely symbolic recognition is bound to stir up powerful nationalist and cultural emotions on both Berber and Arab sides.

The aim of this paper is to explore the co-existence of the Berber and Arabic languages in what one may call a '*liaison dangereuse*'. The case of Berber is important. In some African countries, minority languages were recognized as national languages in the wake of independence. Berber, despite being the mother tongue of an estimated 45% of the population, was never given such recognition. The official government line, and that held by the mainstream political parties, has always maintained that a recognition of the Berber language would entail racial divisions within Morocco. However, many Berbers feel that their linguistic and cultural identities have been marginalized with respect to the authoritative Arabic. Such feelings lead easily to the argument that after centuries of Arabisation, whether forced or spontaneous, the Berbers have become not Arabs but merely Muslims. Given this, the paper also explores the linguistic challenges which Morocco faces as it enters the 21st century, particularly in the wake of the recognition of Berber, even if only as three dialects. The events in Morocco should not be analysed in isolation; they are affected by similar events in neighbouring countries, such as Algeria and Spain.

The Linguistic Map of Morocco

In its preamble, the 1996 revised Constitution of Morocco states: 'The Kingdom of Morocco is a sovereign, Muslim state, with Arabic as its official language, and it is part of Greater Arab Maghreb'. (translation from Arabic is by the author). While this is the official policy, the reality is that Morocco is a country of linguistic complexity, even if the Arabic-Berber duality seems simple. In Morocco, the following languages and/or varieties of languages are used with varying degrees of frequency: 1) Classical Arabic (CA); 2) Modern Standard Arabic (MSA); 3) A hybrid cross between CA and MSA; 4) '*aransiyya*', a blend form of '*arabiyya* (Arabic), '*faransiyya* (French) and Moroccan Arabic; 5) Moroccan Arabic (*dārija*); and *Hassaniya* Arabic used by

some inhabitants of the Western Sahara in the south; 6) Berber (three main varieties); 7) French; 8) Spanish; and 9) English and German.

Chiatou (1994) divides the linguistic mosaic of Morocco into three categories. First, popular languages or varieties, which include the spoken dialects, including the three main Berber dialects. Second, the official language, which is Arabic. Third, business languages, which are mainly French and English. It is noteworthy that the popularity of English has increased, and that the opening of *Al-Aktawayn*, the first English medium university in Morocco in January 1995, dealt the status of French a serious blow.

Given this linguistic diversity in Morocco, the question arises as to whether or not there is a national language policy? Officially, such a policy exists but, unofficially, Moroccans do not wish to be involved in such a controversial issue. The controversy stems mainly from the fact that the issue of language evokes powerful nationalist and cultural emotions. In short, there is only one official language, and that is Arabic. French, which has an important influence in Morocco has lost some of its status, due to the process of Arabisation and the status of English as an international language. Nevertheless, everyday life in Morocco shows that Arabic is not the language that is used by different segments of society. Rather, Moroccans use a number of what the official policy likes to call dialects. These include Moroccan Arabic and the three Berber varieties: *Tashelhit*, *Tamazight* and *Tarifit*. These Berber varieties are quite similar to each other, so much so that most Berber activists often speak of a single Berber language. In this paper, reference will be made collectively to all three as Berber, principally because the primary aim is not to assess their relative status. This same principle will also apply to the use of the term Arabic, which is taken to refer to the official language of Morocco, covering both the Classical and the Modern Standard forms.

In Morocco, people are taught from an early age that the purity of Arabic is something to be safeguarded, because it is the language of the country and its religion and the language that unites all Arabs wherever they are. However, official politics blatantly tends to ignore the fact that Morocco has for long been a bilingual country, a reality dating even before the French colonization in 1912. It also ignores the fact that the Arabic-Berber duality which has existed for centuries is still an important part of the current language situation. This Arabic-Berber duality has been more marked and robust since independence because

of the Berber activists' constant demands for official recognition of Berber as a national language.

From the middle of the eighth century onwards, Islam gave the tribal Berbers a political structure for a militant community conquering and living off the wealth of its conquests. The Muslim Berbers of Morocco often found themselves following one or other zealous preacher who seized upon their tribalism - the common denominator in Berber's sign of belonging - and who used it for the purpose of establishing a new dominant culture. This explains why, up to the present, the Berbers, particularly those in rural areas, still identify with the tribe and family first, and with the *Zawiya* second.

The Berbers claim a historical presence in Morocco which dates back 5000 years. They successfully resisted invasions as long as they stayed confined in their harsh mountainous lands. They resisted the rule of many Sultans, hence the labelling of their lands as *blad siba* "the land of lawlessness", as opposed to *blad Imakhzen* "the land of law", i.e. ruled by the central government. It took the French some 30 years to bring the Berbers of Morocco under their control and, in the process, some 37000 French lives were lost, which is more than what France lost during the war of Algeria.

The Berber allegiance to the tribe and Islam before the State seems to be the factor which has kept them in a relatively harmonious co-existence with the Arabs in Morocco. This is because the King of Morocco has always derived his legitimacy, in the first instance, from Islam. The current King's title of *Amir Al-Mu'minin* "Commander of the Faithful" does not refer to any particular ethnic group, but rather to a larger community that transcends ethnicity. Nonetheless, since independence and the rise of Arabisation, Moroccan Berbers began to sense a change in what they saw as their main sense of belonging to the Moroccan community. Arabisation advocates exclude any recognition of the Berber language, a policy the Berbers do not accept and which they see as non-Islamic in spirit.

Berber: A Permanent Challenge for Policy-Makers in Morocco

What post-independence states of the Arab Maghreb probably never realized is that language policy, in general terms, represents an ongoing process even in older, established nation-states. The reason being that languages and language varieties change, and this change has to be

accommodated in some way in the national policies. Linguistic minorities - both indigenous and non-indigenous - become more articulate in formulating their demands, particularly after long years of linguistic and cultural contact with a colonizer or colonizers, as in the case of Morocco which was colonized by both France and Spain.

States that used to see themselves as monolingual now find themselves compelled to address the issue of language allocation anew. In Canada, for example, the emphasis has shifted from supporting a bilingual English and French educational system to reallocating a language, French, in the domain of business and commerce where it played little part in the past. Such a reallocation has sometimes resulted in extreme actions, such as the banning in Quebec of business cards written in English.

With large numbers of Berber speakers, Morocco has not taken any concrete policies to satisfy the demands for the recognition of the Berber language and culture as formative components of the national overall identity. Such policies may in the future lead to events such as that described above in the case of Canada. Instead of balancing its policies and taking account of all attitudes and aspirations of both Arab and Berber speakers, Morocco has, since independence, embarked on a process of rapid Arabisation. While this was seen as a means of getting rid of a 'bastard' language and culture, i.e. the mixture of Arabic and French, some argue that a recognition of Berber as an official language would also lead to another 'bastard' language, i.e. a mixture of Arabic and Berber.

Forty-two years after independence, Arabisation in Morocco is still an issue which stirs up controversies and disagreements; with three principal groups of protagonists fuelling the controversy. First, the traditionalists who favour a total Arabisation of Morocco and a return to the traditional educational system which existed before, as they see it, the French corrupted Moroccan education. Second, the modernists, who are less committed to Arabisation, and are concerned to ensure the establishment of an effective educational system which can prepare the country for an industrialized future. As such, they reject a path which would inevitably lead to a 'passionately' hasty policy of Arabisation, and which might result in the country being thrown back into the Middle Ages. The modernists feel that French is more appropriate than Arabic for the future. The Berber activists broadly agree with the modernists, because they perceive that a *de facto* bilingualism will always be present and will ultimately curb the

influence and dominance of Arabic. Third, the nationalists, whose attitudes to Arabisation are linked with ideas of patriotism - and who see in Arabisation a political and post-colonial rather than a cultural or economic reaction. The process is viewed as the only factor which will allow Morocco to take its place in the Arab World, and is the key to unity and solidarity between all Arabs (cf. Bentahila 1983).

It follows from the above that when it comes to Arabisation in Morocco, a confusion arises because language policies are constantly entangled with politics, nationalism - not Berber - and, most of all, passion, thus ignoring the needs and attitudes of those who do not favour total Arabisation, like the Berbers. Any language policy, to quote Lewis (1981:262), should,

... take account of the attitudes of those likely to be affected. In the long run, no policy will succeed which does not do one of three things: conform to the expressed attitudes of those involved; persuade those who express negative attitudes about the rightness of the policy; or seek to remove the causes of the disagreement. In any case, knowledge about attitudes is fundamental to the formulation of a policy as well as to success in its implementation.

Language policies in Morocco have not appropriately and effectively considered any of the three things to which Lewis refers and certainly never fully explored the attitudes of the Berbers to Arabisation. The Berbers argue that Arabic is a second language for all Moroccan Arabs and a third language for Berbers, after their Berber mother tongue and Moroccan Arabic. But the official policy remains that Arabic is the official and only national language of the country. This attitude stems from the nostalgic view of a glorious past and, in a technological world that is, in the main, alien to the Arabs, their language remains their only possession and their only technology.

Immediately after independence, the nationalists, headed by the conservative and pan-Arabist party *Isiqlat*, began their call for Arabisation. Alarmed, the Berbers rebelled and riots ensued over the three years (1957-60). As a result of this Berber civil disobedience, Arabisation was halted and, instead, pilot schemes were initiated. But the ultimate goal of arabicising all Morocco has never changed. It is in fact a dogma, and an objective that is not for discussion, as with national independence which made Arabisation its cornerstone. But, the multiple and complex aspects of Arabisation, the questions it

poses, the fundamental referents it puts into perspective, and the future cultural and linguistic identity of the country have never been properly addressed by policy-makers in Morocco (cf. Grandguillaume 1983).

The constant problem for the Berbers is that Arabisation is also linked with the Qur'an and Islam, issues which are beyond question. The Berbers know that Arabisation is first and foremost linked with Islam and, as such, works in structuring the ideology of the nation. This situation is different from that of the Berbers in Algeria where the leaders cannot claim any religious legitimacy, even though they promote themselves as the successors to the Ottoman Dey.

To this intimate connection with Islam, is added, today, another function for Arabic: it is the unifying factor for the Moroccan nation-state, the Arab Maghreb and the Arab World. Within these three aspects of unity and identity, Arabic and Arabisation play a pivotal role, which has been further extended by the distinction between the *self* and the *other*, whether this other is represented by English or French. The Berbers may easily fall into the category of otherness if they pursue their demands for official recognition of their language by directly or indirectly touching upon any of the three aspects of Arab unity and the identity of Morocco.

Morocco's three aspects of unity and identity, national, Maghrebi and pan-Arabist, confront the Berbers with almost exactly the same policies which the French Third Republic adopted. The Third Republic considered that the phenomenon of linguistic unity at the level of the national language consisted of three main characteristics. First, linguistic unity was necessary for the masses to follow the national authority. Second, from the necessity of linguistic unity, a *valorization* "promotion" of a central culture was needed which would concomitantly lead to the devaluation of indigenous and regional cultures. In this respect, the national language did not represent only a high linguistic system, but also the medium of the high intellectual activity which would eradicate the irrational activity that was equated with ignorance. The third characteristic was that the role of language as a symbol of national unity should become manifest *via* a functional representation of this unity.

Faced with an unenviable situation, Berbers in Morocco have often found it difficult to voice their concerns and demands. But, sensing the confusion created by a rush to full Arabisation in the 1960s and the subsequent failures of that policy, the Berbers have begun to ask a number of valid questions. What are the real objectives of

Arabisation? What would happen if all Moroccans spoke the language of the Abbasids or the early Caliphs? What identity is envisaged for Morocco: Arab, Muslim or Moroccan? One further question follows: what function does Arabisation assume, or to be exact, what do its advocates want it to assume?

The Berbers suddenly found themselves citizens of an Arab-Islamic state in which the Arabic language and its associated culture have been in a position of overall dominance. Over centuries, and prior to the Arab conquest, the Berbers never managed to organize themselves in a strong and stable union. Rather, there have been constant conflicts of interest between rural and urban groups, each of which has had different clan and tribal allegiances. This has precluded any political strength for the Berbers and, by extension, denied them any real influence on the affairs of the state, except for their frequent rebellions and civil disobedience. Neither has the geographical dispersion of the Berber lands helped their cause.

Yet notwithstanding the dispersion of the Berbers in the different regions of Morocco, they have managed to: a) construct an opposition between themselves (us) and the others, whether these be Arabs, French or Spanish; b) redefine and interpret the borders between their various social groups, as well as choosing which to belong to; and c) mark this group membership by the use of a strong identity idiom, i.e. language. Though never officially recognized as a language in its own right, Berber bestows on Morocco its pluralism, a feature which has been variously used by many rulers to curb nationalists and pan-Arabists. This is why Arabisation has always represented, and been presented with, a problem.

Faced with the existence of Berber and its large number of speakers, the Moroccan authorities have not been able to formulate adequate language policies that would meet the requirements of Arabisation. In other countries, language planning policies have often determined the fate of minority languages, reflecting therefore the official attitudes towards minorities in general. But in Morocco, Berber and Berbers are part of the national identity and further part of the Islamic identity. Killing Berber, though desirable to some nationalists, would have never worked because of the militant nature of its speakers. Adopting Berber as a national language has always been out of the question. So, it seems that letting Berber die within an unsupported co-existence with Arabic has been the unofficial basis of language policies. But even these policies have proved futile and, in 1994,

Berber was given partial support for specific linguistic functions, i.e. recognized as three dialects.

Since independence, the majority party of *Istiqlal*, with its obsession to Arabise, directly caused a parallel awakening and revival in the cultural phenomenon of pride in the Berber language and the continuation of its tradition as both a medium for popular literature and a symbol of Berberness. To the Berbers, therefore, their language has been the *Muttersprache und Geistesbildung* and, once officially recognized, will pave the way for them to become fully recognized and will expand their community, which has long been based on ties of shared history, culture and blood in the absence of an official language. Certainly, the Berbers have most of the components of a nation: language, ethnicity, culture, territory and shared history. Here one can conclude that the Berbers have more in common than two Arabs from different parts of the Arab World. This is because unlike the Berbers, the Arabs, this century, have embarked on legend-making with only one identity marker, viz. the Arabic language (cf. Holt 1994).

Unlike the case in Tunisia (1% Berber-speaking inhabitants) where Berber does not appear at all on the political or the language policy agendas of the state, the Berbers in Morocco have never lost sight of their aim of achieving official recognition for their language. This started immediately in the wake of independence having, probably, wasted their chance with the French *Dahir Berbère* "Berber Decree" of 1930 which recognized, for the first time in history, the Berber language and culture as distinct from those represented by Arabic. The Berbers opposed the French move because it came from the colonizers and was seen as a ploy to divide and weaken the Moroccan Muslim brothers. The French initiative therefore failed but, after independence, when calls for Arabisation started before the state could organize itself to govern properly, the Berbers felt the dangers. They rioted and rebelled for three years. Taking advantage of the situation, the Berber-orientated the Popular Movement (PM) party was formed in 1957 as a clandestine Berber activist movement, but with tacit support from the palace in order that it might weaken the conservative *Istiqlal* party. The PM was legalized in 1959 and from the start demanded the protection of the Berber language and culture through the establishment of a Berber institute, as well as the introduction of Berber in schools. But these demands were always preceded by the PM's allegiance to the unity of Morocco, symbolized by the King, and its timid support for Arabisation, but within a bilingual Morocco. Grandguillaume

(1983:87) quotes a passage from one of the PM's leaders, Moatassime, in a speech to the Moroccan Parliament in 1977:

We are attached to Arabisation and we defend the Arabic language as the language of Islam and of the national unity. But at the same time, we must establish an Institute for the Berber language to safeguard it from extinction.... we believe that bilingualism (Arabic-French) is indispensable for our era..., because our country will lose its vertical cultural dimensions (with Africa and Europe) if we opt for a horizontal monolingualism (exclusively Arabic) which will be for us a simple and sure suicide of national cultural spirit, which should remain Arab, African and Mediterranean. (translation from French is by the author)

The PM always projected the recognition of Berber as an act of saving a language, a culture and a glorious past of the nation. By so doing, it played the cultural card and indicated that it did not seek to politicize the Berber issue. The PM's aim was that the advocates of Arabisation and the pan-Arabists should accept its demands because they relate mainly to a glorious past, in the same way that they were trying to protect and revitalize a glorious Arab-Islamic past. In 1980, a Berber periodical *Tamazight* was published and made clear the demands for the revitalization of Berber. The demands were that the official position on Berber issues should: coincide with the consideration of the historical, geographical and sociological characteristics of the country; reduce the ardour of Arabisation in certain fields; give Berber language and culture enough radio and television time without censorship; allow the broadcasting of Berber language lessons and; promote a policy that advocates the teaching of Berber to everyone who is interested in learning it, including Arabophones. For what Chataou (1994) calls 'obscure political reasons', the periodical was censored in 1983.

The 1990s, in particular, have witnessed a change in Berber attitudes towards official policies. What is probably more remarkable is that, unlike their peers, the new breed of Berber leaders work outside the establishment. Examples of slogans which have appeared in the Berber heartland since 1991 include: *Arabs out; Hebrew is taught not Berber; Berber at schools; No democracy without Berber*. The slogans translate the level of anger and dissent within the Berber movements in Morocco (cf. Donnet 1995). After centuries of a psycho-political, and

by extension linguistic and cultural, blockade against the Berbers, the Moroccan authorities started in 1991 to show signs of *ouverture*. Between 1991 and 1994, eleven Berber cultural associations were established. In 1991, six associations signed the *Agadir Charter* (Agadir is a Berber city in the south of Morocco). The Charter is critical of the systematic linguistic engineering that has been aimed at weakening the Berber language through Arabisms and other manipulations. It also seeks to stop the marginalization of the Berber language and culture from mainstream national linguistic and cultural life. In May 1994, the Berber association Tilelli "liberty" organized a demonstration in Errachidia (southern Morocco) to demand recognition of Berber as a national language. It was during this demonstration that the type of slogans cited above were evident. Many explanations were given and apologists attempted to excuse the action as merely local and as representing one association. But the stakes, it seemed, had been raised, and the speech of the King on 20 August 1994, in which he stated that Berber dialects and Moroccan Arabic should be represented within the national educational system, at least at primary level, indicated a shift in favour of the Berbers. Of course, and as Donnet (1995) notes, there is strong opposition to the integration of Berber and Moroccan Arabic into the education system. The *Istiqlal*, reiterating that the only official language of the state must be Arabic, admits that the state has a moral responsibility to safeguard all aspects of the national heritage. Others argue that, instead of teaching people a Berber dialect, the state would be better advised to embark on a serious programme to eradicate illiteracy.

Despite many voices against the recognition of Berber in any shape or form, many events were precipitated by the King's speech. On 24 August 1994, Moroccan Television started a daily broadcast of a 10 minutes news bulletin in each of the three main Berber dialects of *Tashelhit*, *Tamazight* and *Tarifit*. Many Berbers, however, see such measures as counter-propaganda and as a further linguistic 'bastardisation' of their language because of the heavy influence of Arabic. Nevertheless, by hearing their language on television, it is argued, the Berbers will start to regain some of their lost dignity, identity and signs of belonging.

The dilemma for the Berbers now is that once the King acknowledged the existence of Berber, albeit as different dialects, they can no longer argue that Berber is not officially recognized in Morocco. Six years after the *Agadir Charter* and three years after the

King's speech, no tangible steps have been taken to teach Berber at any level, although the number of Berber dailies and periodicals has doubled, even tripled. The Berber activists have to establish which variety of Berber and which script to adopt as standard (cf. Tilmatine & Suleiman 1996, for a detailed discussion of the issue of Berber script).

The Moroccan Berbers should learn from the experience of their Algerian cousins. Algeria officially recognized Berber as a national language. But a regime under siege would do anything to alleviate its headaches. In December 1996, the Algerian government passed a law that stipulates the total and full implementation of Arabisation by July 1998, with the year 2000 as an ultimatum (cf. Grandguillaume 1997). The use of any other language except Arabic will be considered an offence. This is reminiscent of the situation in Quebec cited earlier in this paper, and it appears that the optimism shown by Tilmatine & Suleiman (1996) about the prospects of Berber revival in Algeria has already evaporated. The Moroccan King's recognition of Berber dialects in 1994 was a positive step, but the next few years will be vital for the Moroccan Berbers and their language.

Conclusion

For the Berbers, Arabic Morocco was preceded by centuries of Berber Morocco. The constant calls for Arabisation, particularly since independence in 1956, have antagonized the Berber speakers who make up around 45% of the population and have awakened strong feelings of identity amongst them. By deciding in 1994 that Berber dialects would eventually be taught, at least at primary education level, the King of Morocco has finally made the Berbers feel that a healing process for their language and culture has begun. Many plans are being drawn up, priorities set, associations established, but what is new in this recent Berber endeavour is that Berber activists no longer hesitate to speak of a real Berber renaissance in Morocco.

This Berber revival faces language policy-makers in Morocco with serious problems for the first time in 41 years. Previously, policy only took Arabic into account; now, Berber dialects and Moroccan Arabic have all to be considered within any national language policies. If all aspects of the 'new officially' multilingual Morocco have to be considered, then policy-makers should perhaps learn from the Spanish and Canadian experiences to avoid antagonising one group or the other.

In Spain, for example, Hoffmann (1995) highlights the possible consequences of the rise of Spanish regional languages, as in the case of Catalan. The fear is that such indigenous languages, long oppressed, may well establish oppressive tactics against non-speakers of the language in their geographical areas of influence. If this were to happen in Morocco, then nothing would have changed and the cherished *multisms*, linguistic and cultural, would give way to Arabs and Berbers seeing each other from purely monolingualistic perspectives. Equally, the cultural and linguistic ideal of Morocco might become that of a hyphenated (cf. Edwards 1995) one, where there would be no place for someone who wanted to be purely Moroccan.

Arab Moroccans should also show serious sensitivity to the aspirations of the Berbers and to the issues of Berber language and identity. They may, otherwise, find themselves, one day, without some areas of Morocco. This is in line with Bercuson's (quoted in Edwards 1995:19) warning to the English-speaking Canadians:

English-speaking Canadians must either give up the quest to create a liberal democracy of multi-ethnic origin, or they must wave goodbye to Quebec. Since they will not do the first ..., they must sooner or later do the second.

If the above warning to the English-speaking Canadians were not to materialize in Morocco, then at best what might emerge would be a series of bilingual regions: Arabic-Berber, Berber-Arabic, with independently determined language policies for each region. But given the long history of the co-existence between Arabs and Berbers in Morocco, and the symbolism attached to the person of the King, the Berbers would endeavour to find a Moroccan solution to the status of their language rather than a self-centred Berber one.

In concluding this paper, I would like to leave the impression that Morocco, a country long regarded by the outside world as a coherent and tolerant one, is going through a period of great flux. Whatever the outcome of the Berber renaissance, one of its central features is the intertwining of language and cultural identity. It is apparent that the Berbers of Morocco have embarked, in the words of Gross (1993) on a process of historicising their territory and territorializing their history.

Despite their desire to contemplate and explain ongoing events like the ones in Morocco, sociolinguists should heed Hoffmann's (1995:89) remark that linguists in general,

... may well be much more enthusiastic about linguistic diversity and cultural pluralism than those who take political decisions and those who have to live with the consequences.

It would therefore be beneficial to the Berbers and the Arabs in Morocco to seek mutually agreeable and contextually viable Moroccan solutions to the co-existence and status of the Berber and Arabic languages in their country.

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NOTES.

- ¹ I am grateful to the participants at the Third Symposium on Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa, Edinburgh University, Scotland, for their valuable comments and suggestions on the issues raised in this paper. My particular thanks go to Jacob Landau, Muncef Lahlou, Enam El-Wer and Yasir Suleiman for suggestions that have shaped this final version of the paper. Finally, I am grateful to Mike Ingham for his valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper.

CHAPTER EIGHT

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE PLANNING IN
IRAN AND TAJIKISTAN

John R. Perry

1. Historical Background

The language communities of Arabic, Persian and Turkish extend far beyond the Middle East and Mediterranean regions, scenes of their classic political and cultural achievements. Not counting the overseas diasporas, Africa and Central Asia are present-day regions with active and expanding speech communities and literary ties to the contiguous "heartland" of the major languages of Islamic culture. Since the disintegration of the USSR, Central Asia and some areas of European Russia which had been detached from their Islamic orbits must again be studied in conjunction with the central Islamic region from the perspective of contemporary cultural development. Language is again one of the force fields involved. Both the Turkic-speaking and the Persian-speaking lands of the newly independent states look respectively to Turkey and Iran for models in refurbishing their enfeebled titular languages as fully functional media and symbols of a new national identity - more than they seek guidance from them in the political or economic realms.

During the past century, Persian language reform movements and government language planning have played a role in the sociocultural development both of Iran, the cultural centre of gravity, and of Tajikistan, the once and future satellite - though in significantly different ways, which the present survey will attempt to highlight.

Although in pre-modern times the range of literary and spoken Persian - from the Zagros and Caucasus foothills across Iran into Central Asia and India - covered an area increasingly subject to Turkish settlement or rule by a Turcophone élite, the inevitable Turkicisation

was tempered by three factors. The first of these was the continuing literary status of Persian as a language of poetry, diplomacy and informal belles-lettres, even among Turcophone rulers (the Safavids, Afsharids and Qajars in Iran, up until 1925; the Shaybanid, Janid and Manghit Uzbeks in Transoxiana, until 1920; the Mughals in north India, until 1857). In Iran especially, the traditional bureaucratic class throughout these four centuries, the *mirzās*, comprised mainly urban Persians. They ensured the dominance and routinisation of Persian as the state language of government and letters in symbiosis with, on the one hand, spoken Turkish and Iranian vernaculars, and on the other with literary Arabic (written chiefly by Persians) as a medium of specialised doctrinal scholarship. Secondly, the large population of native speakers of Persian scattered throughout the Iranian plateau identified their language (however low their overall level of literacy, and however different their spoken dialect) with literary Persian, and maintained a strong oral tradition of Classical literature, especially poetry. This solidarity in turn tended to draw speakers of regional Iranian languages who shared other cultural ties - the Pamirs and Caspian dialects, Kurdish, Baluchi - into the orbit of Persian as a contact language and supra-regional vernacular. A further result of this upward leveling has been the comparative absence of diglossia in Persian. The third factor was the emergence on the western Iranian plateau of a territorially stable nation state under the Qajar dynasty, which consolidated literary and linguistic trends established under the Safavids or earlier and established modern Iran as the cultural *qibla* of the Persophone world.

Outside the state of Iran, the position of Persian was more tenuous. In India it had no native-speaker basis, aside from a minority of literate Iranian immigrants, and competed not so much with Turkish (Chaghatay, or eastern Turki, was no longer spoken at the Mughal court from at least the early eighteenth century) as with Hindi and subsequently English. With the rise of Urdu, a vigorous Hindi-Persian hybrid, and the ascendancy of English in government, Persian lost its raison d'être throughout its traditional range in poetry, belles-lettres and bureaucracy. By the middle of the last century, Persian in the Subcontinent had become a dead language.

The continuum between the spoken Persian of Iran and of Central Asia was interrupted definitively from the sixteenth century by a broad band of Turkic speech. In the Uzbek khanate (later, emirate) of Bukhara, Persian speakers (called Tajiks) were soon outnumbered by

Turcophone settlers in most regions of the Oxus basin, where Persian was replaced by Uzbek in all but a few rural regions. Spoken Persian survived mainly in the Pamirs foothills on the borders of Afghanistan and in the ancient oasis cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. Despite the continued reinforcement offered by literary Persian (which was practised even by the Uzbek chancellery and some of the educated Uzbek élite), spoken Persian was everywhere succumbing to the uneven competition with Uzbek. In Bukhara and the northwest, Persian fell so strongly under Uzbek influence (not only phonological and lexical, but syntactic) that it has been characterised as "an embryonic Turkic language" (Doerfer 1967:57).

The subjugation of the Uzbek emirate by imperial Russia in 1865 had no immediate effect on the indigenous languages. However, the Russians were initially tolerant of the Jadid movement, the liberal Islamic educational reforms introduced to Central Asia around the turn of the century by Tatar intellectuals of Kazan and Astrakhan, whose followers advocated and produced vernacular modern textbooks in a simplified style of Turki and Persian. Then, with the advent of Bolshevik rule in 1921 and the demarcation of the former emirate ethnolinguistically into Soviet socialist republics, complex questions of language and national identity took on an urgent political form.

Meanwhile in Iran, the Qajar dynasty was overthrown in 1921 by a military despot, Reza Khan (from 1925, Reza Shah Pahlavi), whose agenda of centralisation and modernisation of society (modeled largely on that of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey) was likewise to encompass the national language. The period of the later 1920s to the 1940s were thus to witness the first concerted language planning applied to the two literary standards of Persian whose users had just attained "modern" nationhood. In each case, the language was appreciated by some as a cultural vehicle and by others was pursued as a political fetish. The whole process is replete with ironies and paradoxes.

Much more than the language as such, it is the cultural and especially the literary tradition - expressed primarily in the shared corpus of epic, lyrical and mystical poetry, for which the language is a vehicle - that unites Persian speakers, of whatever adventitious "nationality" they may be. This common literary tradition has undoubtedly helped to maintain the noticeably slow rate of language change in New Persian over the past millennium of its existence, and in modern times has promoted translingual comprehensibility among educated speakers of different standards in much the same way as the

shared tradition of literary Arabic has helped overcome the barrier of regional vernaculars in the Arabic-speaking world. The year 1921 marks a third and arguably more significant event in the linguistic history of Persian: the publication of the first collection of modern Persian short stories, *Fārsi shekar ast*, by Mohammad 'Alī Jamālādeh, prefaced by a literary manifesto advocating a more naturalistic and vernacular style of Persian prose. The writer had barely beaten the politician to the starting gate. (A further portent of modernisation is that some of the early Jadid textbooks, and Jamālādeh's book, were printed in Germany, in Arabic script with movable type.)

The language planning of the 1920s to the 1940s is not merely of historical interest, for the question has recently resurfaced with a new urgency for both Iran and Tajikistan. Both the regimes under which these programs were conceived, the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) and the Soviet Union (1922-1990) have collapsed spectacularly, only two to three generations after the putative implementation of their respective programmes of national cultural engineering. The ideologies that in part inspired both language reforms have been automatically discredited, though their legacies, as we shall see, have survived in strikingly different ways in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in independent Tajikistan. Language remains emblematic of ethnic identity and national cohesion for Persian-speakers in both countries, but goals and stakes have changed considerably since the first half of the century. Let us examine just two arenas of the reforms as applied to Persian and Tajik: the writing system, and the lexicon.

2. The Writing System, 1920s-40s

From the middle of the nineteenth century, various internal reforms of the Arabic script or Latin orthographies for use in Persian and the Turkic languages had been proposed. Around the turn of the century, the reformed Arabic option was championed by the Jadids. Competition between the various systems, however, delayed any consistent application of a new orthography in educational curricula or the Tatar press (Baldauf 1993:130-34, 191-225). Nevertheless, it became axiomatic for all Turcophone reformists that simplification of the Arabic script or a change of alphabet must precede systematic educational reform, and was the key to modernisation of Islamic society in general.

This obsession was based in part on the "alphabetical fallacy" - the assumption that alphabetical writing is intrinsically superior to logographic or morphographic scripts, with its corollary that a synchronically accurate phonographic system (one-sound-per-character) is simpler to learn than an anachronistic one tied to a historical etymology. This belief in turn breeds a pseudo-scientific conviction that it is fundamentally the complexity of a writing system or its application to an alien language that inhibits the acquisition of literacy, and thus compromises all consequent cultural and scientific progress in a society. We now know, and can demonstrate with examples ranging from Japanese to English, that this is not necessarily so: that proper goals (reading and writing for informational rather than devotional purposes) and efficient pedagogy can compensate effectively for the mechanical shortcomings of a writing system and produce a functionally literate populace with correlated skills and attitudes.

In one respect the reformists had a strong case: the semi-cursive nature and contextually changing forms of Arabic characters were difficult to apply in the current technology of movable type, and inhibited the development of the press. To the frustrated heirs of an apparently decadent Islamic culture labouring under colonialism or in unequal competition with print capitalism, the Arabic script was a natural scapegoat for the backwardness of their society at large.

The best-known proponent of a reformed Arabic alphabet for Persian, Mirza Malkam Khan, presented his proposal first (in 1870) to a special session of the *jam'iyat-e 'ilmiye-ye 'osmāniye* (Ottoman scientific society), which had involved itself in the evaluation of script reform and Latinisation projects. This body rejected his scheme as too conservative (according to Malkam, they feared the end of Islam). The Iranian minister in Istanbul sneered that Malkam had done well to present his scheme to the Turks, since Iranians already had the perfect system, viz. *nasta'liq*, *shekaste* and *naskh*! (Baldauf 1993:69). This attitude was to dominate debate over reform of the Perso-Arabic script in Iran, even when - from the early 1920s - the focus of the still Turkish-led movement had shifted to Latinisation. As early as the 1890s Arfa' ol-dawla, the Iranian minister to the Scandinavian countries, published a pamphlet in which he proposed a limited pedagogical use of Latin transcription for Persian; this was vehemently opposed by the *'ulamā* (Christensen 1970:42). Subsequent suggestions for Latinisation by individual Iranian writers - Kasravi, Nafisi,

Taqizadeh, Hedayat - failed to win the support not only of the conservative clergy but of most secular intellectuals in Iran.

There were solid reasons for this, beyond the pious abhorrence of tampering with the medium of holy writ. Literate Iranians feared the loss of their huge and valued corpus of Classical Persian literature, which was much more central to the cultural solidarity and national identity of Iranians than was the existing body of Turkish literature for Turks. Both the Ottoman and the Chaghatay classics were highly Persianate in lexicon, style and genre; though prized by traditionalists, they were sacrificed without serious opposition (and even this was mollified by selective preservation of a far-from-bulky corpus) when political and cultural dictatorship called for the creation and buttressing of a new national idiom in the republics of Turkey and Uzbekistan. More than this, Iranians feared the destruction of the linguistic tradition, which was bound up inextricably with the literature and culture. Written Persian was so imbued with Arabic vocabulary, idiom, and the literary arts that (as one otherwise cosmopolitan Persian intellectual put it) "the use of Arabisms demands Arabic script - it is a plant that will not grow in the soil of Latin script" (Christensen 1970:44). One has only to look at a modern Turkish text, where recognition of Arabic vocabulary and the recovery of prosody can be difficult at best, to appreciate this fear. If the one-phoneme-one-grapheme principle were to be strictly applied in Latinisation of Persian, the Arabicate metrical system of Persian poetry, *'aruz* - which is subtly at odds with present-day Persian phonology - would vanish too, and poetry would have to change radically.

From a strictly pragmatic viewpoint, as the Iranian minister at Istanbul had intuitively realised, the Arabic script is surprisingly well adapted to Persian (even though much less suited to Turkic languages, with upward of eight vowels and a system of vowel and consonant harmony). The three overt (*plane*) and three covert (diacritic) vowels of Arabic correspond schematically to the six vowels of Persian, even though the system of opposition is qualitative rather than quantitative; Persian morphology and phonotactics are intuitively sufficient to resolve most potential ambiguities; the etymological spelling of Arabic loanwords is no more of a nuisance than the historical orthography of Latin, etc., in English and French; and - to bring things up to date - modern printing techniques have largely done away with objections based on ligatures, contextual forms and ugly fonts.

So, although the obligation remained on the statutes of the *Farhangestān* (the first Iranian Language Academy of 1935-1948, q.v. below) to study proposals for the reform of the Persian script (Christensen 1970:44), this step was never seriously considered in Iran. Persian language reformers - even if not entirely for the right reasons - had rejected the seduction of the alphabetical fallacy.

The Tajiks, in contrast, were thrust willy nilly into Latinisation. In the last years of the nineteenth century, Bukhara city and Samarqand had a large Persian-speaking population and a certain literary tradition. By 1907 indigenous reformists in Bukhara, notably Sadriiddin Aini and Abdulvohid Munzim, had founded a Jadid school for Tajik boys and broken decisively with the conservative clerical establishment of the *madrasas*. By the early 1920s, when the emirate fell to the Bolsheviks in collaboration with native reformers-turned-revolutionaries, both Uzbek and Tajik intellectuals (who were bilingual and in most respects bicultural) enthusiastically took up the cause of modernisation and Latinisation of their shared languages.

The debate between the Arabic script reformists and the Latinists had still not been settled in 1917, when the Bolsheviks adopted Latinisation - as being one of the progressive trends of the age (it was even rumoured that Russian was scheduled to adopt the Latin alphabet) - as part of their platform in Muslim Asia. In this they benefited from considerable (but far from total) native intellectual support, and a general perception that in rejecting the use of Cyrillic (which had previously been tried out by missionaries in Russian Christian schools in Central Asia) the Bolsheviks were genuinely repudiating the Russian imperial past. Lenin declared, "Latinisation is the Revolution in the East!" and from then on the growing power of the Soviet government was thrown behind a concerted programme of Latinisation, not only of the Turkic languages for which it had been conceived but of all non-Christian Asian languages using other than a Latin or Cyrillic system (cf. Baldauf 1993:496-8). The alphabetical fallacy had acquired an invincible institutional matrix.

For all the participation of most Tajik intellectuals in what they saw as the wave of the future and the key to the twentieth century, the "Tajik people" were not free agents during this crucial formative period of 1924-29. With the national delimitation of Central Asia into four ethnic Turkic republics, "Tajikistan" was for the first five years of its existence an autonomous republic within the Uzbek union republic, doubly subject to Tashkent and Moscow, its national (Persian)

language policy obliged to march in step with that decreed for Uzbek. The latter was a minimal revision of the Pan-Turkist programme of Latinisation and vernacularisation of late Chaghatay. The remaining supporters of Arabic script, whether pristine or reformed, were ridiculed as reactionary religious fanatics. In 1927 and throughout 1928, which saw the triumph of Latinisation in Atatürk's Turkey, Uzbek and Tajik writers daily expected Afghanistan and Iran to declare for Latinisation of their Persian languages too, and even hoped for a unified system (e.g., Alef Dâl in *Rahbari donish* 1928 No. 7:31-2, Rahim Mim in *Rahbari donish* 1929 No. 2:346-7, 50).

In this they were disappointed. Nevertheless, a concerted Soviet educational programme produced in a few years a dramatic rise in literacy in the new alphabet. This predicted miracle was enough to justify the Party zealots' destruction of manuscripts and books in the old Arabic script and their denunciation of those slow to learn the new alphabet as "bourgeois nationalists" and saboteurs. Thus, though Latinisation of Tajik Persian was begun as an afterthought to that of Uzbek in the mother republic, it was completed after 1929 in the new union republic of Tajikistan by the Tajik intelligentsia, ostensibly as a necessary and beneficial development of the language.

In its motivations, goals and results, Latinisation as effected in Tajikistan is comparable to that of Turkish under Atatürk during the same few years (cf. Perry 1985). The results were exactly what the Bolsheviks had hoped: instant literacy, an apparent raising of the consciousness of the proletariat and the promise of a native Soviet intelligentsia and bureaucracy within decades. They were also exactly what most intellectuals in Iran had feared: the cutting of the umbilical cord with Arabic-Islamic literary culture, spelling not only the end of contact with transliminal Persian writing but the imminent loss of access to the Classical literary heritage. As the older generation of *madrasa*-educated readers and writers (hardly numerous to start with) died off, the rising graph of literacy in Soviet Latin-script "Tajik" was matched by a falling line of literacy in Arabic-script Persian. This was offset to a small extent by the continued training of a few native orientalist(s) in the philology streams of the universities, though the editions of surviving manuscripts have mostly ended up on the shelves of Russian and other foreign scholars; and by the later publication of some Persian classics in transcription Cyrillic-transcription, that is, after 1940 (see below). Arabic-script versions of Soviet Tajik literature were indeed printed, but strictly for export to Iran and Afghanistan. The

vocabulary and diction of Classical literature was stigmatised as archaic and bourgeois, and since the traditional long and short vowels were not distinguished in the new alphabet, 'aruz prosody became largely opaque to the new generation; older Tajik scholars who survived the purges of the Stalin era prudently concealed their chagrin at the MacGonagalesque efforts of younger poets until the era of *glasnost*' (Perry 1996:284).

Thus leftist Tajik intellectuals of the twenties, in order to gratify their internationalist and progressive urges, were obliged, as they emerged from subjection to the emirate of Bukhara, to subordinate their nationalist aspirations (both political and cultural) to a new Uzbek political elite, ostensibly an arm of the Party and a surrogate of Moscow but with its own narrowly nationalist agenda. In order to be progressive in terms of the pan-Turkist Latinisation movement (now co-opted by the Communists of Tashkent), they embraced the alphabetical fallacy rejected by their counterparts in Iran and regressed (from a Persian cultural perspective) to a pre-literate, vernacular base from which to re-invent their literary language. Just as they had too little political input into the territorial gerrymandering of their republic during 1928-29 (Masov 1995:170-73, 191-93), Tajik intellectuals were inadequately represented in the making of their own alphabet. The version settled on was a compromise between the proposals of Abdurrauf Fitrat, an Uzbek ex-Jadid (bilingual, but at this period an outspoken pan-Turkist) and A. Freyman, a Russian scholar of German extraction.

Even so, once the Tajik SSR was freed from the Uzbek embrace (a freedom paid for by the forfeiture of the principal urban cultural centres, Bukhara and Samarqand), a more Persian literary culture might have been promoted. Two of the most prestigious Tajik scholars and (of necessity) politicians, Sadriiddin Aini (president of the Writers' Union, later of the Academy of Sciences) and Bobojon Ghafurov (First Secretary of the Party, later director of the Oriental Institute), somehow retained Stalin's favor and from their positions were able to ensure that the Tajiks preserved a modicum of cultural and literary consciousness throughout the most oppressive period of Stalinism. The debate over details of the new Latin alphabet was still simmering, and the influx of new literary blood from the central and southern regions (whose dialects were not so heavily influenced by Uzbek) might have eased the stranglehold of the Bukharan style. In 1938, however, Stalin - having already jettisoned Lenin's time-serving internationalism in favor of

"Socialism in One Country" decreed that all the languages Latinised less than a decade earlier should now be Cyrillicised, in order to facilitate their speakers' learning of Russian and consolidate his new imperial version of the Soviet Union. This time there was none of the lively debate and competing proposals that had characterised the change to Latin: the switch was effected virtually overnight, without argument.

Orthographically and prosodically, this compounded the problems that had been introduced by the Latin alphabet. The latter, at least, had been a scholarly, neutral system on the basis of one character per phoneme, even if some of the vowel phonemes were debatable. The Cyrillic system was not neutral, but Russian-specific with a few extra diacritics: it used the Russian characters for palatalised vowels *e ia iu*, and the facultatively palatalised *i*, to represent the adventitious Tajik combination of consonant /y/ plus a vowel, but in some cases used *e* and *i* as simplex vowels and *i kratkoe* for consonantal /y/. And of course it incorporated the other Russian characters alien to Tajik for the sake of the ever-increasing number of Russian loanwords, which it was decreed must be spelled as in Russian. Soviet Tajik linguists proclaimed with a straight face that this system had benefited from the results of research in the intervening years, and was superior to the Latin script. In reality it employed almost as many approximations, compromises and ruses - and of the same kind - as had the partially morphographic Arabic system (Perry 1996:281-2). Which in practice perhaps made little difference, but is a notable example of political hypocrisy couched in linguistic terms.

3. *The Lexicon and Syntax, 1920s-40s*

Lexical morphology and etymology are always the chief targets of purist movements and state language plans, for both practical and aesthetic reasons. Iranian students had been returning from European universities since before the turn of the century, unable to express the specialised terminology essential to their careers and to their country's development except in a lexical smorgasbord of French, German and English. In Iran of the 1920s, as in Turkey, the initial impetus for relexification came from the military: from 1924, both Atatürk and Reza Shah needed to modernise and standardise not only the hardware, tactics and administration of their forces, but also the terminology and

style of the new manuals. During 1924-25 a committee made up from the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Education compiled a list of 300 neologisms, including direct borrowings (*bomb*, < Fr. *bombe*) and calques (*vā-baste-ye nezāmi* < Fr. *attaché militaire*; *havā-peymā* < Fr. *avroplane*, replacing the Arabicate Ottoman *ṭayyāra*). In 1933 Iran's teacher training college, the *dār ol-mo'allemin*, formed a society to suggest new terms in the arts and sciences: 3,000 words were soon listed, of which 400 were adopted by teachers and in publications. The society continued to function until 1941, thus overlapping with the official Academy. In 1934 the Ministry of Education collaborated with the Medical College to expand and standardise medical vocabulary. This included some everyday terms such as *mariz* "sick" and *mariz-khāne* "hospital," which were to be replaced by *bimār* and *bimārestān*: the new term for the institution has indeed replaced *mariz-khāne* in general usage, but *mariz* is still the more usual word for "sick," with *bimār* in the literary register.

By this time the language bazaar had been flung open to the literate public in general. Although there was never a concerted effort by the government to involve the people in the language question *per se*, the intensity of chauvinistic propaganda in other spheres of social activity generated a sympathetic flood of letters to the press in 1934-36 from persons with nativist, purist or pan-Iranist linguistic axes to grind. One target was the use of Latin-script copy in Persian publications, such as the advertisement for ROLLS RAZOR that appeared, by chance or design, next to one such letter. Other correspondents focused their wrath not on the West but on the Arabs and Islam, excoriating Arabic loanwords as insidious secret agents that had helped destroy the Sassanian empire and should now be expunged before it was too late. Others yet blasted all non-essential foreign vocabulary, from French *mādmuāzel* to Turkish *khānom* (*Eṭelā'āt*, 3 Esfand 1313/22 Feb. 1935; 11 Esfand 1313/2 March 1935; Perry 1985:300-301).

However, by the end of 1934, moderate voices were increasingly heard from the academic establishment. At the millenary celebrations of the national poet, Ferdowsi, Professor Rezāzādeh Shafaq pointed out that although Ferdowsi in his *Shāhnāme* had used little Arabic vocabulary, he had accepted the Arabic alphabet and the principle of Arabic loanwords; reform of Persian should be based upon his "measured path" (*rāh-e sanjideh*). The following year was established, by royal charter, the *Farhangestān* or Persian Language Academy, a body of Iranian scholars (and some distinguished foreign academics).

This proved to be a moderate, not to say conservative and élitist enterprise, modelled on the Académie française; it neither sought nor heeded a broad range of public opinion, and on occasion even fell foul of its royal sponsor for its dilatoriness. Beyond the publication of two lists of suggested neologisms and a tentative spelling standardisation, it produced no solid collective contribution to the language question. It failed to respond to the two tasks of interest to this survey, namely, the compilation of a modern Persian dictionary and a study of projected reforms of the writing system. By 1948 it had virtually ceased to function. It was revived under Reza Shah's son and successor, and although it published periodic lists of neologisms and sponsored a bulky frequency list of written Persian, it seems never to have caught the imagination of the public.

Persian prose in Central Asia at the turn of the century was every bit as Arabicate in vocabulary and florid in style as that of Iran or India. Soviet Tajik linguists routinely claim that the autobiographical *Navodir ul-vaqoye'* (Amazing Events) of the late nineteenth-century Bukharan polymath Ahmad Donish exhibits a simplification in style and a vernacularisation of idiom that prefigure Soviet literary Tajik, but this is hard to justify. There are, however, instances of spoken Tajik idiom in between the lines of laboured bureaucratese in turn-of-the-century Bukharan chancellery memoranda which show that an important dialect did have the potential to invade a debased variety of the international standard (Unpublished mss. in the personal collection of Prof. Senzil Nawid, University of Arizona). From about 1900, Jadid reformers sought consciously to develop a simplified written Persian in order to educate children and propagate their ideas in the press. After the revolution in Bukhara came a wave of purism in the early Communist press of Bukhara and Samarqand (initially in Arabic script). Like the purists of Iran, writers sought primarily to replace Arabic words and collocations with Persian. Loanwords from European languages, processed through Turkish or Russian, were not yet numerous. Tajik writers, being intimately linked with their Uzbek colleagues and the hybridised Persian of Bukhara, did not think to purge the many Turkic words and idioms that made the transition to print in the journalistic Persian of the oasis cities.

Even less did they resist the Russian vocabulary and jargon of revolution and technology, which in the following decades steadily and almost indiscriminately ousted existing Persian words. Not only did *revoliutsiia* displace *engēlāb*, but even everyday idioms suc' as *ta'mir*

kardan "to repair" were jettisoned in favour of *remont kardan*. After the establishment of the Tajik SSR, with the Russian colonial city of Dushanbe as its capital, waves of Russian immigrants accelerated the process: in 1924-25, seventy-six percent of bureaucrats and technicians were non-Tajiks, and at the radio station the count was one hundred percent. There was thus no incentive for the development of a native vocabulary in the administrative and technical domains (Vahhob 1991:22; Perry 1996:285-6). Despite rearguard efforts by ex-Jadids such as Aini, the modern Tajik literary language was from the outset a lexical hybrid of Persian, Uzbek and Russian, with strongly Turkicised syntax. An example of the latter is the type of modal auxiliary construction *rafta [na]metavonam* "I can[not] go", as against Persian *[na]mitavānam beravam*.

With Russification of society and Russianisation of Tajik came a loss in status of the titular language, as upwardly-mobile Tajiks sent their children to Russian schools and Russian language invaded the domestic domain. The phenomenon of a class of speakers disdaining their native tongue to use a colonial or culturally imperial tongue is well attested - ironically, of Russians in regard to French a century earlier, and in Iran throughout the modern period (mainly French, for the generation before World War II, and English thereafter; cf. Milani 1996:27-28). In Tajikistan, however (as elsewhere in Central Asia, thanks to an egalitarian educational policy) it was not merely a proportion of the élite who switched codes at will, but a broad spectrum of the populace that functioned extensively and by preference (in some cases exclusively) in Russian. The structure of educational curricula and the relative volume of publications in Russian and Tajik mirrored and reinforced this trend.

To sum up, the lexical reformers of Iran from the 1920s into the 1940s responded to linguistic imperialism of the past, that of Arabic, and of the present, of French and English, by attempting to replace as much as possible of both strata of foreign vocabulary with native words and formatives, mostly recovered from Middle Persian. One example is the large class of scientific fields of study corresponding to English *-ology*, *-ics*, etc., in which both Arabic and French loanwords were replaced by Persian compounds ending in *-shenāsi* (< *shenākhtan* "to know, be familiar with": e.g., *zaminshenāsi* "geography," *zabānshenāsi* "linguistics"). Where replacement proved impracticable, assimilated Arabicisms were tolerated and European neologisms admitted selectively into the Persian lexicon. Within the more captive speech

sub-communities, such as the military and government bureaucracy, relexification was extensive and compliance both rapid and guaranteed; in the academic world and society at large, the Farhangestan and other bodies enjoyed little legislative and no coercive power, so that lexical change has proceeded more slowly and erratically, by natural selection.

By an accident of geography and history, language reformers among the Tajiks came chiefly from the very sector of the populace that had already been most influenced by the established stratum of Uzbekisms and were most committed to the future incorporation of Russianisms (or at least were obliged to appear so). They responded to the challenges of the new order by apparently welcoming both lexical layers with open arms, in the name of fraternal Soviet cooperation. This triple entente was from the outset, in more than merely linguistic terms, the embrace of a bear, a hare and a mouse. The more the parties protested how well they got along together, the less they were believed; but in fact a workable symbiosis was achieved through implicit respect for the political, economic and ethnolinguistic pecking order in its various permutations. The traditional bilingualism had been mildly asymmetrical: Tajiks were more likely to be bilingual in Uzbek than vice-versa, to the extent anyone bothered to make the distinction. The new, vaunted Soviet bilingualism was egregiously asymmetrical, and became steadily more so: in 1989 sixty percent of Tajiks in Dushanbe spoke Russian, whereas only 2.3 percent of Russians knew Tajik (Guboglo 1990:91:4-7). But since the ultimate aim was *sitiānie*, the withering away of ethnolinguistic distinctions, few were prepared to raise the issue. "The sooner we all learn Russian," Khrushchev had declared, "The sooner we'll build communism" (Perry 1996:286-7).

4. Revision and Reaction, 1980s-90s

Both processes seemed to many to be taking longer than expected. Suddenly, in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev's unprecedented *glasnost* permitted open criticism of the USSR's stultifying nationalities policy, and language became an important issue in the rush to establish viable polities as the Union threatened to unravel. A wave of national language status laws, beginning in the Baltic republics, swept across the country. The mouse roared (or at least, coughed): in June 1989 Tajikistan promulgated the first of such language laws in Central Asia, aimed at securing the status of Tajik Persian as the national language

and raising the profile of its usage against Russian and Uzbek. The hare pricked up his ears: Uzbekistan's similar language law followed within four months. And the bear? Politically speaking, he simply shrugged and shambled away, followed by tens of thousands of his family. Linguistically, he may rest assured that his lingua franca, and the high proportion of its jargon embedded in Tajik Persian, will not be uprooted overnight.

The law was redrafted in 1992, after independence, with essentially the same goals and provisions: to attempt, by legislation of the status and corpus of Tajik Persian, to reverse the trends outlined above, and to secure an active life for the national language in all the domains it had progressively sacrificed on the altar of socialist solidarity - government, education, press and publications, social and cultural life and international recognition. Suffice it here to review two realms of the corpus of Tajik Persian, the writing system and the lexicon.

Article 26 (1992 version) commits the republic to promoting the teaching of, publication in, and "in the near future," official reversion to, Perso-Arabic script. Implementation of this aim is fraught with problems, both practical and ideological. It is expensive, and will take time and commitment to marshal all the necessary pedagogic and technical resources. The project tends to be identified not only with the nationalists and pan-Iranists who initiated it but also with the Islamist opposition, and is repugnant to the neo-Communists currently in power. At the same time, there is no serious constituency for a return to the Latin alphabet (a goal announced by most of the newly independent Turkic republics), since Latinisation still smacks of a pan-Turanian plot to absorb the Tajiks into a greater Uzbekistan. The Firrat-Freyman orthography has been somewhat simplified but, in the foreseeable future, Cyrillic will stay.

A good deal of enthusiastic but ill-coordinated relexification was undertaken by journalists in the 1980s, even before the promulgation of the language law. Many of them had served in Afghanistan or were familiar with Iranian publications, and introduced Afghanisms or Iranisms into their writings; these were criticised on the one hand by nationalistic purists, who demanded an autonomous relexification (e.g., *jahon-numo* for "television," a term not used in Iran), and on the other by Sovietised conservatives, who complained that *havo-paymo* "aeroplane" or *donishgoh* "university" are unrecognisable in comparison with the established Russian loans *samolyot* and *universitet*. There is now an official Terminology Committee, which

strives to follow a middle course between these extremes. Now that the initial euphoria of perestroika and independence has waned, with the realities of a failing economy and civil unrest claiming priority, further implementation of the language law is marking time. In the remote event that circumstances again encourage a thoroughgoing relexification and official reversion to the Arabic alphabet, it is possible that the Tajik literary language, as conceived and maintained in Cyrillic as a separate Persian standard between c.1928 and 1988, will fade away, to merge with standard Persian of Iran. As a result, the spoken dialects of Tajik, deprived of this bonding agent, will drift even farther apart.

One undoubtedly good result of any language reform movement is that it makes ordinary citizens (often for the first time) consciously aware of their language and its social and political ramifications. An extra benefit of the proximity of Iran's Islamic revolution and the collapse of the USSR is that Iranian and Tajik Persophones have become more actively cognisant of their separated yet related language communities. Since 1989 the Islamic Republic has been assisting Tajikistan's language revolution by providing Arabic-script publications, both classics and modern works, and publishing volumes of Tajik poetry and essays in Arabic script for the Tajik Persian Language Foundation and other organs of re-Persianisation. Not, be it admitted, without a certain smugness: for, regardless of who won the Cold War, Iranian Persian has arguably survived the serious "collateral damage" visited upon many colonised and clientised languages of the erstwhile Third World by political, economic and cultural fallout from the tussles of the other two.

The Islamic revolution in Iran brought no dramatic, politicised sociolinguistic reaction. In everyday usage there was initially some leveling of status markers and an avoidance of honorific language, a trend later reversed to some extent (Keshavarz 1988), and some of the new ideological lexicon is of course from Arabic. Resisting the temptation to throw out the baby with the bath water, the Islamic Republic has revived and even enhanced the work of the old Farhangestan in regulating and coining scientific-technical and general neologisms. Contrary to some expectations, there has been no concerted favouring of Arabic as a lexical fount. The bulk of the Persian coinages established during the 1940s onward has been retained and built on for further lexical expansion (cf. the new *hameh-porsi* "referendum"), and even Western loanwords, influx of which is

now identified as the number one problem, are being tolerated where they are obviously assimilated. The competing claims of neologisms in these lexical classes are settled by appeal to computerised frequency lists of recent periodical literature (Interview with Haddād 'Ādel in *Eṭṭelā'āt-e beyn-al-melali*, 13 Dec. 1995:1, 4; M. Tonok, boni in *Eṭṭelā'āt-e beyn-al-melali*, 29 May 1996:5).

The Islamic régime does, nevertheless, accord an ideological dimension to post-revolutionary Persian. It has sought to raise the profile of the language abroad by means of well-publicised international conferences (Persian and the language of science; The teaching of Persian), and through publication of a Persian-language cultural periodical aimed at a readership in South and Central Asia (*Āshnā*). It envisions an expanded role for Persian in regional and supra-regional communications parallel to Iran's expansion of road, rail, air and diplomatic links with its former Soviet neighbours and its initiatives as peace broker in the south Caucasus and Tajikistan, and in propaganda for its conception of the Islamic state. While it is true that the old political and cultural orientations have been dramatically realigned - the (Islamic) Middle East, like (Catholic) Central Europe, has moved further east and north - such hopes are almost certainly quixotic, whichever way one calculates the religious and linguistic ties. Imami Shi'i Iran is ideologically estranged even from co-lingual Tajikistan, while its co-religionists in Lebanon, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have their own languages and do not, for the most part, speak or read Persian.

5. Conclusion

During the first two decades of this century, social and political pressures encouraged writers and educators in both Iran and Persophone Central Asia to reconsider the functions of written Persian. By the time of their respective coups d'état in 1921, the literature of each country (led by the periodical press) was on a track that would lead to a more vernacular style and lexicon in the written language. Since the vernacular continuum between these regions had been interrupted and their spoken standard divergent for nearly four centuries, this led to a rapid divergence in their literary Persian, which had hitherto been virtually identical. This separation was sealed by the double switch of writing system in Tajikistan.

In the following decades, the pace of language change was accelerated by the respective political leadership. Persian was seen in Iran as the medium of an independent, modernising, centralising state, its replacement of Arabic and European vocabulary by native stock (and rejection of the Western script) at once a pragmatic empowerment of the national language and doubly symbolic - of the repudiation of traditional Islamicate trammels (though not of Islam itself), and of its defiance of Western colonialism (without renouncing Western technology and fashions). The transition from lithography (reproducing the calligraphed *nasta'liq* of the manuscript tradition) to moveable metal type was effected early, despite the dubious aesthetics of early fonts, and has given way to offset and compuset printing in elegant *naskh*.

Control of the relexification movement in Iran was adroitly taken from both the militaristic government and the linguistic radicals by a conservative academy, whose "hands-off" guidance maintained a balance among the continuity of established Arabic terms, the infiltration of European neologisms, and the revival of Persian vocabulary and lexical morphology. A Pahlavi-era phrase such as *tawlid-konandegān-e māshin-ālat-e barqi* "producers of electrical machinery" exemplifies this piecemeal approach: Persianate derivation and composition on an Arabic or Arabicate and European lexical base (*tawlid* "generation, production" in Arabic is not restricted to an industrial context, as in Persian; Arabic *ālat* "tools" combines readily with French *māshin*; *barq* is "lightning" in Arabic and Classical Persian, "electricity" only in modern Persian, here with the Persian adjectival suffix *-ī*); and archaising or "literary" Persian morphology (plural *konandegān*, as against unmarked or vernacular *konande-hā*).

Among the Tajiks, control of the nascent relexification and vernacularisation process in Persian was surrendered to the agents of a delayed-action colonial invasion. Far from a flexing of linguistic muscle, such revival and preservation of native vocabulary and morphology as the ex-Jadid intelligentsia could manage in the 1920s and 1930s was confined to proving the existence of the speakers of the language (embedded beneath the Uzbeks in the ethnopolitical mosaic of Central Asia) as a viable *natsionalnost'* in Soviet terms - a salvage operation to stave off short-term assimilation into Turcophone Uzbekistan and long-term Russianisation. Accepted as a Soviet nationality, the younger generation of Tajiks were, on the one hand, indulged in a simplistic identification of their language and literature

with that of Classical Persian and, on the other, deprived of the writing system and literary materials to study either Classical or modern transliminal Persian. The Russian alphabet was minimally and inconsistently adapted to Tajik phonology. Tajik Cyrillic typewriters were not generally available, so that most of the relatively few Tajik-language (as distinct from Russian-language) dissertations produced at the State University have made their appearance in faded Russian typescript, the diacritical hooks fudged by means of half-spaced commas.

Token toleration of Persianisation was superseded in the 1940s and 1950s not only by direct incorporation of Russian loanwords but by an indirect calquing on Soviet Russian jargon through the already partly Turkicised verbal morphology of Tajik Persian. Thus *avtomobil* - *korkarda-barori* "automobile production" parallels Uzbek *avtomobil* *ishlab chiqarish* (both verbal complexes are, literally, "having-worked bringing-forth") and recapitulates Russian *proizvodstvo avtomobilei* ("leading forth," more transparent in Russian than is *production* in English) - pleonastically concatenating Persian morphology in an agglutinating, Turkic fashion. These excesses were to some extent repaired in the 1970s and 1980s (even before *perestroika*), when earlier Arabic borrowings such as *istehsol* and *tavlid* were revived for "(industrial) production."

Obviously the fact that Iran avoided direct colonisation, whereas Tajikistan succumbed to it, bears primary responsibility for the dramatically divergent fates of their languages. However alien to each other were the blueprints for Iranianness drafted by the Pahlavi shahs and the ayatollahs, each is very Iranian in its recognition of the inalienability of the national language. Whereas Soviet policy for Central Asian society, by the very act of devising five "national languages" separated from each other and from their transliminal cognates, but tied to Russian, projected the ultimate alienation and demise of each national language. In the case of Tajik Persian, the plan was unwittingly abetted by a small, madrasa-formed native intelligentsia, seduced by progressivism, international socialism, and the (Latin) alphabetical fallacy, who saw Uzbek pan-Turanism as a greater threat to their ethnic and cultural identity than Russian communism. In Reza Shah's Iran some of the secular literary establishment evidently saw in Pahlavi fascism a greater threat to the Persian language than to Islam or other aspects of traditional culture;

their conservative, bourgeois, laissez-faire reaction was a godsend to Persian on the plateau, for which the Tajiks too may yet be grateful.

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INTRODUCTION NINE

THE STORY OF A FAILED ATTEMPT: 1997 DRAFT BILL ON THE CORRECT USE OF TURKISH LANGUAGE

Çiğdem Balım-Harding

Introduction

During January 1997, the most debated issue in Turkey was a draft bill on the Turkish language, submitted by a Minister of State to the Council of Ministers. Claiming to be based on the third Article of the Turkish Constitution, which states that *the language of the Turkish Republic is Turkish*, the bill set out to provide the legislation to support the Article by *regulating* "the usage of the Turkish language within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic". It was conceived as a measure to protect Turkish against the *invasion* of foreign words and the influence of foreign sentence structures which had been overwhelming it since the 1980s. Its articles covered most areas of language use, such as trade and industry, public meetings, language education, written and oral media. It also proposed language-watch committees, outlined sanctions for incorrect use of the language, and proposed a tax on all advertising to cover the costs of language-watch activities.

The draft bill was still-born because it contained articles which did not comply with the existing Laws of Turkey, and it would not have passed through the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee nor through the Constitutional Court. Moreover, adoption of such a law would have stirred up the debate over the status of minority languages (especially Kurdish) in Turkey, at a time when politicians were quietly looking for compromise between the already existing articles of the Constitution and the demands of the Kurdish community.¹

After a month of heated debate in the media, the draft bill was laid to rest and forgotten. One speculation is that the proposers of the bill

had not really expected the bill to pass but used the draft bill to test public opinion on language matters.

Background

State involvement in language matters, and in protection of the language, goes back a long time in Turkey. The necessity of reforming the Ottoman language had become apparent in the 19th century when the *Tanzimat* leaders needed the support of the people for the legitimization of their policy decisions and for the dissemination of their reforms. While many western concepts and words were borrowed (especially from French), the intellectuals strove to bring the written language closer to the spoken vernacular - the two modes of the language which had functioned side by side. Modification of the Arabic alphabet was also discussed, and there were proposals to abandon the Arabic script altogether.

Arguments about the alphabet and the state of the language took a different turn after the Republic. In 1923, Turkish was made the official state language of the Republic of Turkey, in 1927 street names were turkified, and in 1928, the Arabic alphabet was abandoned. Purging the lexicon of Arabic and Persian elements was the next step, after Atatürk provided the political rationale for its necessity: the Turkish nation, which had protected its country and liberty, had to save its language from the hegemony of foreign languages.

In 1932, the Turkish Language Society (TDK) was established under the name Türk Dili Tedkik Cemiyeti ("Turkish Language Research Society"), and during the first National Congress of Turkish language (1932) the state policy on language was declared. Turkish had to develop in order to meet the needs of a modern civilization, and as an expression of the national culture. To achieve this aim, purification of the language and minimization of the differences between public and intellectual use of the language were needed. Concepts for which western languages had words had to be expressed in Turkish, and the "most beautiful and suitable form of Turkish" was to be used in all communications. Atatürk declared that anyone who claimed to be a Turkish citizen should speak in Turkish.

After 1938, as lists of new Turkish words and dictionaries began to be published, they created unrest among the intelligentsia, who were by this time divided into two camps: those who were for total purification

of the lexicon (strong adherents of the Republic and secularism, and socialists), and those who were against purification because they saw Ottoman as a part of the cultural heritage (right-of-centre conservatives, and religious groups). The argument of the latter group was that Arabic and Persian words in the lexicon were *conquered words*, and hence they were as Turkish as anything else. For them it was controversial that, while the progressives condemned all forms of ultra-nationalism, they looked into other Turkic languages to find pure Turkic words for the purification of the lexicon.

After the centre-right Democratic Party won the elections in 1950, the TDK lost its privileged official status. Until then forty six per cent of its income had come from state funds and thirty per cent from an endowment under Atatürk's will. The new government was against further purification of the language, and there would be no concessions to the TDK.

After the military coup of 1960, the purification of the lexicon started once again. The government issued directives to the ministries for the use of *özgürkeçe* "pure-Turkish", and the Republican Party declared itself the protector of language reform. The right wing parties immediately declared their own language policies. The Justice Party made it known that it opposed the purification process, and the National Salvation Party went as far as wanting to revert to the Arabic alphabet. Language purification increasingly became a party-political issue in Turkey, where the origins of the words labelled the political stance of the people who used them. Under the influence of the language of the more charismatic leaders (such Bülent Ecevit), pure-Turkish words began replacing Ottoman words in the lexicon of the younger generation. To ensure nationwide use of pure-Turkish, in 1974 directives were sent to the Ministries urging them to use pure-Turkish, and school books were adjusted accordingly. In 1975, however, the National Front coalition government once again sent directives to the Ministries, this time instructing them not to use any language which was not *national* (i.e. not to use pure-Turkish). In 1977 the Ecevit government reversed the situation yet again, and more directives were sent to use nothing but pure-Turkish.

During these years, the *language problem* (i.e. the state of Turkish) was debated by the media daily. Writers, academics and politicians who were against the TDK policies claimed that the language reform had cut the nation's ties with its past. Moreover, new words were being created without respecting the rules of Turkish grammar. TDK

members were accused of linguistic racism though they claimed to be anti-racist otherwise. Supporters of the TDK and of purification accused their opponents of being fundamentalists, of being against the modernization and economic development of Turkey, and of holding Turkey back behind the times. Meanwhile, new scientific and technical terminology created problems for both sides. Clearly new words had to be created. The conservatives dragged their feet, but even the TDK could not create words fast enough to replace the foreign words which flooded the market.

In 1983, following the 1980 military coup, the Turkish Language Society and the Turkish Historical Society were replaced by *Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu* ("Atatürk Higher Council of Culture, Language and History"), under one of the Ministries of State. Its new board of executives was composed of academics who opposed purification as it had been carried out by the previous TDK. In 1984, the executive board of Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) issued a list of 205 words whose use would be forbidden on Turkish radio and television. The list was rumoured to have originated from the new TDK, and it received wide-spread criticism on political grounds. The TDK could not get across to the media that the words in the list were chosen because they did not follow the word-formation rules of Turkish, and that there was a linguistic justification for the list. In 1985, the members and supporters of the old TDK began to publish their own journal *Türk Dili Dergisi* in response to the official journal of the TDK, *Türk Dili*. Clearly they had had enough.

The new TDK was in line with the conservative cultural policies of the governments of the 1980s. However, their economic policies promoted liberalisation, the market economy and individualism: the unleashing of economic potential meant that language matters lost importance in the everyday lives of the public. When economic and industrial development took priority, foreign products and firms flooded the market, state control and monopoly over broadcasting were lifted, and when Özal himself peppered his speeches with foreign words of Western origin, it was possible neither to enforce lists of prohibited words, nor to implement language purification. Nevertheless, a National Council for Culture met in 1989, and its resolutions can be taken as the closest thing to the declaration of a state policy on language. It declared that there would be no room for pluralism in Turkish culture, and that language was the nation's tie with its past. Turkish culture was an indivisible entity which had not begun

in 1923, and therefore Ottoman had to be studied and understood by the younger generation.

By 1990, foreign words used in Turkish ranged from everyday words to the names of stores and products, and to scientific and technical terms, and 'ungrammatical language' was much used on the numerous television and radio channels. While inaccurate translations of foreign films into Turkish had always been ridiculed by the press, the quality of Turkish used by untrained and under-qualified broadcasters became a source of worry not only for the TDK but for all educated listeners. What made matters worse was that while Turkey encouraged the newly independent Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union to use their national languages, and advocated a common written Turkic language, its own language suffered an 'infestation' of foreign borrowings. With the creation of several Turkic states in the new world, for the first time since the Ottoman Empire Turkish had the chance of being widely used; but how could it be, in its present chaotic state? Of course the other problem was that while Turkey claimed that a common national language was an important element of being a nation, it was finding it difficult to fight off the claims of the Kurdish minority to be allowed to use their own language.

In April 1994, the TDK began issuing lists of Turkish words to replace the borrowed foreign words (mainly of English origin) in its monthly journal *Türk Dili* under the title "We are reclaiming our language". The executive board of the TDK believe that words of Arabic and Persian origin are a part of the Ottoman heritage and should be not changed, and by the same token these words can be used, where possible, instead of new foreign words of Western origin. For example, for the unwanted word *mega* "mega", TDK proposes *dev* or *dev-asa* which are of Persian origin; or for *reyting* "rating", they propose *takdir* of Arabic origin. However, among the new words proposed by the new TDK, there are pure-Turkish words which had been created by the old TDK twenty years ago and which were then fiercely opposed by the very people who are now members of the new TDK. For example, for the undesirable word *metropol* "metropolitan", *ana kent* is proposed; for *handikap* "handicap", *engel*; for *fiktif* "fictive", *kurnaca*; for *konsept* "concept", *kavram*; for *global* "global", *küresel* and for *globalleşme* "globalization", *küreselleşme*. The word-lists of the new TDK illustrate the fact that from 1938 to the present, despite opposition, purification has taken root, and that pure-Turkish words are widely used by the population, even by the opponents of purification.

Although change in the lexicon has been administered and implemented by the state over the years, nevertheless the role of writers and the intelligentsia, and the willingness of the younger generation to purify their language of foreign elements, cannot be disregarded.

It may be that the success of this state-driven purification inspired the proposers of the bill, and convinced them that state intervention was necessary in order to regulate the use of Turkish in 1997. Another possible source of inspiration was Europe. France was facing similar problems, although the threat to French was more immediate. Domestically, American-English vocabulary 'infested' the language; mass education and the spread of popular culture affected its *proper* usage. Globally, French was losing its international importance and was being replaced by English as a medium of communication. According to reports, the decline in prestige of the French language had reached such a state that many French people had given up using French in their professional work (especially scientists), and they were accused of committing cultural treason. (Safran 1996). Back in the 1960s, a *Commissariat Général de la Langue Française* was created, with the task of combating *franglais*. A terminology commission was also set up which was nicknamed *vocabulary constabulary* by its opponents. In 1968, the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel was given the duty of alerting its personnel to the correct usage of French. However, none of these agencies was successful because it was not certain what constituted proper French.

In 1994, as the number of Americanisms in the language increased, France issued a language law (the *Toubon law* after the name of the Minister of Culture and Francophonie in the government of Édouard Balladur), containing the following provisions: French is the language of education, work, exchange, public services and art; it is obligatory to use French in product descriptions, directions for use, advertising (both in print and audiovisual media), and in public announcements, public transport and contracts. This brave motion by the French created waves of excitement in Turkey. Probably unaware of the exact nature of the debates which had been going on in France for centuries, many Turkish academics and members of the press praised the new French law. Finally, on 2 January 1997, Minister of State Işlay Saygun announced on national television that there was need for a law which would regulate the use of Turkish, and that her Ministry had prepared a draft bill to this effect. She claimed that "disrespect for our mother tongue is also affecting our business community. Once only some shops had

foreign names, and they were seen in certain districts of big cities; now they have spread even to the remote districts of Anatolia. Our country is becoming one where almost no Turkish is used". Probably to defend her proposal, she used the unfortunate words: "I question the Turkishness of anyone who will oppose this law".

The contents of the draft bill

The bill was prepared by the Ministry of State responsible for the Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu. In the general corollary, it is explained that the new bill was prepared as a complement to the third Article of the Turkish Constitution which states that the language of the Turkish Republic is Turkish, and this article cannot be changed and cannot be proposed to be changed. However, since there was no legislation which detailed the application of this Article, the new bill was prepared to fill this void.

The bill then describes the state of the language as used by various sectors. According to the proposal, young people finish secondary education, even higher education, without having read the major works of Turkish authors, and without having grasped the importance of Turkish; indifference towards the mother tongue is reflected in the increasing use of foreign names in products and firms, and as a result Turkey seems like a place where Turkish is not used: "one can not expect people who do not realize the beauty and importance of their language to be careful and fastidious. As a result, many errors are made while using Turkish on the radio and television, and in the written press. ... The organs of the press are as important, maybe more important, than schooling in affecting the correct and beautiful use of language. Incorrect use of Turkish by the press spreads very quickly, and affects the population negatively. It is known that language is one of the most important elements of nationhood. Any unravelling and deterioration in language, and the presence of foreign elements in it, affect the makeup of a nation. When language, which unites the individuals of a nation, stops being important, the tie between individuals gets weaker, which leads all the way to desires of noncommitment and to separatism". Hence the draft bill concludes that legislation is needed to regulate the public use of Turkish which would not interfere with the spoken and written language used in private communications. The law would not interfere with the choice of words

(i.e. whether pure Turkish or Ottoman), as this can cause new arguments instead of creating the national unity which the legislation seeks. However, "it is clear that when the precautions proposed by this legislation are implemented, citizens will take care to use a richer, more beautiful and more national form of the language".

Section two of the draft bill is devoted to commerce and industry. Article three states that names and commercial titles of any kind must be in Turkish, and that this requirement will be enforced by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. All business signs must be in Turkish, and if a second language has to be used then this will be given below the Turkish name. However, this foreign name will not take more than "half of the space occupied by the Turkish name". Companies which use a second language in their signs will "pay four times as much in advertisement tax". Moreover, the Turkish used in commercial names must fit the standards given in the latest edition of the Turkish dictionary published by the Turkish Language Society. Turkish words can be abbreviated and combined, but in case of doubt, the TDK is to be consulted. All advertising and formal documentation of goods must be in Turkish; however, foreign firms which have obtained the right to carry out their activities in Turkey are not obliged to use Turkish in their names and titles though they must use Turkish in all advertising. Article Six of the bill details the fines for businesses which break the law. These range from confiscation of offending materials to collection of fines by local councils.

The third section of the draft bill requires all formal written communications to be in Turkish. Companies can use a foreign language when communicating with the members of their boards who are foreigners but, for the Turkish members, all documentation has to be provided in Turkish. Foreign firms are excluded from this obligation. All public meetings and demonstrations organized by Turkish citizens must be in Turkish, though in international meetings other languages besides Turkish may be used.

The fourth section concerns education, and states that one of the core aims of education is to educate citizens to use Turkish without mistakes, and therefore Turkish courses in primary and secondary education are of the utmost importance. In primary and secondary education, failure in one of the core courses such as Turkish language, Turkish literature or Turkish composition will disqualify a student from moving up a grade. In university entrance examinations, questions on Turkish will be worth not less than ten per cent of the total mark. In

competitive examinations for the civil service, language competency will also be examined, and will be worth not less than twenty per cent of the total mark.

The fifth section of the draft bill considers the use of Turkish in broadcasting and written publications, and establishes language-watch committees: a national *Dil İzleme Kurulu* "Language Watch Committee" (DİK), and local *Dil İzleme Alt Kurulları* "Language Watch Sub-Committees" (DİAK). The DİK will have nine members (two members elected from the members of the TDK by the Scientific Committee of the TDK; two members elected by the Higher Education Council from lecturers in Turkish; two members elected by the Ministry of Education from teachers of Turkish literature and language; one member elected from members of the Executive Board of Turkish Radio and Television; one member elected jointly by the Turkish Journalists Society and Ankara Journalists Society). The DİAKs will have five members (two lecturers in Turkish elected by the Senate(s) of the local university/fities; two teachers of Turkish selected by the local Directorate of National Education, and one member representing the local press.)

The next section of the bill describes the financial arrangements to pay for these committees. Press and broadcasting companies will pay three per cent of their advertising income to the TDK. The incomes of the DİK and DİAKs will be composed of this three per cent, and of all income from the fines collected in enforcing the law. The government will also include provisions in the national budget in case there is a shortfall. The section also gives details of how the DİK and DİAKs will use their budgets.

Next, the bill describes how these committees will work. The DİAK will meet every month to discuss cases of incorrect Turkish usage reported by specialists. The DİAKs will report to the DİK in January, April, July and October. The DİK will scrutinize the reports, and coordinate the workings of the local DİAKs. Both the DİK and the DİAKs will employ enough specialists, who will decide on the correctness of Turkish used nationwide. The DİAKs will determine whether Turkish is used correctly (in terms of spelling, pronunciation and grammar) in oral and written communications, advertisements, and promotional materials. In the case of any incorrect usage, they will issue warnings, impose fines, or order temporary cessation of activities by offenders. An offender will receive three written warnings stating the nature of the mistake and its consequences. Then, if the offence

persists, a fine will be imposed which "will not be less than ten times the minimum wage and not more than hundred times the minimum wage. If the offence persists, then the firm's activities can be stopped for one to fifteen days". Any appeals regarding the fine will be made to the DİK, and although the offender has the right to appeal to the civil courts within seven days this will not stop the application of the fine by the DİK.

The draft bill makes it obligatory for all broadcasters and presenters to obtain a certificate from the *Sunuculuk Sertifikası Kurulu* "Committee for Presenters' Certificate". This committee will comprise nine members, including representatives of the General Directorate of the National Theatre, and a representative elected from the presenters of Turkish Radio and Television.

Finally, the draft bill requires all broadcasters and publishers to employ Turkish specialists who should be graduates of Departments of Turkish [thus curbing unemployment as well as the language]. These specialists cannot work in any other capacity than determining the correctness of the language used in the activities of the firms which employ them.

Reactions to the draft bill

On January 3, the news that the draft bill was opened to signature at the Council of Ministers spread through the media, receiving mixed reactions. Everyone agreed that Turkish was badly written and spoken, and that the Turkish used by some members of the press did not make sense either syntactically or semantically, and that foreign expressions were borrowed and translated into Turkish freely, often abusing the syntactic and morphological rules of Turkish. The poor standard of the Turkish oral skills of many announcers and presenters on private television and radio channels was also not approved. Yet not everyone was of the opinion that a law could put things right, and dictate the form of language to be used by citizens.

From what was written and said by different sectors of the public, it was clear that very few people were aware of the actual contents of the draft bill, which had been prepared in a hurry by people with no training in law. The illegal, unrealistic, unscientific, absurd and dictatorial demands of the bill were not immediately picked up by the media (nor by the intelligentsia) who clearly had not seen the text.

However, because everyone had strong opinions about Turkish, the debate about the bill got under way.

During the debate, the media of the Islamic right wrote more about the glory of the Ottoman language before the Republic than about the contents of the proposed draft bill itself. An article in *Zaman* (5 January) by Ebubekir Eroğlu claimed that the form of Turkish before the Republic was based on a settled *written culture*, and complained about the alphabet reform and the purification movement. Another Islamist columnist Fehmi Koru (*Zaman*, 3 January 1997), had a more religious interpretation of events. He claimed that the Turkish law was inspired by the French law, and although he accepted that Turkish was invaded by foreign words borrowed from Western cultures, he argued against legislation to protect the language. He called for a campaign by consumers against buying products with foreign names, or shopping from stores with non-Turkish names. The duty of protecting a language did not lie with the bureaucrats but with the people who used it, i.e. journalists, writers and broadcasters. The "problem of presenters", according to him, would be solved when viewers learned to give more importance to "hearing than seeing", referring to the fact that most female presenters are better qualified by physique than by language skill. He claimed that "belief in the fight" against incorrect Turkish could solve the problem, but, because the people who proposed the draft bill were not believers, they would not succeed.

On January 3, the Islamic Welfare Party asked an academic (who is not a linguist) to brief its members about the state of Turkish. The professor presented them with a formula: *mathematics+science+heart=Turkish*. He also attacked the eagerness of young people to learn foreign languages. He suggested that Turkish scientists should not worry about learning foreign languages because they can learn enough foreign language to aid them in their work through "special learning methods". (see *Aksiyon*, 1996, no. 88 for similar views on the subject.)

Liberal columnists dwelt on the fact that the draft bill sought the creation of a standard dialect. They made it clear that they were against imposing a standard form of the language on people. Suspecting a more sinister aim behind this insistence on standardization, they celebrated the fact that the interaction between Kurdish and Turkish was effecting both languages, and asked what was wrong with this change. Was the next step to outlaw drama series where local dialects were spoken? How far was fascism in language going to go? They asked for the state

to keep out of language matters. Journalists like Zülfü Livaneli (*Milliyet*, 4 January) and Doğan Hızlan (*Hürriyet*, 4, 5 January) stressed the fact that names for concepts exist in cultures which have these concepts, and since technology is imported from Western cultures, it is natural that the names for these technologies are borrowed as well; this is all a part and parcel of globalization. Mehmet Barlas (*Sabah*, 4 January) wrote: "Language is a changing, developing living organism, it can not be protected with legislation. Language conscience can only be developed by reading good books. Moreover, language is not an abstract concept. As long as you borrow the lifestyle and civilization of another language, you will also borrow its words". He pointed out that the efforts of the state, from Atatürk to the new TDK, have failed to ensure the correct use of Turkish. Making fun of the proposed DİK, and DİAKs, he called them "language fascists". Oktay Akbal (*Milliyet*, 7 January) asked about the fate of Persian and Arabic words in Turkish; were the authorities going to outlaw shops whose names are in these languages? Or, was this a movement only against words of Western origin?

Among the intelligentsia, some, like Talat Halman, (*Milliyet*, 8 January), gave support to the proposed language bill because something needed to be done about the present state of Turkish, and in the past, state intervention in language had been successful. Orhan Pamuk (*Hürriyet*, 12 January), also supported the bill. Pamuk's support of the bill had more to do with an anti-materialist stand than with the contents of the bill itself. He claimed that the media in Turkey were controlled by the demands of a group of people who obeyed the rules of the market economy and who had no respect for the language nor for the culture they operated in, and he believed that the new legislation would put a stop to all this.

Similar anti-materialist reactions to the bill came from the writer Atilla İlhan, the poet Can Yücel and from the journalist İlhan Selçuk, who gave samples of how the media of the market economy polluted the language. According to Selçuk (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 February), there is a cultural vacuum in the post-market-economy Turkish society, which is reflected in the language used by the media. Where people live in extremes, and nothing is too surprising, headlines are given in terms of two borrowed words; *şok* "shocking" or *mega* "mega". Hence one gets *şok kadın* "a shocking woman", *şok yarışma* "a shocking competition", *şok çekiliş* "shocking draw", *mega yazar* "mega author", *mega aşk* "mega love", *mega yarışma* "mega competition", and so on for ordinary

events. These authors also made it clear that legislation could not solve problems of mentality and culture, but education could.

A similar reaction to the bill came from the author Tahsin Yücel, the only linguist by profession among those who took part in the debate. In *Milliyet Sanat* (15 January 1997), he pointed out that the more serious journalists and Turkish authors wrote beautiful Turkish demonstrating how rich and pure the language is, and that those who could not use Turkish like this were so contaminated by materialism that no law could help them. He also stressed that, like other languages, Turkish had several layers and forms of expression, and that all these dialects and usages could not be standardized under one banner. Since not all borrowed words survived in the language, he pleaded for the state to leave the language alone. He accused the authors of the bill of being insincere, and dared them to have the call-to-prayer read out in Turkish rather than Arabic, if they were so keen to purify and to protect the language.

Aftermath

On 1 February 1997, *Samanyolu*, one of the Islamic TV channels, broadcast a debate on the proposed legislation. Representatives of the political parties criticized the bill bitterly, and pointed out how its articles clashed with the Constitution, and with sundry other legislation. During the debate it became apparent that the bill was created by a few members of the executive board of the TDK following a meeting of the Parliamentary Commission on Culture and Art where the state of Turkish was discussed. After its preparation, neither the members of the TDK, nor of the Parliamentary Commission, nor journalists were shown the text of the draft bill before it was submitted to the Council of Ministers. It also became apparent that, in face of criticism, many changes had been made to the draft bill; for example, articles on the mass media and on language-watch committees (DİK and DİAKs) and fines were taken out; and the condition for product names to be in Turkish was changed. If the bill had been signed by the Ministers, and had come before the Parliamentary Commissions, no doubt it would have changed even more before it was discussed in Parliament, after which it would have to go through the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court.

During the debate, which continued for a month in the media, it became clear that in the 1990s Turkish cannot be regulated from above: any change must come from a grassroots movement. Although the TDK regards itself as the authority which knows what correct Turkish is, the syntactic mistakes of its own members are followed and regularly exposed by its opponents (for example in the monthly literary journal *Varlık*). It was also suggested that, in proposing a bill which was not only criticized but ridiculed, the TDK had lost its credibility. This is not to say that the Turkish public will cease to discuss how pure Turkish should be, or whether the media uses 'correct' Turkish, and since what constitutes 'correct' Turkish seems to depend on the individual's political stance and life view, the debate will continue.

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NOTES

- 1 There are several articles in the Turkish Constitution which block the use of any language other than Turkish in public communications. The basis is Article Fourteen which outlaws separatist movements: "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic... or of creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. The third paragraph of Article Twenty Six elaborates on Article Fourteen, and states that No language prohibited by Law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, phonograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized by a duly issued decision of judges or, in cases where delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority designated by law."

Amara, Spolsky and Tushyeh, El-Essawi, Yasir Suleiman and Al-Wer all in this volume).

CHAPTER TEN

GENDER IN A GENDERLESS LANGUAGE: THE CASE OF TURKISH

Friederike Braun

1. Introduction

In some languages gender distinctions are grammaticalised, while in others females and males are referred to with the same grammatical forms. An utterance in a genderless language does not always contain formal clues to the gender of the persons mentioned. Are genderless languages then gender-neutral languages? Do they express egalitarian attitudes? These questions will be addressed in the present paper, taking Turkish as a case in point. The empirical studies to be described were conducted at various universities in Ankara from 1995 to 1997. The central hypothesis underlying the studies is that a genderless language structure cannot be equated with gender-neutrality. Instead, the "gender belief system"¹ which has evolved in the language community was expected to have permeated into the semantics of the language with gender biases emerging behind the structural neutrality. The sociological background of the project, which cannot be dealt with here, was examined on the basis of pertinent publications as well as interviews with Turkish scholars in the field of gender research. Theoretical aspects, such as the semantics of categorisation (esp. prototype semantics, for example Rosch 1977), theories of natural classification as developed by Lakoff (1982 a, b) as well as the theory approach to classification developed in psychology (e.g., Murphy and Medin 1985), will also be excluded from the present discussion.² Neither have I touched on the complementary issue of how women and men may use linguistic variables differently. Studies of this type are lacking on Turkish, although they have been conducted for other languages in the Middle Eastern context, for example on Arabic (see

2. Gender Languages and Genderless Languages

Grammatical gender, according to a definition by Dixon (1982: 160) is a grouping of all the nouns of a language into two or three classes which show considerable correlation with sex.

Languages like German or Arabic are thus clearly gender languages and even English, with its pronominal distinction of *she*, *he* and *it* is often regarded as such. During the past 20 years feminists have criticised what they consider to be the asymmetrical use of the linguistic gender category (Miller and Swift 1977, Hamilton 1997, Pusch 1984, Braun 1996, b). Feminist language critique focuses on so-called "masculine generics", i.e., the use of masculine forms to refer to persons of unspecified or unknown gender, as in the German example (1):

(1) *Der Wähler* [masc.] hat seine Entscheidung getroffen.

The voter has made his decision

Feminists have claimed that masculine generics render women generally less visible, make people think of males as the prototypes of humanity and ultimately lead to a neglect of women's interests and rights. As a consequence of the public debates about "sexist" and "non-sexist language", American publishing houses, for example, condemned the use of generic *he* or the use of the word *man* in the sense of "human" (Hellinger 1990:140ff). In Germany, state parliaments have decreed that both feminine and masculine forms be used in legal texts instead of masculine generics (Grabruker 1993:269ff lists the legal sources).

The Turkish language community has been spared tedious arguments about masculine generics, since Turkish lacks a grammatical gender category completely. Although there are some lexical gender distinctions such as *anne/baba* "mother/father", *kız/oğlan* "girl/boy" or *hanım/bey* "lady/sir", most terms for person reference contain no formal clue to the gender of the person referred to, e.g. *öğretmen* "teacher", *başbakan* "prime minister", *işçi* "worker". Even third person pronouns such as *o* "she, he" or third person forms like *gidiyor* "she is

going, he is going" are free from gender distinctions. In Turkish it is possible to write a text without ever revealing the gender of the protagonists or to formulate generic sentences without being forced to decide on the use of masculine or feminine forms (or both), because there are no masculine or feminine forms. This structural feature gives Turkish the appearance of a perfectly gender-neutral language in which women and men are largely treated alike. Since there is a tradition in Turkey of claiming that females and males enjoyed equal rights in pre-Islamic times (cf. Ziya Gökalp in his "classical work" *Türkçülüğün esasları*, 1923)³, the lack of grammatical gender has been taken as further evidence of a Turkic tradition of egalitarianism. The empirical studies I am going to report on in my paper, however, will challenge the assumption that a grammatically gender-neutral language is automatically an egalitarian language.

3. Covert Gender: Gender Biases in Turkish Terms for Person Reference

130 students (78 females, 52 males) participated in the pilot study. The subjects were given a questionnaire, which, they were told, was aimed at investigating Turkish forms of address. The questionnaire contained a list of person categories, such as *sekreter* "secretary" or *kuyumcu* "goldsmith, jeweller". The subjects were asked to write down the terms of address most widely used for these types of persons. Many Turkish terms of address express the gender of the addressee, e.g. *hanımefendi* "lady", *beyefendi* "sir", *teyze* "aunt", *amca* "uncle". Therefore the subjects' responses - the address terms they chose for a given person category - usually showed which gender they had associated with the stimulus-term. It should be noticed that the instructions did not contain any explicit mention of the real intentions behind the study.

One group of stimulus-terms involved occupations which represent typically male domains, e.g. "police officer", "street vendor", "taxi-driver". These terms were interpreted as male by the majority of the respondents. The stimulus *polis* "police officer", for example, was interpreted as male by 98% of the subjects, and as both male and female by only 1%. Similarly *isportacı* "street vendor" was interpreted as male by 94% of the subjects and as inclusive by only 1%.⁴ Although there was some variation in the percentages of male interpretations, all of the terms from a male domain showed male bias to a degree that was

statistically significant.⁵ This comes as no surprise, of course, because in all of the occupations included males outnumber females by far. Many of them also imply activities which are considered less suitable for women such as exposing oneself in public (street vendors) or exerting power (police).

A second group of stimulus-terms involved activities from predominantly female domains such as "cleaning person" and "secretary". Responses to these terms showed a female bias: *temizlikçi* "cleaning person" elicited female interpretations from 96% of the subjects and male interpretation from only 1%. *Sekreter* "secretary" was seen as female by 94% of the subjects and as both male and female by 5%.⁶ Again there were variations in the percentages for each stimulus, but the female bias was statistically significant for all of the terms.

So far the data confirm what we would expect. The results given in table 1 are, however, contrary to common-sense assumptions.

Table 1: supposedly neutral domain

stimulus	male interpretation	female interpretation	female & male	indeterminate
<i>köylü</i> "villager"	72%	5%	20%	3%
<i>kişi</i> "person"	68%	8%	21%	3%
<i>birisi</i> "someone"	68%	5%	28%	0%
<i>yolcu</i> "passenger"	66%	6%	24%	4%

What we find is that all of the terms in table 1 display a male bias. But why should a "person" or "someone" be more often thought of as male rather than female? Why should "villagers" be seen as predominantly male, when most of the persons living in villages today are probably women (a consequence of men's migration to the cities in search of work)? Obviously we cannot resort to the statistical distribution of men and women here.⁷ One reason for this kind of male

bias may be the fact that male presence is more conspicuous in many areas of everyday life in Turkey. Often there are more men than women to be seen in public places, in cafés, and restaurants. In addition, many of the sub-systems of Turkish society (economy, labour market, politics, law, religion) may be described as male-dominated, in the sense that men are present in greater numbers, in a wider range of functions and tend to occupy more prominent positions than women. Thus women may come to be seen as somewhat peripheral and therefore less representative members of society, which is reflected in the male bias of terms like *kiji* "person".

To sum up, the results of my first investigation show that Turkish terms for person reference are not semantically neutral. On the contrary, they tend to have a significant gender bias more or less firmly integrated into the terms' lexical meaning, which I will term a "covert gender". This covert gender corresponds to the gender belief system that has evolved in Turkish society.⁸

4. *Semantic Conflicts between Covert Gender and Proposition*

As we have seen, it may be claimed that covert gender exists in language reception, in the way Turkish speakers interpret sentences they hear or read. But is this linguistically relevant? Is covert gender just an image arising in people's minds while they process sentences or does it have consequences for linguistic structures? Informal observation suggests that covert gender may affect the way sentences are formulated, for sentences are judged as problematic by native speakers when their proposition contradicts the covert gender of the involved term which combines a female proposition with the male-biased term *kayyumcu* as in example 2 below:

- (2) ?Köşedeki *kayyumcu*, altı aylık hamileymiş

The jeweller at the corner is six months pregnant

In order to investigate the impact of covert gender on the formulation of utterances, another study was designed in which terms for person reference were systematically combined with propositions that either did or did not match their covert gender as in examples (3) and (4) below.

- (3) Sadece iki günlük evli olan 22 yaşındaki bir *fuibolcu*, yaştu olan karsını dün

Maltepe'de meydana gelen feci bir trafik kazasında kaybettii

A 22 year old *football player*, who had only been married for two days, lost

his 22 year old wife in a tragic car accident in Maltepe yesterday

- (4) Sadece iki günlük evli olan 22 yaşındaki bir *fuibolcu*, yaştu olan kocasını

dün Maltepe'de meydana gelen feci bir trafik kazasında kaybettii.

A 22 year old *football player*, who had only been married for two days,

lost her 22 year old husband in a tragic car accident in Maltepe yesterday

105 native speakers (60 females, 43 males) participated in the investigation. They were told that the study served the evaluation of a programme for computer translation and that they would be asked to judge the well-formedness of sentences translated by that programme. Every subject then rated stimulus-sentences on a 5-point-scale ranging from "totally impossible" to "perfectly possible". Three of the sentences contained a conflict between covert gender and proposition of the type shown in (4), three were matching sentences like (3). In all, six different stimulus-terms were used:


Table 2: stimulus-terms according to domain and covert gender

term	domain	covert gender
<i>sekreter</i> "secretary"	female	female
<i>çocuk bakıcısı</i> "nursery school teacher"		
<i>Ankaralı</i> "inhabitant of Ankara"	neutral	male
<i>genç</i> "young person" ⁹		
<i>futbolcu</i> "football player"	male	male
<i>işportacı</i> "street vendor"		

Each of these terms was presented both in the matching and the conflicting version of two different sentence frames, one of which was the "accident"-frame shown in (3) and (4). This resulted in a pool of 24 stimulus-sentences, of which every respondent received a selection of six. The results of this study are summarised in figure 1.

Figure 1.: Mean ratings of matching and non-matching sentences

by domain of terms for person reference



As the figure shows, sentences with non-matching propositions consistently received lower scores than sentences with matching propositions. The difference between matching and non-matching

sentences in each domain was statistically significant.¹⁰ Note that none of the non-matching sentences violated grammatical rules and that all of them were "logically" possible, because there are, for example, female football players and male secretaries in Turkey. Moreover, the cover story about the translation programme encouraged respondents to judge the well-formedness of the sentences rather than the likelihood or credibility of the reported facts. Therefore the reason for the reduced acceptability of non-matching sentences must have been the semantic conflict between covert gender and proposition.

In addition to the quantitative study, qualitative interviews were carried out with 42 native speakers (22 females, 20 males) using the stimulus-sentences of the quantitative study as a starting point for discussion. Many of the interviewees expressed uneasiness with the non-matching sentences, as the following comment illustrates:

(5) Yani, orada bir anlam bozukluğu da var. Yani, o şeye, olayla, özne arasında bir uyum yok.

That is, there is also a disruption in meaning. That is, there is no agreement

between the, ah, the event and the subject

(interview 13)

The quantitative study as well as the interviews show that covert gender in person reference is a factor which affects the formulation of sentences. It is unlikely that speakers would utter conflict sentences, such as the ones used in the study, in a natural conversation. Since speakers share intuitions about the covert gender of terms for person reference, they anticipate its possible effects on the interpretations and expectations of the hearer and therefore construct their utterances in such a way that semantic conflict does not arise.¹¹

5. Females as the Marked Gender

Another study focused on whether, when and how Turkish speakers would make the gender of a person explicit in a text where gender is not of crucial importance. 404 subjects (176 females, 227 males)¹² participated in the study, which was based on a translation from English to Turkish. Subjects were given a text about a traffic accident

in which one person was injured. The person concerned was introduced via a term like *child*, *secretary* or *basketball player* in most of the cases¹³ and was ascribed a certain gender by pronominal forms such as *she* or *he*. The following is an example of the text in the version *child/she* together with a typical response:

Child injured in traffic accident

Thick fog over South England was the cause of several traffic accidents yesterday. Near London a seven year old *child* was seriously injured when the car which *she* was in crashed into a tree. *She* was taken to Knightsbridge Hospital. This morning doctors reported that *her* condition was critical.

Dün İngiltere'de yoğun sis bir sürü trafik kazasına neden oldu. Londra yakınlarında bir kız çocuğu, içinde bulunduğu arabanın bir ağaca çarpması sonucu ciddi şekilde yaralandı. Knightsbridge hastanesi'ne kaldırıldı. Bu sabah, doktorlar kızın durumunun ciddi olduğunu açıkladılar.

(questionnaire 149)

The text frame was held constant over all versions, but the term for person reference (the "main character") varied according to a 3 X 2 factorial design. Different stimuli were selected to represent a neutral, a female and a male domain: *American* and *child* (neutral domain), *secretary* and *househelper* (female domain), *basketball player* and *police* (male domain). The terms were combined with either *she* or *he* to make the main character female in one version of the text and male in another. Each subject read only one version and translated it into Turkish. The data were analysed across a large number of parameters, but I will summarise only the most important results here. The first parameter was whether gender was made explicit in the responses or not, regardless of the means used to do so. The data are summed up in table 3:

Table 3: distribution of gender marking by term for person reference and gender

term	gender	marked	unmarked
police	F	100%	0%
p<.0001; phi=0.972	M	3%	97%
basketball player	F	26%	74%
p<.0005; phi=0.382	M	0%	100%
American	F	57%	43%
p<.0001; phi=0.487	M	11%	89%
child	F	69%	31%
p<.0001; phi=0.682	M	3%	97%
househelper	F	25%	75%
p>.25; phi=0.158	M	13%	88%
secretary	F	7%	93%
p<.1; phi=0.189	M	0%	100%

As is evident from the table, gender marking was always more frequent for female than for male gender, but the difference was small in the case of *househelper* and *secretary* (terms from a female domain) and was not statistically significant there.¹⁴ It seems only logical that female markings diminish when the covert gender of a term is female already, as with *hizmetçi* "househelper" or *sekreter* "secretary". But what is striking is that male gender is marked only rarely even in these cases, although in fact male gender is the deviation from the norm here. Thus the general rule extractable from my data is that male gender mostly remains unmarked regardless of context, while female gender tends to be overtly expressed. The total frequency of gender marking for female and male stimuli is summed up in table 4.

Table 4: gender marking vs. non-marking
by gender of person referred to

gender	marked	unmarked
female	50%	50%
male	5%	95%

Statistical analyses show this difference to be highly significant and the correspondence of gender and marking to be substantial ($\chi^2=104.81$; $df=1$; $p<0.001$; $\phi=.508$).

As translations may not be the most reliable type of linguistic data, the question has to be raised whether the asymmetrical distribution of gender marking could be attributed to features of the English stimulus-material. However, the female and male versions of each stimulus-text were structured in an exactly parallel way (*child ... she vs. child ... he, policewoman ... she vs. policeman ... he*), so that the asymmetry in the translations actually constitutes a significant digression from the input pattern. Moreover, the tendency towards female marking can also be observed in Turkish literary texts or newspaper articles and thus is very unlikely to represent an anomaly.

6. Conclusion

Turkish as a genderless language escapes certain problems that are inherent in language systems with obligatory gender marking and is therefore less susceptible to feminist language critique. Yet, the assumption that Turkish is semantically neutral or even egalitarian is falsified by the empirical evidence cited in this paper. Turkish terms for person reference have a covert gender which results from and reconfirms the gender belief system in Turkish society.

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NOTES

- 1 I borrow this expression from Deaux (1985: 65), who uses it as a cover term for gender stereotypes, gender roles, attitudes towards and representation of gender.
- 2 These are dealt with in more detail in Braun (1996a).
- 3 A modern edition of this book is Ziya Gökalp (1994). *Türkçülüğün esasları*. İstanbul: İnkılâp.
- 4 The remainder of the data were not interpretable according to gender, because subjects had chosen terms of address which were not gender-specific.
- 5 Chi²-tests were used to check the significance of the findings.
- 6 Again, the remainder consist of responses that could not be classified according to gender.
- 7 Because of the design of the investigation (address terms) it was not possible to present these terms without any context. Thus *birisi*, e.g., was presented as "someone who is waiting in the bus queue". I have not seen any significant differences in the numbers of women and the numbers of men waiting for buses in large Turkish cities, but an effect of context information cannot be excluded with absolute certainty. The results of the second study, however, confirm the male bias of "neutral" terms.
- 8 There were also effects of subject sex with some terms, especially those with a less pronounced gender bias (e.g. *köylü* "villager", *misafir* "visitor"): subjects tended to imagine a person of their own gender more readily.
- 9 To some speakers, the male bias of *genç* is so pronounced that they would find the translation "young person" less than adequate. Yet *genç* cannot simply be regarded as a "male" lexeme such as *bey* "sir", for even females are sometimes referred to as *bu genç* "this young person" (for example in a Turkish news programme on television). In addition, 15 of 42 interviewees claimed to associate both sexes with the word *genç*.
- 10 This was statistically tested by using t-tests for paired samples.
- 11 The interviewees were also asked how they would formulate the non-matching sentences, if they were to express what was stated in the sentence with their own words. Responses show that the semantic clash between covert gender and proposition could be and would be avoided in a number of ways.

- 12 One subject did not specify her/his gender.

13 The only exception was the stimulus *police*, which displayed a lexical gender distinction (*policewoman* vs. *policeman*). This case of lexical gender distinction was included to determine the impact of the linguistic form of the stimulus.

14 A multiple contingency analysis (Sutcliffe analysis) was used for the statistical evaluation. A significant interaction was found for stimulus-term and ascribed gender (χ^2 (H)=49.77; df=5; $p<.001$). The p-values given in table 3 are the probabilities calculated when the term is held constant and the effect of gender on the dependent variable is determined separately for each term.

of prestige in speech. Males and females of all social classes agree that these forms signal - or are employed deliberately by some individuals to signal - the speaker's actual or imagined membership in a prestigious social group. It is also generally believed that members of this group tend to be educated in the private school system in Egypt, where one or more foreign languages are taught, and that this in turn accounts for the occurrence of the foreign forms. Most males and females interviewed in the course of this study also believe that the foreign forms are more prevalent in the speech of females than males, ascribing this to the stronger tendency among the former to use foreign words, so much so that the more accurate, i.e. foreign, a speaker's pronunciation of these variants is, the more feminine/effeminate his or her pronunciation is considered to be. However, attitudes towards these variants among Cairenes do vary. Thus while some consider the foreign forms to be the result of a desire to adhere to standards of correctness in speech, others regard them as an expression of pretentious or, even, arrogant behaviour.

The above view concerning the linguistic behaviour of females in Cairo seems to correlate with the findings of Labov (1970) in New York and Trudgill (1974) in Norwich. These studies, among others, posit that female speakers tend to use a higher proportion of what are believed to be prestige forms of speech than male speakers do. This in turn is said to emerge from the conviction that women are more concerned than men with the kind of speech they produce, and that, therefore, they are more likely to be influenced by the prestige norms in the language than their male counterparts.

Purpose

The aim of this study is two-fold. On the one hand, it seeks to investigate the validity of the above assumptions concerning the social meaning of the foreign forms of /p/ and /v/ in word initial position. On the other hand, the paper will seek to establish the empirical truth or otherwise of the widely held belief that females are more likely than males to use the above variants in their speech.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE SOCIOLINGUISTIC CONNOTATIONS OF /p/ AND /v/ IN CAIRO ARABIC

Raghda El-Essawi

Preamble

The present paper is a preliminary study of the sociolinguistic implications of the pronunciation of the variants /p/ and /v/ in loan-words by males and females in Cairo.¹ These variants are realised in two variant forms in Cairo Arabic which, for lack of better terms, we will call the 'foreign' and 'native' forms. In their foreign form these variants are articulated as in English or French. In their native form, these variants are rendered as /b/ and /f/ respectively. For the purposes of this study, loan-words are regarded as lexical items of foreign origin which appear in the speech of monolinguals in Cairo, for example *Paris*, *pantaloon*, *pullover*, *video*, *villa* and *veranda*. In investigating the sociolinguistic significance of the above variants in their foreign form, the present study will draw on the speech of four groups, each with a different socio-economic profile.

Deuchar (1988) suggests that research into differences in male and female speech must give priority to the norms governing a communicative act over factors that are external to the act in question. Accordingly, this paper attempts to explain research data on male/female linguistic behaviour in terms of the notions of *Power* and *Face* which Deuchar uses in her explanation of that act.

Sociolinguistic Significance of Foreign Forms

The researcher has noted the belief, widely held among Cairenes, that the foreign forms of the variants /p/ and /v/ are regarded as indicators

Subjects

The sample used in this study is a judgement sample, including 40 subjects (20 males and 20 females) with different socio-economic backgrounds as defined by their education, occupation, income and area of residence. The sample was originally intended to be representative of Cairo as far as possible. It did not, however, in the end include any uneducated subjects, since it was ascertained at an early stage that such subjects recognised (and, by extension, were able to pronounce) only a few words from the range to be elicited during the interview. Moreover, since these subjects were illiterate, it was judged that it would be difficult for them to contribute fully to this research.

All the female subjects were working women. This was a deliberate choice on the part of the researcher to balance (as far as possible) the effects of social networks on the speech of men and women. It was feared, for example, that the speech of unemployed women, especially those living in *al-manātiq al sha'abiyya* (down market areas) would be affected by their respective social networks, as represented by family members and other women living in the same neighbourhoods. It was also thought that working women, in contrast, would not exhibit the same level of solidarity with the speech of their social networks as a result of, among other things, fewer hours of contact within the networks concerned and less pressure from peer group members in the networks to conform to speech norms intended to gain the respect of interlocutors in the outside world, were thought to motivate working women to produce a speech variety of as high a level as that produced by their male counterparts.

The grouping of subjects is usually one of the most challenging aspects of this type of study. It also constitutes one of the most obvious points of weakness since it is very difficult to assign people to specific social classes or groups in a complex social situation of the kind found in Cairo. However, owing to the lack of a workable alternative the present study will follow the Labovian model by assigning individuals to groups (not classes) according to education, occupation, income and area of residence. Our subjects were therefore divided into four groups of five males and five females each as follows:

Group A: this group includes university graduates in high-income occupations, living in areas recognised by most Cairenes as elitist/upper class.

Group B: this group includes university graduates in low-income jobs living in areas regarded either as *manātiq sha'abiyya* (for example, *Būlāq, Shubra and Al-Marj*) or as old elite areas where housing is cheap (for example, *Al-Qasr Al-'aynī*).²

Group C: this group includes graduates of Polytechnics with low-income jobs living in *manātiq sha'abiyya*.

Group D: this group includes subjects who reached or finished high school or polytechnic, with low-income jobs, living in areas regarded as *manātiq sha'abiyya*.

The Interviews

The interviews consisted of two sections. The first section took the form of a conversation in the course of which the interviewer asked the interviewee questions intended to elicit lexical items with the variants /p/ and /v/ in initial position (for example, *Paris, pantaloon, Pepsi, video, villa*). The interviewees were also asked to provide personal information regarding, for example, their education, occupation, income, area of residence, and their impressions of males and females who use the target linguistic variants in their foreign form. In the second section of the interview, the interviewees were asked to read a list of words of the required type which the researcher elicited in the first section of the interview. In this way, evidence was obtained pertaining to the subjects' linguistic performance in both casual speech (interview style) and formal speech (reading style).

Analysis of the Interviews

The technique adopted here was a simple one: the researcher counted the number of times each subject produced the variants /p/ and /v/ in their foreign forms during the interview. Each interviewee thus produced two sets of data: the first set representing the occurrence of

the foreign forms of the variants during the first part of the interview (the more casual, interview-style speech) and the second set representing the occurrence of these forms when reading a list of target lexical items of the type mentioned above (the more formal, reading-style speech). The average number of times males and females from each group produced the target variants in their foreign form in casual and formal speech situations was then calculated to establish (a) the degree of their use of these prestige forms, and (b) whether these prestige forms were more prevalent among females than males. In addition, the present research aimed to establish whether or not the foreign forms were more prevalent in formal than informal speech styles, since it is generally assumed that prestige forms tend to be more represented in the former than the latter owing to the greater degree of control and monitoring the speaker exercises in the speech style concerned.

Results

The results obtained allow us to draw certain conclusions about the occurrence of /p/ and /v/ in their capacity as sociolinguistic variants (see Appendix). In this context, we adopt Labov's (1970:283) definition of the sociolinguistic variant as one which is correlated with some non-linguistic feature of the social context of the speaker, the addressee, the audience or the setting. The results we obtained may be stated as follows:

1. The subjects in all groups approximated the foreign norm of the target variants at a higher rate in formal speech (reading style) than in informal speech (interview style). This indicates that use of the foreign forms of the variants was accorded a higher prestige value than that of the native ones. This conclusion is supported by the answers the subjects gave to questions concerning their attitude towards speakers who use foreign and native forms of the variants. In this connection there was an almost unanimous agreement that the use of the foreign forms indicates that the speaker has a high socio-economic status. This is considered by some subjects to be a positive trait, while others consider the use of the foreign forms to carry connotations of pretentiousness and superiority.

2. A positive correlation exists between the use of the foreign forms and the socio-economic status of the speaker. Thus, subjects belonging to Group A (i.e. university graduates with high-income occupation) showed the highest average production of the foreign forms, followed by Group B, then Group C. Subjects belonging to Group D had the lowest average. This indicates that use of the foreign forms generally correlates with an individual's socio-economic status, level of education and (therefore) prestige.
3. There is a considerable gap between the average production of the foreign forms in Group A and group B, the two university graduates groups in the study. This may be related to the absence of these forms from the phoneme inventory of Cairo Arabic and as for all Arabic varieties. But his cannot constitute a full explanation because it applies to all groups equally. The explanation for the above disparity must therefore be additionally sought in what, most probably, are non-linguistic factors. In this connection we believe that differences in the type of education members of the two groups receive, their type of employment, social networks and life-styles can offer such an explanation. Thus, the fact that members of Group A tend to be graduates of the private school sector where foreign language learning is positively promoted, and the fact that their employment, social networks and life-styles (involving travel and entertainment) bring them into direct contact with, and frequent exposure to, the foreign forms of the variants means that they are better able to recognise and produce these forms. It is these factors in the social environment of the speakers which confer on the foreign forms of the variants the prestige and perceived exclusivity they enjoy in sociolinguistic terms.

The gap between the groups is especially clear in the case of the variant /p/. As a whole, the incidence of production by our subjects in all groups of the foreign form /v/ is higher than that of /p/, indicating that most subjects found it easier to differentiate between /v/ and its native counterpart /f/ than between /p/ and its native counterpart /b/. This explains why most of the subjects considered the production of words like *villa* and *video* in their native form to be a greater social taboo than the production of words like *Paris* and *Pepsi* in their native guise. This is an interesting point to which we hope to return in a future research.

4. Our data showed that, contrary to our expectations, males in all groups used the foreign forms more than females did in informal speech (interview style). However, the reverse obtained in informal speech (reading style) with females producing a higher count of the foreign forms than males. We will deal with this difference between the males and females in the population sample in the next section.

5. The difference in female speech between the incidence of the foreign forms of the variants in informal and formal situations is wider than in male speech. This indicates that females tend to use these foreign forms in formal speech considerably more than in casual speech. This result will also be discussed in further detail below.

Discussion

Research into male vs. female speech has hitherto depicted females as more attracted to variants perceived as prestigious in a speech community. Studies on Sydney (Eiskovits, 1987), Glasgow (Macaulay, 1977), Edinburgh (Romaine, 1978) and New York (Labov, 1979) have all shown that female speech was generally found to be closer to prestigious forms than male speech. This tendency on the part of females was attributed to their insecure social position (equated to that of the lower middle classes). Similar research conducted in Cairo on the subject of light vs. strong pharyngalisation, which, in sociolinguistic terms, is thought to carry a higher prestige value than its counterpart among females for light pharyngalisation, which, in sociolinguistic terms, is thought to be emblematic of female identity (Royal, 1986). It therefore seems strange that our results should indicate that the informal speech of males in all groups includes a higher incidence of the foreign and prestigious forms than does the informal speech of women. Does this mean that the general assumption in sociolinguistics that females are more prestige conscious than males needs modification in the light of our findings? Or is it possible that the specific nature of our results can be attributed to some other factor which has no impact on the cross-linguistic applicability of the above assumption?

Let us deal with this issue here by first noting the fact that it is not totally unknown for males to be more attracted than females to a particular prestigious variety. Research carried out in Egypt, Jordan and

Palestine has shown that males tend to be more attracted than females to Modern Standard Arabic variants which have a high prestige value in society (Royal, 1985:172). But this is contour-balanced by the fact that females in Arabic speech communities tend to be more attracted than males to certain spoken prestige forms. This indicates that the Arabic language situation is characterised by different prestige norms which, in the case under consideration here, have a gender-based dimension. What makes our results particularly problematic therefore is that they seem to deviate not only from the sociolinguistic assumption mentioned above, but also from the bifurcated prestige norms construction of the Arabic language situation in terms of gender. Deviation from the latter is particularly relevant in view of the general attitudinal association in all groups in our study, particularly in Groups C and D, of the use of the foreign forms with effeminateness. In light of this we must first seek to explain the above deviation from the above general and language-specific norms by reference to some other factor or factors before we can pronounce this deviation to be a genuine counter-evidence to, or refutation of, the norms in question.

In providing such an explanation an appeal will be made to the effect of the interviewer on the subjects in the course of data elicitation. It is the belief of the present researcher that the high incidence of the foreign forms in the speech of males in the first part of the interview is related to their desire to accommodate to a female interviewer who, in some sense, is in a position of *Power* in relation to them. It may however be argued that, on the face of it, this does not explain why the situation changes in the second part of the interview or, for that matter, why females behave in the completely opposite manner. The only way to find out for certain if the gender identity of the interviewer has the effect we are claiming for it on the production of the prestige forms would be to repeat the interviews with the same, or a comparable sample, but with a male interviewer. We hope to do this in a future research.

In the absence of this we will seek to underpin our explanation by reference to the notions of convergence and divergence in speech accommodation theory into which the pragmatic notions of *Face* and *Power* are injected by Deuchar (1988) to argue that the interpretation of linguistic behaviour should not rest solely on factors external to the process of communication itself. Within an instance of communication therefore *Face* is taken to imply the consideration and respect shown by the speaker towards the addressee's feelings, while *Power* is said to

refer to the position of the speaker relative to the addressee. In spelling this out Deuchar makes four basic assumptions: (1) participants in any interaction wish to preserve their own *Face*; (2) attention to others' *Face* is affected by their *Power* in relation to others; (3) attention to others' *Face* may involve damage to one's own; and (4) women are in a position of less *Power*.

Applying the above insights to the situation under consideration here we may hypothesise the following. First, men converge to the interviewer's prestige (foreign) forms in the first part of the interview to preserve their own *Face* and to show solidarity with her. It may also be argued in this connection that the use of the foreign forms in this part of the interview is an attempt by males to match the *Power* of the interviewer which accrues to her by virtue of her being the interviewer in a socially constructed encounter. Second, men diverge from the prestige forms used by the interviewer in the second part of the interview because of the lack of need to preserve *Face* in relation to the interviewer, having done so in the first part of the interview. It may however be pointed out that the high incidence of the native forms by males in the second part of the interview reflects their desire to diverge from the interviewer by distancing themselves from the sociolinguistic connotations of effeminateness associated with the foreign forms thought to be characteristic of her speech, and that this in turn can be seen as a socially constructed expression of *Power* on their part. It is nevertheless more probable that the occurrence of the native forms in the reading style is motivated by the pull towards Standard Arabic which is the norm in this style and which, additionally, expresses a prestige norm of a kind not available through the foreign forms. Third, the behaviour of the female subjects in the first part of the interview constitutes a case of divergence arising out of their being in a position of less *Power* in relation to the interviewer which may have motivated the lower than usual rate of incidence of the foreign forms in their speech. Finally, the high incidence of the foreign forms in the speech of female subjects in the second part of the interview constitutes a case of convergence and a desire to preserve *Face*. Although it is not possible to be certain of the validity of the above hypotheses, we nevertheless offer them as possible explanations which would bring our findings in line with the cross-language sociolinguistic assumption and the interpretation of the Arabic language situation given above.

Conclusion

This study provides confirmation of one of the most important principles in sociolinguistic research: the effect of prestige consciousness on language behaviour. In particular it shows how prestige in some cultures is associated with foreign rather than native forms, a fact which correlates with other factors in the cultural life of Egypt. This study also shows the complexity of the almost routine association of prestige with female speech in the literature, the explication of which cannot be validly sustained without reference to factors of the speech situation as a pragmatic act. This explains why in this study we had to move beyond the correlation of linguistic variants with social factors as a means of explaining the incidence of prestige forms in linguistic behaviour in favour of a more complex framework in which speech accommodation theory and the pragmatic notions of *Power* and *Face* are invoked to account for what initially seemed like a falsification of the association of prestige with femaleness. We believe that this would not have arisen had it not been for the effect of the gender identity of the interviewer on the linguistic behaviour of her interviewees. This in turn forcefully suggests that linguistic behaviour is subject to negotiation between the speaker and the addressee in pragmatic terms.

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
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
- 1 I am grateful to Professor Yasir Suleiman for his comments on an earlier version of this paper which led to many changes and reformulations in both content and style.
- 2 University graduates were sub-divided into two groups because this category covers a wide range of the population of Egypt. Education is heavily subsidised by the Government, and university graduates therefore constitute a very heterogeneous group representing a range of different socio-economic profiles. The need to divide university graduates into two groups was confirmed by the linguistic performance of the subjects concerned during the interviews.

APPENDIX

Average /p/ Pronunciation



Average /w/ Pronunciation



CHAPTER TWELVE

LANGUAGE AND DIASPORA: ARABS, TURKS AND GREEKS

Jacob M. Landau

Introduction

Several years ago, a Jewish refugee named Hans Heinz Altmann, who had left Germany just before the Second World War to live in Bolivia and Argentina, published a book with the moving title *Muttersprache: Heimat der Heimatlosen* (Altmann 1992). Translated into English, the title means approximately *Mother Tongue: the Home of the Homeless*. For Altmann, this refers to German, the language which is the quintessence of patriotism for German emigrants.

There is, of course, a substantial body of literature in various languages dealing with migration and diasporas. In recent years, new periodicals have started to appear on the subject of immigrants and their problems, such as *Migration* (Berlin), *The International Migration Review* (New York), or *Immigrants and Minorities* (London). More recently, in 1991, yet another, entitled *Diaspora*, began to appear in New York. However, studies on the subject under consideration here, whether in book or article form, important and useful as they are, have devoted only limited attention to language as a socio-political issue among immigrants originating in the Middle East and North Africa. With the growth in the number of these immigrants in recent years and increasing tendency to become settled rather than transient, linguistic nationalism has gained in significance both among the majorities in the host countries and among the immigrant communities. A linguistic culture has increasingly become the chief bond between human beings, binding them together into nations. Within the diasporas, one perceives a continuing struggle between those desiring to adopt policies of cultural assimilation in their host country and those tending to maintain close cultural ties with their

home country. This is reflected in language instruction, literary output and cultural activities, among other things. Assimilatory pressures in the host countries have varied, as has the involvement of the home countries in helping to strengthen the immigrants' original culture. Language rights have been a frequent issue of dispute (Kloss 1971). It is however the varied response in the realm of language within the immigrant communities themselves which will be our major concern in this paper, where we shall attempt to assess it, its factors and results. The main cases discussed will be the Arab, Turkish and Greek diasporas, concluding with some comparative remarks between these and other immigrant groups from the Middle East within a more general framework.

Some General Observations

Among the general patterns of diaspora creation in our days, several features seem to stand out. First, the tempo of growth of immigrant communities, worldwide, usually directed towards finding jobs in countries which are more economically and industrially developed than their own. Over time, not a few labour migrations crystallise into incipient diasporas. Second, the fact that a part of this immigration is made up of illegal workers sometimes adversely affects their claims for language rights, as well as other matters. Third, immigrants seem to constitute more compact communities in or near urban centres; this has been the traditional European pattern, while the American one, formerly characterised by relatively swift dispersal throughout the United States, is coming to resemble it (due to the massive Hispanic immigration into certain states). Fourth, there has been a speedy increase in the number of 'small' languages employed by diverse immigrant groups. And fifth, some immigrant groups contain speakers of more than one language; thus, the Turks include a large component of Kurds, the Moroccans and Algerians numerous Berbers. These factors, in a changing situation, have posed serious problems for planners of language policies in many countries and to opinion shapers within the immigrant communities themselves. Their dilemma is between language maintenance, on the one hand, and a cushioning of language transition, chiefly for the children of the immigrants, on the other (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1984:17-44). Nonetheless, this has complicated the work of officials in many countries, who have tended

to show limited interest in adult language instruction and have concentrated on the children. These and other processes have had varying results in different countries, characteristically affected by several of the above variables.

Quite probably, in the context of our discussion, language nationalism (Wood 1981; Rogers 1981) is the main factor influencing cultural attitudes within diaspora groups, host countries and home countries. The seeds of language conflicts are there (Nelde 1989:277-287). To put it bluntly, certain groups within the majority in multilingual states believe that linguistic borders ought to conform to political ones; in other words, that modern nations are denoted by language boundaries, hence that the state must be homogeneous in language, that is, monolingual. This rather extreme view in several host countries is countered by sharply different perceptions in certain of the diasporas' home countries, viz., that language rights are basic to pluralistic democratic societies, indeed that they are part and parcel of human rights (Kloss 1971:250-268; Giordan 1992). Some of the more radical elements in both host and home countries argue that language has always been a component of traditional culture and of collective memory. Both sides are prone to appeal to imagined myths and, not surprisingly, to reach diametrically opposed conclusions. The home country, in particular, has frequently used myths of homeland and return in its argumentation (Safran 1991:83-99).

As for the diasporas themselves, their language nationalism has often been an initial response to the cultural and language pressures of the new environment, in their respective host countries. Thus, they were sometimes perceived as a diverse element by the majorities in those lands, especially in new states suspicious of separatist trends. Large-scale immigration fuelled inter-community conflicts. Some historians have considered ethno-nationalism the preserve of intellectuals, although this applies only partially to the language attitudes of immigrant communities, whose cultural ties to their home countries seem to be championed by various social elements. Those supporting linguistic rapprochement with, or even assimilation into, the host countries, are equally heterogeneous. Lastly, it seems that the shared memories of the diaspora are based on religion and customs and on language (together with other, apparently lesser commonalities, such as forms of literature, arts, crafts, architecture, music and dance). With the hold of religion waning amongst certain sections of the population in some home countries and, consequently, among many

emigrants as well, the main tie between home country and diaspora appears to focus on culture, with an emphasis on language, as concepts of authenticity (Smith 1996:449-455). Perhaps one can learn a little more about this by considering a few selected cases, not all of which have received adequate attention as yet (see Chiswick 1992 for more widely discussed cases). We will focus primarily on diasporas created by voluntary migration (not exile or annexation). Such migrations, whether politically or economically motivated, frequently tend to consider language as a crucial factor in their choice of host country (for instance, in the case of many Arabs).

Arab Diasporas

Arab voluntary migration in the modern period has been expressed, barring a few isolated cases, in two main waves of emigration, about a century apart. The first wave, which began in the 1880s and went on until soon after the end of the First World War (Karpas 1985:175-209; Naff 1986), was chiefly made up of Syrians and Lebanese, largely Christian, who voted with their feet to express their dissatisfaction with what they regarded as harsh Ottoman rule and pressure from their Muslim neighbours and competitors. In other words, this migration was mainly motivated by political and religious factors and was directed towards Western Europe and the Americas (Safa 1960; Kayal and Kayal 1975; Naff 1986; Hourani and Shehadi 1992). The second wave started in the years following the end of the Second World War, has been more marked since the 1970s, and is still going on. It was largely conditioned by the desire of individuals and families in poorer societies to improve their financial lot. Thus, it has been chiefly dictated by economic reasons and was directed towards the richer, oil-producing Arab states, on the one hand, and to Western Europe (mainly France, but the United Kingdom and Germany as well), the United States and Canada, on the other (Naff 1992:144-164).

Characteristically, the first generation of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to the West wrote literary works (important ones, too) and published newspapers and periodicals in Arabic. There was no doubt about their commitment to the culture of their original home. Their children and more so their grandchildren were less committed and considerably less certain about their own identity. This was due in no small part to assimilatory pressures in the Americas and Western

Europe than to language shift. In a perceptive article, published in 1985, Professor Mohammed Sawaie, of the University of Virginia, examined the use of Arabic in the periodical press, places of worship, ethnic schools using Arabic, and organisational societies of the Arab communities, chiefly in the United States (Sawaie 1985:324-332). He correctly points out how the functional use of Arabic has decreased in all four categories, together with the dispersal of the Syrians and Lebanese and the competition of the local majority language within the younger generation. The process was from monolingualism in the pre-emigration language to bilingualism to monolingualism in the majority language. I would argue that, among Sawaie's four categories, learning Arabic at school (or, rather, its neglect there) was perhaps the crucial factor for the second and third generations in their process of Americanisation. These conclusions would also seem to apply to later Arab immigrants to the United States (Sawaie 1986; Sawaie and Fishman 1985). It seems to me that not only the paucity of opportunities for using Arabic but also the intermittent way of studying it at school or church and mosque were conducive to its non-retention.¹ Also, considering the diglossic character of Arabic, it seems safe to assume that, barring a minimal amount of education in the written language, what language maintenance there was, was in the colloquial. Aware of the size and importance of its diaspora and of its receding cultural ties with its home country, in 1963 the Lebanese government established a World Lebanese Cultural Union, with branches in various parts of the United States and Canada. The Union's main goals were to strengthen Lebanon's cultural, economic and touristic exchanges with its diaspora in the Americas (Suleiman 1992). However, little was done in practice to foster Arabic culture and language. Assimilationist trends, despite signs of a revival of interest in the study of Arabic, won in this case; the ethnic relationship, although still extant, seems somewhat downgraded in the identity awareness of these immigrants and their children.

In the 1970s, there was a revival in the particularist identity of Arab Americans, partly bolstered by the arrival of new immigrants from various Arabic countries (Labaki 1992). Several new clubs and organisations have been set up. However, these are political, economic and social rather than cultural (even when calling themselves 'cultural') and so in the main are their connections with their home countries. Again, the language factor seems rather peripheral, in patterns which repeat those of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is

not however the entire story of Arab migration in our own generation. The migration to the oil-producing Arab countries, chiefly to find more remunerative employment (Maaouia 1992), is (for obvious reasons) a clear case of language maintenance, both for the guest workers who stayed and for those who returned home. But the other Arab migrations, in relatively smaller numbers, to the Americas and proportionately larger ones to Western Europe, provide us with a somewhat different picture.

Let us take some examples from the Arab diaspora in France (for the United Kingdom, Wernberg-Møller 1992:40-55 and this volume. For Germany, Abboud 1991; Freund 1991). Overall immigration to France was always heavy and, by 1972, the government instituted a series of measures to restrict it, formally halting all immigration by 1974. Nevertheless, immigrants continued to arrive. Thanks to a high degree of bilingual fluency in Arabic and French, Arab migration from Lebanon and North Africa to France has visibly augmented the Arab community there, which is estimated to have reached at least three million. The Lebanese community, estimated at about 100,000, has changed in social and cultural terms, due to the influx of those leaving Lebanon during the civil war. Not exclusively middle and upper class, as before, they include a lower class whose knowledge of French is mediocre or less than mediocre (Abou 1962; Kemp 1992:689). Many newcomers from Lebanon return there and then go back again to France, torn between emotional and other ties in both host and home country. Those from the Maghreb, chiefly from Algeria, are much more numerous in the south of France and in the main towns there. The issue of integrating their children in France is complicated by the diversity of their backgrounds; their parents, of Moroccan, Algerian or Tunisian origins, display differing cultural levels and immigration situations (Begag 1990:2-8). Taken as a whole, however, many are poor and jobless, of limited education and closely linked to their home countries by religious sentiment and cultural background. Since Arabisation at school has had much success in both Algeria and Morocco, many of them do not know French and, according to one survey, 20% of their children who complete school are not able to read and write French (Bergheaud 1983). The situation is hardly better for the school-leavers. Educational failure, despite frequent official intervention (Rosenbaum 1981:435-448), is due to a number of causes, one of the main ones being the insistence on instruction in French, a constant dimension of language policy in France. That this could - and did - lead to strained

relations between schoolchildren and their parents was hardly considered relevant. Elementary school courses in the native language are organised by non-governmental means and often remain peripheral. Since 1973, however, due to grassroots pressure from immigrant groups, the government has allowed pupils in secondary schools to present their native tongue in fulfilment of language instruction requirement. Later, pupils could select their mother tongue as part of the baccalaureat examinations, and many now take Arabic. Although government directives explicitly refer to the appreciation of the diaspora's national heritage and originality, assimilation via Frenchification is encouraged, in order to prepare pupils for better employment opportunities. Results have varied; surveys have found that many young people, long exposed to French language and life, feel little attachment to their native culture, while others express a profound sense of cultural and linguistic identity with their home country (Rosenbaum 1981:457-458). Perhaps because French commitment to native language preservation is rather ambivalent, there has been a growing drive within the North African diaspora in France to emphasise the commitment to the Arabic language, or to Islam and its customs, such as the clothes worn by female pupils at school, which caused a row in France during the early 1990s. The educational authorities had to give way. It seems that in this case at least, extra-linguistic variables have influenced language preservation and language shift and that Arabic is still maintained due to the strong Islamic component of the North African diaspora in France, reinforced by the recent addition of many traditionally-minded immigrants and the proximity to the lands of origin (Dweik 1985:3).

Turkish Diasporas

Large scale Turkish migration started considerably later than the Arab. Beginning in the early 1960s, it was mostly due to intensive demographic pressures and endemic unemployment. Movement was mostly directed towards Western Europe, chiefly Germany, to respond to an urgent demand for low-wage unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Although Turkish immigration has now slowed to a trickle, because of restrictive laws, the number of Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany, together with their families, stands at about three million, the largest community of foreign workers in the Federal Republic. The numbers of

Turkish schoolchildren there run into hundreds of thousands (for the figures, Gözaydin 1997:7-8). Among its characteristics (Abadan-Unat 1976:1-44) one notices an apparently deeper cultural gap between the Turkish *Gastarbeiter* and their German hosts than in the case of Arab immigrants in France, due to cultural and linguistic divergence. Very few Turks knew German or much about German culture before their arrival. While the Federal Constitution declares that nobody is to be discriminated against because of language or religion, the country's official language is German and the majority of the population remains monolingual (Menk 1986:25). Not unexpectedly, this situation has created social and other tensions for Turkish adults and their children, as German law allows the workers to bring their families after two years' residence. Although typical language courses for adults are spread over sixty to eighty lessons, many Turks have remained alienated in the host country and linguistically oriented towards their home. They listen regularly to radio and television broadcasts from Turkey and read Turkish newspapers which are flown daily into Germany (and also the Netherlands) and printed there from matrices. Children vary between fully acculturated to totally unintegrated, with numerous Turkish youths only partly ready for cross-ethnic friendships. There are differences, linguistic and otherwise, between those who were born to Turkish workers in Germany or arrived there very young, and those who joined their families later; also, naturally, between those educated in German or in Turkish at their neighbourhood schools. Since each *Land* in Germany determines its own educational policies, procedures of instruction in Turkish vary. In several *Länder* instruction in German is compulsory, to assist integration, while in others, such as Bavaria, the largest *Land*, parents are asked to decide whether their children will be taught in German or Turkish: in schools with at least 25 Turkish pupils, instruction may be offered, on request, in Turkish. A complicating factor is some parents' wish for exclusive Qur'an schools for their children. All in all, the children have serious problems. Generally, a one to two-years' class is supposed to prepare them for joining regular grades. In it they are instructed in both Turkish and German, but the latter often proves inadequate. Moreover, even those who join regular classes afterwards obtain little help to correct their shortcomings in German. Consequently, those who graduate from these schools do not, as a rule, continue their education, and remain at the level of unskilled or semi-skilled work (Mehrländer 1986). In some schools, mainly in Bavaria, full class instruction in Turkish is offered to

those choosing this medium, with German taught as a second language, in which, however, a satisfactory level of proficiency is seldom reached. In this case, Turkish school children are segregated not only from their German peers, but also from those coming from other guest workers' families. The reverse effect is that, while less integrated in Germany, they are better prepared, linguistically, to return to Turkey. The Turkish children who return to their homeland notice immediately, however, that they differ from their peers there both in language and in general culture, just as was the case in Germany. Hence many feel alienated in both countries (Bilmen 1976:235-252), and there is very little assimilation on their part in either. This has occurred despite determined German efforts to prepare well-thought out curricula for studying German aimed at these school-children (Barkowski, Harnisch and Kumm 1980) and to prepare many textbooks for the teaching of both German and Turkish (Kreiser and Pingel, eds., 1987:159-168); and despite the training of Germans to teach Turkish (to supplement the Turkish teachers) and then to teach German in Turkey itself to young returnees to Turkey whose mother tongue was German (*Kieler Nachrichten*, 6 January 1987; *Die Welt*, 1 July 1995).

There are Turkish immigrant communities outside Germany as well, with similar or even more acute difficulties. According to a recent study, it seems that in the United Kingdom Turkish schoolchildren are the lowest achievers, largely due to their poor linguistic performance (Nuri 1997:11). These general trends are corroborated by methodical research undertaken in France among several communities; in the second half of the 1980s, then again in 1992, published in 1995 (Tribalat 1995). The data were later re-examined more specifically for the Turks in France (Pelle-Guetta and Doğrusöz 1995:407-431). The general study concludes that the Turks have been the least assimilated and the least assimilable of all immigrant communities in France. The more limited study, focusing on the Turks in France, examines this conclusion by referring to their acquisition of the French language. A major finding of both studies was the erosion and loss of the home country language of immigrants in France, over several generations - with the exception of the Turks. A correlation should be pointed out between the language erosion and the increase in mixed marriages, the change in religious practice, and social mobility. In all these aspects, the Turks in France are the least assimilated, and in language matters, French is only exceptionally employed within the family, even by those who came to France as children. The statistics indicate that the Turks

know French more rarely than most other immigrant groups. Moreover, even among the Turks, men knew more French than women and acquired it faster, probably because they had arrived earlier in France, had more schooling there and, at work, more contacts with the French-speaking population (the same is true, in different ratios, of other groups of immigrants, such as Algerians and Moroccans). One may wonder, however, whether the fact that the Turkish group is being the least Francophone is really a result of their resistance to integration, as the general study concludes, or, rather, is largely a result of the very brief time of their French exposure, much shorter than that of the Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians and some sub-Saharan groups.

Greek Diasporas

The Greek diasporas are much more ancient than either the Arab or Turkish. In age they parallel the Jewish and Armenian (for the Armenian, Patrie 1994; Sanasarian 1995). The fact that 'diaspora' is a Greek word is no accident. The Greek dispersal is a wide one, over space and time. In our context, it is enough to say that, particularly after the fall of Constantinople, Greeks migrated to many European cities, carrying with them their language and civilisation, but soon becoming polyglot and adaptable (Smith 1995:10-11). From the late eighteenth century onwards, this diaspora was largely responsible for fostering the national movement which brought about the creation of the Greek kingdom in the 1820s, the first nation state carved out of the Ottoman Empire. Its success was due, to a significant extent, to the persuasive linking of modern Greece to classical Greece through mythology. Culture and language have had a crucial share in the development of Greek nationalism. However, in some cases, this competed with another linguistic nationalism, e.g. with Arabic in Alexandria, where the Greek community lost importance due to this rivalry and to economic competition (Kitroeff 1983a:5-16). In any event, the debate about Greek identity goes on both in Greece and in the new diasporas created during the twentieth century in the United States (Moskos 1989) and in Europe. Since ethnicity has become legitimate and respectable in the United States, the Greeks there and elsewhere project their identity as members of a modern, classically inspired, Greek civilisation. Indeed, they emphasise their ethnicity within multi-cultural states and societies. As in other diasporas, these

trends are opposed by others favouring acculturation in the countries of residence. Language is, again, of vital importance in this conflict of attitudes. In the United States, community churches and public organisations have voluntarily maintained day schools in which not only are Greek language studies emphasised, but instruction in history and religion is generally carried out in Greek. In addition, hundreds of afternoon schools offer instruction in Greek history and religion, in Greek. However, a basic controversy has prevailed, since the 1920s, between the Greek-American Progressive Association, striving for the preservation of Hellenic civilisation and language amongst Greek immigrants and their children, *via* the above schools and by other means; and the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association which, although claiming to be interested in maintaining the ethnic ties, has campaigned actively for smoother and speedier Americanisation. Significantly, the latter organisation is the larger one (Vlachos 1968:90-98; Landau 1986:90-92). A similar debate about the status of modern Greek goes on in some parts of Western Europe, where Greek workers have arrived in sizable numbers, as a result of free movement of workers in the European Union. In Germany, in particular, open to Greek immigration since the 1960 treaty, the issue has at times affected relations between the government and that of Greece. In the Rhine/Main region, for example, two groups of parents have been carrying on a new version of the Greek quarrels in the United States in a new version. The integration-oriented Association of Greek Parents in Frankfurt argues that, since many schoolchildren will remain in Germany and settle there, they ought to reach proficiency in German; another organisation, Athena, maintains that numerous children may well wish to return to Greece some day, hence a good knowledge of Greek is essential for them. The groups do not just argue, but compete with one another to promote their respective objectives, all the while putting pressure on the education authorities in the German *Länder*. In any event, Greek national schools in Germany have obtained a special status, with the right to present their students to the *Abitur* (the secondary school qualifying examinations). The Greek government and its consular offices abroad have maintained, since the early 1970s, that they want all Greeks to return to their home country (Fietkau 1972:66-67). But the arguments go on (Zeiss 1982:33).

Concluding remarks

Language issues in diasporas will most probably endure, at least partly because of the fact that only in rare cases do individuals belonging to the majority learn the languages of the immigrants living among them. Indeed, linguistic diasporas have remained peripheral second societies, certainly in unitary states, such as France, and somewhat less so in federal ones, such as Germany or the United States. Here, if grouped in large numbers, immigrants may increase their influence in respective *Länder* or states. They almost always have less influence than diasporas based on a religion, since the latter may make common cause with their coreligionists in the host country, as is perhaps the case of Greek and Jewish immigrants. This seems true even when the immigrants are essentially secular-minded. Linguistic diasporas are generally well aware of their peripherality in the political, social, and economic life of their host country and, even more so, in its cultural life. Hence their efforts, enthusiastic or lukewarm, as the case may be, to reach some degree of acculturation; hence, also, the response of those sections of the immigrant community which feel more committed to their home country. Such trends appear to be characteristic not only of the Arab, Turkish and Greek diasporas discussed here but of many others as well. The degree of language loss, shift and maintenance depends largely on the general political, economic and cultural situation in the home and in the host countries, the size of the diaspora and its concentration, the distance from the home country, the duration of its existence in the host country, its own educational level and occupational preferences; as well as, of course, the determination of the dominant group in the host country to absorb or reject it. Such factors and prejudices on all sides (Woll and Miller 1987:180) determine the linguistic acculturation of the diaspora within a host country majority, in tandem with economic pressures or inducements. Obviously, each diaspora has its own tempo of acculturation. The evidence of its newspapers is instructive. Multilingual columns in the local press (e.g., in Germany) has failed to attract immigrant readers. In many diasporas, it has been the press in their native languages which has helped to maintain links to the home countries and among the members of the diaspora, and to preserve the knowledge and use of language and traditions among those living in a linguistically and culturally different environment (Kanarakis 1992:113). However, there are certain variations. The early Syro-Lebanese emigration in the United States

published important periodicals which dwindled almost to one, *al-Hudā*, offering social and economic information to the veterans of the diaspora. Although some new Arabic newspapers have appeared recently, their impact is not yet clear. Important Turkish periodicals were published abroad under the late Ottoman Empire, but there are very few today. The diaspora Turks are now reading Turkish newspapers published in Turkey, although some, like *Hürriyet*, are re-edited locally, for instance in Germany. Since 1892, when *Neas Kosmos*, "the New World", the first Greek-American newspaper, circulated in Boston for several months, over one hundred other Greek periodicals have appeared in 29 U.S. Cities (Papacosma 1978:46). It is however symptomatic that such an important quarterly as the *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, founded in 1973, is published in English.

Linguistic processes within the diaspora are difficult to assess precisely, due to the fact that they usually stretch over several generations and are not always fully articulated or recorded without bias. Yet another difficulty in analysing such processes lies in their not being unidirectional. I refer to the cultural revival of ethnicity among several diasporas, sometimes expressed in a renewal of interest in the communities original language within the second or third generation. Hence this paper is offered merely as a preliminary consideration, in the hope that others will continue the study, using all possible sources and all available methodologies of research.

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NOTES

- ¹ In the extensive literature in Arabic and other languages on Arab migration there is fairly little solid information about Arabic education in the United States and elsewhere in the West during this period.

A phenomenon such as this, that is the integration of another language, or parts thereof, into the speaker's mother tongue or his preferred language of communication at any one time, may be studied from several angles and has been variously described in the literature (for example, Gumperz 1977; Sridhar 1978; Rouchdy 1992, etc.). It seems that two of the most common approaches to this phenomenon have been through the study of two distinct, though by no means wholly unrelated concepts: borrowing and code-switching.

I do not propose to deal here with problems relating to the use of the terms 'borrowing' and 'code-switching', although there has been considerable debate about the way in which borrowing might always be distinguished from code-switching, (see for example, Peñalosa 1980:59). Rather, I intend to make use of examples of speech which I believe show clearly that the speaker is switching from one code to another and not inserting the foreign word more permanently as a borrowing. In this connection I shall be examining two of the main forms of code-switching referring to classifications put forward in the literature and I shall apply this to my own research.

Apart from difficulties in distinguishing between borrowing and code-switching, there seems to be no clear consensus on the use of the term code-switching, (if it is used at all). Other terms have been introduced in an attempt to describe some of the subtleties involved in a linguistic study of this sort. Sometimes 'language-switching' or simply 'switching' may be used. Other people use the term 'code-mixing', (for example, Sridhar (1978)). On the other hand writers such as Blom and Gumperz (1972) use 'code-switching' in a broad sense within which 'situational' and 'metaphorical' switching form two distinct phenomena.

According to Blom and Gumperz, situational switching, "assumes a direct relationship between language and the social situation" (Blom and Gumperz 1972:424) and "involves clear changes in the participants' definition of each other's rights and obligations" (ibid); whilst metaphorical switching does not relate to "change in social situation" (ibid:425) but seems to depend on attitudes to, and associations with, the languages involved.

Although it does sometimes become confusing when a different terminology is applied to similar, or indeed, at times, identical concepts, one is at least sure of some consensus on approach. It becomes more difficult when the same terminology is applied to different approaches. This, I feel, is the case when one tries to compare

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SOCIOLINGUISTIC MEANING IN CODE-SWITCHING: THE CASE OF MOROCCANS IN EDINBURGH

Alison Wernberg-Møller

Introduction

In this paper I intend to examine the spoken language of some first-generation Moroccan immigrants living in Edinburgh and, more specifically, will look at the use of Arabic with English in code-switching.¹ The relevant background to the gathering of data is as follows: eight first-generation Moroccans participated in a number of sessions during which the researcher led discussions by asking questions in Moroccan Arabic. Respondents' ages ranged from 34 to 49, they came mainly from Tangiers with two people from Rabat and had lived in Edinburgh between 17 and 22 years at the time my research was concluded in 1994. Their socio-economic backgrounds were relatively similar, viz with little or no formal education and having or having had employment as waiters, cleaners or factory workers. They thus formed a fairly homogenous group. Furthermore, the respondents were aware that the sessions formed part of a study on the Arabic language; they also viewed the recordings as an excellent means by which the researcher could learn more about their language and dialect in particular. It must be assumed, therefore, that they appreciated the need to speak in Arabic and not in English during this time and this should be borne in mind when the data are examined and it becomes apparent that English was used during the sessions by many people and, by a few, to a considerable degree. Thus in the case of some respondents it appears that English has somehow been incorporated into speech which is largely conducted in Arabic. What is more interesting is that this was still the case when there were two or more respondents participating at the same time.

situational and metaphorical switching as defined by Blom and Gumperz with how the same two terms are described in the work of Fishman (1972b).

Unlike the approach of Blom and Gumperz, Fishman's approach to the treatment of code-switching appears to emphasise the importance of *whether or not the switch conforms* to the code allocation expected within a given social situation. In other words a situational switch is seen as being triggered by the topic, interlocutor, setting and purpose with which it is associated; whereas in a metaphorical switch a particular variety is used for the topic, interlocutor, setting and purpose to which it is not commonly allocated, (see Fishman, (1972b:42)). In order for this approach to be meaningful topic, interlocutor, setting and purpose must each relate to the variety of language in a similar way before it can be decided whether the variety is one which is commonly associated with the social situation. It follows, therefore, that Fishman's approach is akin somewhat to the analysis of domains.²

It is the present writer's view that although the associations of a language do often depend on its allocation to "a particular cluster of topics, places, persons and purposes" (Fishman (1972:42)), a language switch cannot always be seen solely in these terms. As far as this study is concerned it would be more relevant in the actual analysis of code-switching to concentrate on the way in which the associations of a particular language can serve a speaker's communicative intent rather than looking at how the use of a language relates to a particular social situation as a whole, since my respondents were recorded in settings for which purpose, place and usually person (ie. the participants/audience) remained constant for each speaker.

As for the topic of conversation, naturally, it did not remain constant throughout the session, and it seemed to me, after an analysis of the data, that topic was an important factor affecting language choice. Blom and Gumperz (1972), showed, by their research in Norway, that in some situations variations in topic were not only able to elicit a code-switch but were highly likely to do so. This depended on whether only 'local relationships' were to be enacted within the situation or whether 'non-local relationships' were also included (1972:428).

The study in hand does not seek to uncover large-scale patterns which are immediately relevant to whole communities, but is, like the research carried out by Blom and Gumperz, more relevant to individual situations and people. This does not mean, however, that the two

approaches are mutually exclusive; on the contrary the 'larger societal patterns' which Fishman talks about (1972c:440) only become apparent after individual behaviour has been observed. On the other hand, individual behaviour can, to some extent, be viewed in the context of, and explained by, the established patterns. The analysis of situational switching depends on understanding how people redefine situations and why they associate one variety rather than another with their new definition: the study of domains directly sheds light on this process as far as different situations correspond to different domains. Furthermore in studies dealing with domains people have been found to associate a variety with one domain rather than another, which means that these associations can be put to highly effective use in metaphorical switching and consequently can be an important consideration in its analysis.

The two main forms of switching which will be examined in this paper are situational-switching and metaphorical-switching, which are both relevant to 'face-to-face' interaction. I begin with the first of these - situational-switching, which I will discuss briefly, having noted two interesting examples in the data.

Situational Switching

Blom and Gumperz give, as an example of a situational switch, a description of how, during their study of code-switching in Hemnesberget in Norway, a group of 'locals' reacted when their conversation was interrupted by the approach of the two 'outsiders' (ie. the two researchers) "... our arrival caused a significant alteration in the casual posture of the group. Hands were removed from pockets and looks changed. Predictably, our remarks elicited a code-switch marked simultaneously by a change in channel cues (ie. sentence speed, rhythm, more hesitation pauses, etc.) and by a shift from (R) to (B) grammar" (1972:424).³ The language shift described here may be seen as a reflection of a redefinition of the social situation since what Blom and Gumperz call 'personnel' has changed; ie. two outsiders have joined the group of locals and thus there has been a shift in the 'person' (or 'interlocutor') of the social situation.

Although situational switching of this type certainly does occur amongst Moroccans in Edinburgh, for instance when a parent who has been talking to a child in English switches to Arabic to address an adult

Moroccan friend, this type of switching does not occur very frequently in the data I have collected during field work, this largely being due to the fact that people were recorded in a slightly formal setting in which I was often their sole interlocutor. The only occasions when it seems to occur are when there have been one, or more, other people present during the session. The following may be treated as an example of a situational switch: S.A. has been describing to me in English a book she has been reading; when Z.A. interrupts her she temporarily suspends her description and turns her attention to answering Z.A., at the same time she also switches to Arabic:

- (1) S.A.: ... it's based on a girl it's like it goes through different ... it's like ... y'know it goes through in stages like y'know you've got a seed time, harvest time ... em ...

Z.A.: *qulha b-l'Arabiyya!* [TELL HER IN ARABIC!]

S.A.: *man 'arafshi kayfsh ngulha b-l'Arabiyya* [I DON'T KNOW HOW TO TELL HER IN ARABIC] ... and those times y'know are sort of like ... it's like a circle y'know how things change

When S.A. turns her attention back to me she switches back to English. Certainly the use of English is dictated by the difficulty S.A. encounters in speaking of certain topics in Arabic (here a book written in English), but her use of Arabic is a response to both a request in Arabic and the fact that she is addressing a new interlocutor who is her mother. Whilst children are a major factor influencing their parents' language choice and are the most likely directly to encourage the use of English in the home,⁴ the parents, in turn, exert their influence in such a way as to counter this effect the children have on language. The fact that S.A. is responding to a command already in Arabic does not necessarily mean her response will also be in Arabic, but because her addressee is her mother there is an increased likelihood that it will be. This is because when S.A. switches her attention to Z.A. she is aware of an obligation to reply in Arabic since this would usually be her normal linguistic behaviour with her mother.⁵ Thus the temporary redefinition of the situation also involves a temporary redefinition of obligations. Lesley Milroy (1980:25) mentions the obligations of speakers and how, in an interview setting, the presence of family or friends impels the interviewee to speak in a normal way, that is in the way he would normally speak in their presence. She gives an example of a Belfast youth who "suddenly adopted an obviously marked style"

(ibid:60) due to the fact that he was being recorded. She noted how the mocking reaction of his friends induced a swift return to the vernacular: "Thus obligations to the group were stronger than the influence of both the recording equipment and an outside participant ..." (ibid:61). Perhaps this idea may be modified for the purpose of the above example in that presence of family or friends will not, by itself, always ensure the domination of obligations to family or friends, but these obligations are more likely to be maintained if family or friends actively participate in the interview.

Situational switching seems not only to reflect a redefinition of the social event or situation, but may also be thought of as a dynamic strategy by which such a redefinition may actually be brought about. This dynamic aspect of code-switching is central to the approach of Scotton and Ury (1977) who concentrate on two reasons for switching, that is to "redefine the interaction as appropriate to a different social arena or to avoid, through continual code-switching, defining the interaction in terms of any specific social arena" (1977:6). In the example of the situational switch which I have just mentioned Z.A. may be thought of as attempting to redefine the situation in terms of the primary purpose of the session, which is to record S.A. speaking in Arabic. In this case Z.A. only manages a partial redefinition before S.A. switches back to English again.

In the following snatch of conversation Z.A., who has been talking about the *hajj* and what one is expected to do on returning from the *hajj*, again attempts to redefine the situation, but this time her purpose is quite different and she switches to English:

- (2) Z.A.: ... *li kiyimshi wa y'hajj oo kayrja' kay 'amil bih ... fahma kay 'amil bih?* [WHOEVER GOES AND PERFORMS THE HAJJ AND RETURNS, ACTS ACCORDINGLY ... DO YOU UNDERSTAND 'ACT ACCORDINGLY?'] ... er explain for her

S.A.: *zama kr- kay- mi(l) kiyimshi imma f-hal hiya qalt lik willa mshiti n dik lmuta' khasik mil jit-* [THAT IS ... WHEN ONE GOES THERE, AS SHE TOLD YOU, IF YOU GO TO THAT PLACE YOU WOULD HAVE TO, WHEN YOU CAME-]

Z.A.: no mistakes anymore

S.A.: *khasik tqat' dik shiy li kanti kat'amil kemil ... [YOU WOULD HAVE TO STOP THAT THING YOU USED TO DO COMPLETELY]*

As has already been mentioned, people viewed the recording sessions as an opportunity for me to improve my knowledge of their dialect; they also genuinely desired to be helpful. This leads, it seems, to there being two conflicting thoughts uppermost in the respondents' minds. The respondents juggle with two possibilities: either to try to speak Arabic all the time, in accordance with what is ostensibly the point of the session, or sometimes to use English as well in order to clarify for me something they think I will not understand. It is in the light of these conflicting thoughts that Z.A.'s behaviour can best be understood. As we saw in the first example above, Z.A. switches to Arabic because she is conscious of the purpose of the session and wishes to redefine the situation in terms of this purpose. In the second example, however, Z.A. interrupts a flow of Arabic to turn to address her daughter in English because uppermost in her mind is the need for me to understand clearly what she is saying, the switch to English redefining the situation in terms of this need. In this case the failure of S.A. to respond, by making a corresponding switch to English, later causes Z.A. to furnish me with an explanation in English herself (she does not feel her daughter's explanation in Arabic will be adequate). Thus, contrary to what one might anticipate, it is Z.A. who introduces English here, whilst her daughter persists in using Arabic, the example shows how factors within the context of the interaction itself can bring about a reversal of one's expectations.

Metaphorical Switching

In the recording sessions metaphorical switching is bound to occur to a lesser extent than it does when people are talking informally amongst themselves, without the distraction of either the recording equipment or the outside participant (that is, the researcher). This is because metaphorical switching tends to be characteristic of unmarked or informal speech, in which the respondent is expressing his true feelings; rather than the more formal style which occurs when the speaker is paying careful attention to his language. Labov (1966) differentiates, for the purposes of his study of speech patterns in New

York City, between two major styles of speaking: casual speech and careful speech; these may be seen to denote, respectively, the informal and formal speech styles which have just been mentioned. In an interview situation what Labov defines as spontaneous speech may also arise, in which the speaker forgets the constraints of the formal setting and speaks in an 'excited' or 'emotionally charged' manner. Labov also defines spontaneous speech as the 'counterpart' of casual speech, casual speech being 'in a narrow sense, ... the everyday speech used in informal situations, where no attention is directed to language' (1966:180); according to Labov, in a general sense, casual speech also includes spontaneous speech since, in this latter style, the formal situation is temporarily suspended.⁶ Casual speech in its general sense, as defined by Labov, occurs in the tape-recordings I have made with my respondents, especially when the respondent was speaking of something he or she felt strongly about; it is during speech such as this that I have observed metaphorical switching to take place.

Gumperz (1977) compares the situational alternation which is characteristic of a diglossic situation and which is relevant to Fishman's work with the 'metaphorical and conversational usage' in which he himself is interested. In the diglossic situation, 'There is a simple, almost one-to-one, relationship between language usage and social context, so that each variety can be seen as having a distinct place or function within the local speech repertoire' (1977:2); on the other hand, in conversational code-switching (that is, metaphorical switching here), 'Rather than claiming that speakers use language in response to a fixed, predetermined set of prescriptions, it seems more reasonable to assume that they build on their own and their audience's abstract understanding of situational norms, to communicate metaphoric information about how they intend their words to be understood' (ibid:3). Gumperz's approach to metaphorical switching is broadly the approach I propose to adopt here, in other words, rather than seeing a language as being commonly allocated to certain pre-existing interactions, I would prefer to concentrate on how metaphorical switching acts as a mechanism by which the associations of a language bring an extra and imaginative dimension to the meaning of speech.

The fascination of metaphorical switching, (in the sense in which Gumperz understands the term) lies in the fact that its meaning is ultimately derived from the associations of the language being switched to. Therefore, before one can understand the full import of a metaphorical switch, one must know in what way the speaker himself

views the languages in question. Gumperz has also written that, "knowledge of cultural values and social factors affecting language use are a necessary starting point for any study of code-switching" (1977:12). The researcher who first approaches a community as an 'outsider' must, then, learn something of that community's social structure and system of values and beliefs. In my own case the nature of my fieldwork, during which I organised both a questionnaire and tape-recording and, later, returned to my respondents for help with understanding the recordings, meant that I made many visits to my Moroccan families and thus I not only came to know them very well but was also able to gain insight into the way of life of the community as a whole. During the recording sessions I had the opportunity to question my respondents further about issues which seemed to me, from previous observations, to be of particular interest to them; in addition the questionnaire which I had prepared probed people's language attitudes and included an investigation into 'language choice'.

The formal investigation into people's language attitudes is significant, to some extent, in the consideration of metaphorical switching. The questionnaire helped me to form a clearer idea of people's attitudes to the languages; it provided the forum for several discussions and stimulated much thought about their views in general. The formal study of language choice is also highly relevant to the study of code-switching; for example, asking speakers which language(s) they would choose to speak in certain circumstances (specifying interlocutor and locale for instance) would immediately throw light on situational switching and might enable one to predict when this would occur.⁷ An examination of language choice is also relevant to metaphorical switching, albeit in a less explicit way, since it gives an indication of some of the associations people make between a language and particular topics, interlocutors, etc.. The answers to the questionnaire strongly suggested that most of the first generation respondents associated some topics very much with Arabic whilst others tended to be thought of as topics for which a significant amount of English would be used. This led me to conclude that three of the topics in the questionnaire; 'religion', 'Moroccan society and culture' and 'family in Morocco' were associated in the minds of these respondents with an Arabic language environment and three more topics; 'British society and culture', 'work/profession' and 'sport' belonged more to a non-Arabic (mostly English) language environment.⁸

In other studies dealing with metaphorical switching attention has been drawn to the opposing values represented by the two alternating codes. Gal, for instance, talks of the conflict between traditional and modern values in Oberwart, Austria: Hungarian representing old-fashioned ways, whilst German represents a more modern lifestyle (1979:174). Economic factors are also involved, for while the use of Hungarian is associated with 'peasant status', "German has come to symbolise the higher status of the worker and the prestige and money that can be acquired by wage work" (ibid:106). Hill and Hill (1980) in their study on "Metaphorical switching in modern Nahaut" describe the opposition of power versus solidarity, which is symbolised by the use of Spanish and Nahautl respectively. "Nahautl", they say, "is becoming a 'language of solidarity'" (1980:122), yet switching to Spanish evokes, "the power and prestige of Spanish-speaking society" (ibid), and lends "dignity and force to Nahautl utterances" (ibid). These and many other similar studies suggest that tensions which exist between minority and majority communities can come to be symbolised by the use of the respective languages of these communities. Indeed, Gumperz has noted the tendency for the minority language in a bilingual community to be regarded as the 'we code' and to be associated with 'in group and informal activities' and the majority language to be seen as the 'they code' and to be associated "with the more formal, stiffer and less personal out-group relations" (1977:6).

To some extent this also seems to be true of the Moroccan community in Edinburgh with regard to British society, for, as I have noted above, the first-generation Moroccans give indications of associating particular spheres of activity with one language more than another, in such a way that Moroccan-type activities (including religion) are associated with the speaking of (Moroccan) Arabic and activities to do with British life have come to be associated with the speaking of English. There is an important difference, however, between the Moroccan community in Edinburgh and Hungarians in Oberwart, or the Nahautl in Tlaxcala-Puebla: whereas the two latter communities seem to be large and well-established, the Moroccan community of Edinburgh is much smaller and only dates back to the 1960s. One might suspect that this would affect the extent to which Arabic and English have come to symbolise distinct, and, at times, opposing lifestyles in the minds of Moroccans in Edinburgh, since the members of a smaller and more recent community must often feel closer to the majority society in which they live - and on which they

rely, than members of large, well-established communities with strong identities and their own social institutions.

Although the Moroccan community of Edinburgh only dates back to the 1960s and is a considerably smaller group of people, it is likely to face problems, however, which still serve to highlight its separate identity and to distinguish its members from the majority. Abd el-Jawad (1986) has noted one role language can play in marking off one community from another: "Sometimes, opportunities for social and economic advancement are associated with membership of certain groups, especially in communities with minorities. In such communities, the minority group faces a difficult decision of whether to (a) gain social mobility by adopting the language patterns of the dominant group, or (b) maintain their group identity by retaining their native variety ... much depends on the relationship between the minority group and society (degree of interaction and social acceptance)" (1986:28).

Naturally, Moroccans in Edinburgh must learn English, the language of the dominant group, as a matter of necessity. However, they do face a problem similar to that described by Abd el-Jawad above: namely, whether they should introduce English into the home as soon as possible, so that their children may have a good grasp of English from an early age and thus have a greater chance of performing successfully at school; or whether they should delay the use of English to ensure that their children become competent in the 'native variety': this last alternative would help to maintain 'group identity' but might jeopardise the child's success in school. The questionnaire made it clear that parents desired that their children should learn Moroccan Arabic and most of the children who helped me with my research were able to communicate in Arabic to some extent. Parents have also tended to be concerned with the children's progress at school and especially with the ability of young children to read and write English.⁹ This conflict of interests which besets the parents is explicitly expressed; normally in minor arguments or discussions between the parents, in my presence, concerning the use of Arabic or English with their children, but also in complaints or observations to a third person, such as myself, about the language behaviour of other Moroccan families (excessive use of English at home is often viewed with disapproval).

It would seem, therefore, that, amongst Moroccans in Edinburgh 'social and economic advancement' is, to a certain degree, in conflict with 'group identity', as Abd el-Jawad observed amongst other minority

groups; and this conflict is itself not only symbolised by, but inextricably part of, the Arabic-English dichotomy. Even though a particular minority group may be well integrated into mainstream society, the fact remains that minorities consider themselves as being, and are often made to feel, distinct from the majority. This is especially true if the minority both speak another language apart from English and also practise a religion different to the established religion of the society in which they live. Moreover, the Moroccans have attitudes (clearly expressed during our recording sessions together), which probably differ from those of the majority of people here, and indeed the differing lifestyles of Moroccan and British society are, generally, a point of reference for such differences of opinion. One can only speculate on the extent to which these differences are associated with the use of one language or another; but, as has been remarked upon above, patterns of correlation between certain types of activities or topics and the use of a particular language have emerged in the thinking of the first generation.

With this in mind it is possible to increase one's comprehension and appreciation of the following words of S.M. who is describing in what way old people are cared for in Britain and how this would be regarded in the Arab world:

(3) S.M.: *Wledha, bneha, awledha ... katimshi l- ... [(WITH ALL) HER SONS, HER DAUGHTERS, HER CHILDREN ... SHE GOES TO ...] nursing home ... katimshi l- ... lhosbitar ... [SHE GOES TO - THE HOSPITAL ...] he look after it ... hñna 'andna 'ayb! ... hñna 'andna 'ayb! ... makaynsh! ... kayn sbita ... lima f- hal lima lma li ma 'andhash oo rraj li ma 'andush hata shi li yqablu kayimshi l-sbitar, huma yqablu taht tmma hata ymut [WE THINK THAT IS A BAD THING! (WITH US BAD!) ... WE THINK THAT IS A BAD THING! (WITH US BAD!) ... WE DON'T HAVE IT! (IT ISN'T THERE) ... THERE ARE HOSPITALS ... WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE WOMAN WHO DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING OR THE MAN WHO DOESN'T HAVE EVEN SOMEONE (SOMETHING) TO LOOK AFTER HIM, HE GOES TO THE HOSPITAL (AND) THEY LOOK AFTER (HIM) THERE UNTIL HE DIES]*

It is immediately obvious that S.M. is comparing Arab or Moroccan society with life in Britain, and that, in her opinion, British life does not

compare favourably. However, her words gain extra and more subtle meaning by her switches to English: 'nursing home' and 'he look after it'. It does not seem coincidental that English is used at the point when 'English-' or 'British-type' society is mentioned; rather S.M. has engineered her switches, albeit unconsciously, to give maximum effect to her words. The way she chooses to express herself here reminds one of the 'we code' and 'they code' which Gumperz (1977) wrote about: *h̄h̄na* 'andna' 'ayb! *h̄h̄na* 'andna' 'ayb! *makaynsh!*, is not only an emphatic assertion of values contrary to that which has just been stated, but also effects an immediate 'transfer' to 'we' (*h̄h̄na*) as opposed to 'they', (which is the implied subject of what preceded); the contrast between 'they' and 'we' is made more stark by the switch from English to Arabic. The choice of the words 'nursing home' presumably evokes a certain association which a corresponding Arabic word, *malja?*, for example, would simply not convey and may, I think, be treated as being used in a metaphorical way rather than being a borrowing to which no special associations are intended to be attached. It is interesting too that S.M. distinguishes between *hosbitar* which is used to refer to establishments in Britain and is almost identical to the word 'hospital', and *sbitar* which she uses in reference to her homeland; the difference in the two words must surely be symbolic, in her mind, of two distinct types of hospital.

The same speaker also employed a similar strategy earlier on in the recording:

- (4) S.M.: *lbint hina ... lbint hina f-lblad ... katūsal f-'amrha* [GIRLS HERE ... GIRLS HERE IN (THIS) COUNTRY ... REACH (IN AGE)] s- ... seventeen or eighteen ... *katimshi takhud bit, katdir boyfriend ... katkhurj ma'h ... h̄h̄na* 'andna la! [SHE GOES AND GETS A HOUSE, SHE HAS A BOYFRIEND ... SHE GOES OUT WITH HIM ... WE DON'T DO THAT! (WITH US NO!)]

As before a comparison is being made between the two societies (in this case with reference to relationships between unmarried people), and once again S.M. disapproves of the behaviour of people in British society. *h̄h̄na* 'andna la! mirrors exactly *h̄h̄na* 'andna' 'ayb! and serves the same purpose in that it distinguishes two groups of people, 'we' (*h̄h̄na*) and 'they' (*hina f-lblad*), and emphasises a contradiction between two value-systems. The parallel between the two examples may be extended further, since once again S.M. has switched to

English while she remarks on a British activity she dislikes: '*katdir boyfriend*' and '*katūsal f-'amrha* ... seventeen or eighteen'. Perhaps by using English for the numbers S.M. means to convey an idea of the 'teenager', a concept which in countries such as Britain now represents a distinct phase of a person's life, but for which there is no real equivalent in Morocco. I shall return to switching for numbers presently. S.M.'s choice of the word 'boyfriend' seems also to be specifically related to British culture: it is probably the only word available to S.M. and might, therefore, be counted as a borrowing.

Another speaker, Z.A., also seems to have a tendency to switch to English when making comparisons between life here and life in Morocco. The following example will illustrate this fairly well, but one can also see a difference of style in this example which clearly indicates that these are the words of another person:

- (5) Z.A.: *wa law kakenit hinaya ... hinaya ydiw̄ha sbitar, yi'amluha injection ... [AND IF IT HAD BEEN HERE ... HERE THEY (WOULD) TAKE HER TO HOSPITAL, GIVE HER (MAKE HER) AN INJECTION ...] and that's it! .. wa [AND] injection tkhasha katqayha [SHE WOULD HAVE TO (HAS TO) DO IT] every two weeks and she get fixed ... you see? She no fix - she get er- ... how y- ... ho- ... li kayqul(u) huma [WHAT THEY SAY] you get er ... you feed her ... 'cos she have to do injection every two weeks for all hers life ... she turn a mental, b-haq *h̄h̄naya* 'andna *Qur'an!* ... [(BUT) IN TRUTH WE HAVE THE *QUR'AN* ...] better than 'jection better ... *yikharju* [IT GETS IT OUT] once! *wa intina - lhamd lleh!* 'andna *Qur'an, huwa duwa!* [AND YOU (ARE) - PRAISE BE TO GOD! WE HAVE THE *QUR'AN*, IT IS MEDICINE!]*

The example shows that Z.A. mixes English and Arabic in a manner which was not characteristic of the speech of S.M. in the examples above; she used far more English than S.M. and often for lengthy stretches at a time.

However, there are similarities here between this and the other two examples. Again the comparison involves the distinction between 'we' (*h̄h̄naya*) and 'they' (the implied subject of the two verbs at the beginning of the example). The assertion *b-haq h̄h̄naya* 'andna *Qur'an!* is strikingly similar to *h̄h̄na* 'andna' 'ayb! and *h̄h̄na* 'andna la! in both its structural form and contrastive function. Z.A. had been talking about a cousin of hers in Morocco who had been possessed by a *jinn*; she and

her daughter gave me a lengthy and rather excited account of how the *jinn* affected her cousin and what was done in the end to get rid of the *jinn*. Z.A. describes the girl under the influence of the *jinn*:

khasha [SHE NEEDED (NEEDS)] seven people! ... they canna' ... they canna' hold her ... *taqtilhum!* *sita, saba', taqtilhum!* ... *kay anna l'afrit li f-ha huwa li ktykhdimha!* [SHE WOULD KILL (KILLS) THEM! SIX, SEVEN, SHE WOULD KILL (KILLS) THEM! ... AS IF THE DEMON INSIDE HER (HE) IS THE ONE WORKING (CONTROLLING) HER] ... *makatklimsh welu, had msha!* ... *tah! lisan(h)a tah!* [SHE WAS NOT (IS NOT) SPEAKING AT ALL, THIS HAD (HAS) GONE! ... DOWN! HER TONGUE WAS DOWN!]

She then describes how the girl was cured:

ilt ayem ... kayqraw 'alayha Qur'an kul yawm, kul yawm ... oo hiya makanishi m'anna b-Qur'an oo hazit l'Qur'an 'amlatu ma'aha fin ma mshet ... katimshi bih ... katdur bih [FOR THREE DAYS .. THEY WERE (ARE) READING THE QUR'AN TO HER, EVERY DAY, EVERY DAY ... AND SHE DIDN'T BELIEVE IN THE QUR'AN AND SHE TOOK UP THE QUR'AN, TOOK IT (DID IT) WITH HER, WHEREVER SHE WENT SHE WENT (GOES) WITH IT ... WALK (WALKS) AROUND WITH IT] ... and the *jinn msha f-halu* [WENT COMPLETELY]

Item (5) under consideration above is taken from the very end of the description, and it seems as if Z.A. wishes to emphasise the tremendous power of the Qur'an in ridding the girl of the *jinn*, by making a comparison with the ineffectual or, rather, disastrous medical treatment which she would have received in the hospitals in Britain. The use of English helps her to achieve this, both by relating her words more effectively to an 'English speaking environment' but also by creating a stark contrast, when, having built up her words to a climax, 'she turn a mental', she suddenly switches to Arabic to reaffirm the alternative and better solution: *b-haq hñnaya 'andna Qur'an!* One notices too the use of the word 'injection', instead of its Moroccan Arabic equivalent *libra*: the use of the English word implies that injections, and the use of drugs which is associated with them, are seen by Z.A. to be largely a phenomenon of English speaking society (rather than Moroccan). Its use, together with the word 'fixed' and the idea of 'feeding', also

conjures up dismal images of the girl, still possessed and on a life support-system, in a British hospital for the rest of her life; and the idea of her complete mental breakdown is also, characteristically, expressed in English, 'she turn a mental'.

'Personalisation' and 'Objectivisation'

Perhaps an even more fascinating extension of metaphorical-switching is the way in which the associations of a particular language can be developed so that use of the language itself can exaggerate the personal or objective involvement of the speaker. Gumperz (1977) has drawn up a preliminary typology for switching to help him with his analysis of three distinct language situations and within which he looks at precisely this idea. In this connection he found that the 'we' and 'they' codes tended to represent personal involvement on the one hand and distance and objectivity on the other: this was partly based on his own analysis of examples of switching, but also upon the remarks of bilingual 'members'¹⁰ themselves who were asked to consider a number of examples of speech and to report on the way in which switching could affect a speaker's message. The choice of either the 'they code' or the 'we code' gave rise to a series of oppositions: in one example, "The shift to the 'we' code was seen as signifying more of a personal appeal ... whereas the reverse shift suggests more of a warning or mild threat" (1977:28); in another example, the bilingual speakers " ... interpreted the shift to English [the 'they code'] as signalling that what was wanted was a casual reply rather than an indication of personal feelings" (ibid:29); and in his final example the members agreed that the "shift from Hindi ['we code'] to English ['they code'] signals ... a generally known fact and not merely personal opinion" (ibid). Gumperz concludes that these oppositions "can be seen as metaphoric extension of the we/they code opposition" (ibid:30).

Likewise one can consider the opposing values which are represented by Arabic and English, in order to discover in what way Arabic and English, respectively, could possibly come to symbolise 'personalisation' and 'objectivisation'. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the Moroccans in Edinburgh are a more recently established and smaller community than either the Hungarian or the Nahaul communities which were mentioned above: this would probably affect the extent to which the Moroccans regard themselves as

a separate group with a strong identity, and this in turn is likely to affect the symbolic associations of Arabic and English and the extent to which these associations are felt to be distinct. However, it has also been shown that most likely the first generation Moroccans not only have a special identity which differentiates them from majority society but, more specifically, they feel Arabic and English to symbolise distinct aspects of life associated with the two communities: for example, English would seem to symbolise a type of 'advancement', particularly in education, whilst Arabic is symbolic of the 'identity of the group'. The examples of metaphorical switching which have been given so far (items (3),(4) and (5)) also make it quite plain that at least some of the first generation not only identify with Morocco rather than Britain (which is symbolised by their use of 'we' as opposed to 'they') but also tend to switch code to reflect and exaggerate different aspects of the two societies they are discussing.

Moreover the speaking of the native tongue at home and the use of the acquired variety in most outside relations is characteristic of many bilingual minority communities, including Moroccans in Edinburgh (the section in the questionnaire on 'Language Choice' showed that most of my Moroccan respondents claimed to speak mainly Moroccan Arabic at home and this is borne out by my own observations). There is a further parallel to be drawn between the Moroccan community in Edinburgh and bilingual groups mentioned in Gumperz's study (1977). Gumperz writes of Slovenian-German speakers in Austria that, "although Slovenian continues to be spoken in most homes and is positively valued as a sign of village in-group solidarity, young people are encouraged to learn 'proper German' lest they have difficulty in school or employment" (ibid:12). This again reminds one of the situation of my Moroccan respondents in that social and economic advancement seems to be somewhat at odds with the solidarity and identity of the group. The same parallel can be drawn with the Chicano-Spanish speakers: as Gumperz writes, "Spanish-speakers who entered the middle class felt obliged to assimilate to middle class American culture and this meant giving up one's ties to one's Spanish-speaking background" (ibid:13).

A comparison between Gumperz's observations and my own findings reveals important similarities. Likewise the Hungarians in Austria and the Nahautl in Tlaxcala-Puebla, although differentiated from Moroccans in Edinburgh by virtue of being large and well-established communities, nevertheless also seem to exhibit some

similar oppositions associated with the use of one code or another. Gumperz does not explain exactly how the 'we' and 'they' codes have come to symbolise 'personalisation' and 'objectivisation', but it is possible to draw one's own conclusions from descriptions of speakers' backgrounds and language attitudes, such as those detailed above. The idea of 'in-group solidarity' and 'home' evokes feelings of identity and intimacy, as opposed to the idea of 'work', 'education' and 'sophistication' with their associations with formality and social and economic power.¹¹ Gumperz sees bilingual groups as being able to transform and build upon "norms of language usage" (ibid:30) and "symbolic affirmations of ethnic boundaries" (ibid) to convey all sorts of additional meanings in speech which may be categorised broadly under the heading *personalisation versus objectivisation*.

One can see some similarity here with the metaphorical switching cited above; as with Gumperz's bilingual groups, Arabic is associated with home (including native homeland) and 'inside relations', whereas English is connected with 'outside relations' and British society in general. The switches in items (3),(4) and (5) seem to exaggerate ideas associated with one society or another by the use of the relevant code, and in many cases the switch might be seen as being triggered by topic. These associations are taken a step further in the idea of 'personalisation versus objectivisation'. 'Topic' is not relevant here, it is the choice of a particular code in itself which signifies the speaker's intent. The association of a code with inside or outside relations is taken for granted and it is the connotations of the use of the code which matter: the associations of Arabic and English with inside and outside relations can be thought of as giving rise to connotations of intimacy, informality, personal feelings on the one hand and distance, formality, objectivity on the other.

There are some examples in the corpus relevant to this idea which I would like to mention here; the code shift in these examples is examined in one direction only, and the overriding impression is that the speakers intended to gain authority or an air of 'factuality' by switching to English (apart from the last item which is an interesting example of personal involvement changing to objectivity).

- (6) A.A.: *hedi, hedi* [THIS IS, THIS IS] important *ta'arafa*
[(THAT) YOU KNOW IT]

(7) S.O.: *Šaraħa ya 'ni* [HONESTLY YOU KNOW (THAT IS) IT IS] very sad *ya 'ni* [YOU KNOW (THAT IS)]

(8) S.O.: *Šaraħa ya 'ni* [HONESTLY YOU KNOW (THAT IS)] it's no good .. no *miš mizyen* [NOT GOOD]

In all three items above the speakers are making a statement (expressing their opinion): their words could be said to gain additional authority and emphasis by the insertion of English (the 'they code') at the critical or evaluative part of the statement. In the case of S.O. the switch to English in both her examples reaffirms *šaraħa* in establishing the sense of reality and truth, and in the last example the repetition in Arabic *miš mizyen* again reaffirms the importance of what she is saying.

I have also noted in the recordings the repeated use of English 'no' and 'yes', although *la* and *na'am*¹² are also used, of course. For example;

(9) A minor argument between A.A. and Z.A.:

Z.A.: you talking in -

A.A.: *ka* - no! no! no!

A.A.: no! no! ... no! *bass tafham jami* 'Imooda' ... *nahna* ... *had l'ard* ... *ħhna kunna mus(t)amarin matalan* ... [SO THAT SHE UNDERSTANDS ALL THE SUBJECT ... WE ... THIS COUNTRY ... WE WERE COLONISED FOR EXAMPLE ...] yes oo *wahid* ... [AND ONE ...]¹³

(10) Z.A.: '*a?ila kabira*! [A BIG FAMILY!] ... oh yes! ... thousands! er '*andi* '*a?ila kabira b- zef* [I HAVE A VERY BIG FAMILY]

In item (9) A.A. uses English 'no' to contradict Z.A., who has complained that he is not keeping to the subject, and also, it seems, in order to regain control of the conversation since Z.A. has interrupted him. The use of 'yes' a little further on seems to reaffirm that he will talk about the colonialization of Morocco whether Z.A. likes it or not. This use of English (the 'they code') in order to assert, or reassert, one's own opinion, and indeed one's own authority is similar to an example Gumperz gives of a discussion in Slovenian-German, in which one speaker disputes another speaker's statement: the first speaker then

"counters in German ['they code'], as if to lend his statement more authority" (1977:19). (It should be noted, however, that A.A. switches only for 'no' and not for the whole sentence: perhaps he feels that this is adequate since he has now regained control of the conversation). The other example (10) above may be explained in a similar way to item (9); that is the speaker is expressing or reaffirming her opinion. Given that English does have connotations of objectivity and authority it is not surprising that it is sometimes used by respondents here since 'yes' and 'no' are, by their very nature, expressions of authority and fact.

In both the examples above the effect of the switches to English has been to emphasise the speaker's message. This is particularly evident in example (10). In this example we note not only the switch to English 'oh yes' but also the emphatic 'thousands', the repetition of '*a?ila kabira*', and the final *b-zef*. The use of the English word 'thousands' calls for special consideration since it draws attention to switching for numbers. Gumperz mentions an example of switching in a Slovenian-German conversation where the speaker switches to German to talk about both the cost of repairs to farm machinery and the cost of oil: Gumperz writes, "Perhaps the shift to German gives the air of objective factuality to cost figures quoted" (1977:19). Although there are no examples of speech about cost in the present study there are, however, several points in the recordings where mention of numbers triggers a switch to English; the following is an example of such a switch:

(11) S.M.: *wahid* '*andu flus f-lbank kharij* ... *yhasab shihal* '*andu, kharij* '*alayha* ... *ma'arafsh* [SOMEONE HAS MONEY IN THE BANK HE PAYS (PAID) ... HE COUNTS HOW MUCH HE HAS, HE PAYS (PAID) IT ... I DON'T KNOW] ten percent oola [OR] five percent

The 'objective factuality' which Gumperz writes about seems to imply some sensitivity on the part of the speaker towards the subject of expense and it seems, as if by using German, that is by switching to a more 'formal' code, that the speaker may attach an appropriate degree of importance to what he says and, at the same time, keep his distance from what perhaps may be a delicate subject. The idea of 'delicacy' is not relevant to the example above, yet it may be that some of my respondents (and especially S.M.) do attach a special importance to numbers and feel that English is more appropriate when they are mentioned. The importance attached to numbers would not here be due

to the special context of 'cost', but rather to the associations of numbers themselves in the mind of a speaker.

It is interesting to note that S.M. has never been educated at school; she knows neither how to read nor write either in Arabic or English. She has shown herself, by her various comments, to be self-conscious about both her 'uneducated', dialectal Arabic and her command of English which she maintains "she does not speak well". As far as numbers are concerned, apart from their association with mathematics and school in general which suggest *a priori* that S.M. might treat them in a special way, S.M., due to a lack of confidence rather than ability, has seemed less at ease with their use than the other members of her family.¹⁴ It is possible to relate her slight uneasiness here with her shift to English in item (11), and with her switch before in item (4) above. Since the use of English would imply a certain degree of objectivity, formality even, the switch to English for numbers almost suggests 'careful speech' or rather that S.M. is making a special effort. This is also suggested by her slight hesitation before her shift in both items. The shift to English may be seen as a metaphorical shift in the sense that S.M. views numbers as an elusive and perhaps difficult concept for which a more 'formal' and 'objective' code is suitable.

The last example of speech to be mentioned here is an excellent instance of personalisation versus objectivisation:

(12) A.A. *a rasi! a rasi!* [OH MY HEAD! OH MY HEAD!] you need just somebody to cure you!

This may be explained by reference to another of Gumperz's examples in which a 'Chicano professional' frequently shifts from Spanish to English and vice versa whilst she talks about how she tried to cut down on smoking. Gumperz accounts for the Chicano speaker's alternate use of the two languages in the following way:

... the code contrast symbolises varying degrees of speaker involvement in the message. Spanish statements are personalized while English reflects more distance. The speaker seems to alternate between talking about her problem in English and acting out her problem through words in Spanish (1977:20).

The last sentence in particular describes exactly the way A.A. is using Arabic and English above. 'You need just somebody to cure you!' is an objective appraisal of a situation and *a rasi! a rasi!* is indeed an 'acting out' of, and involvement in, a state. One notes too that the verbal

subject moves significantly from the first person to objective 'you'. In the first part of his utterance imagination and emotion inform the speaker's words, the effect being heightened by the use of an 'intimate' code; the succeeding lifting of emotion and transfer of attention to the second person is accompanied by a shift to a more formal and less personal code.

Conclusion

In this paper I have looked at sociolinguistic meaning in code-switching. I have defined the approach which I find most applicable to my research, and have discussed, with relevant examples, situational and metaphorical switching (as two distinct forms of code-switching). I have concentrated more on metaphorical switching since I found this to be especially appropriate for the present study. I also related the use of Arabic and English by first-generation Moroccan immigrants, to a 'we-they' dichotomy, in which Arabic seemed to be associated more with family life and life in Morocco, and English more with external relations and British culture/society; finally this idea was then developed in a discussion about 'personalisation and objectivisation' where the associations of each code gave the actual use of the codes connotations of intimacy (Arabic) and distance (English).

The comparisons I have made between my own research and the research carried out by other scholars have made it clear that the phenomenon of code-switching has general trends across different speech communities. The idea, for example, of an informal, 'homely' code, and a formal, more 'distant' code, reflecting the 'we-they dichotomy', is well known to many researchers interested in immigrant communities and fits in well with this study also. Likewise, the idea of 'personalisation' and 'objectivisation' put forward by Gumperz (1977), seems to explain exactly how some of my respondents are, at times, using the two codes. The predominant pattern that emerges is that use of the bilingual immigrants' languages can be divided roughly into use for the home and the native culture (Arabic in the case of my respondents), and for outside the home and the foreign culture (English here).

It was my over-riding impression whilst conducting field-work that, for my respondents, maintaining the 'we-they dichotomy' (that is, the distinction between themselves and the 'host' society) was of the utmost

importance. It seems that this is partly due to an overwhelming desire amongst many of these people to preserve their own cultural identity. Language seems to have an important role to play in delineating these cultural boundaries and it is an interesting question whether minority groups who also have a minority language are less likely to be assimilated into mainstream society than those minority groups who do not have their own distinct language. Furthermore, in the conclusion to my PhD thesis (1994) the connection between my respondents' mother tongue and their culture was discussed: it was suggested that cultural assimilation may well imply loss of the native language. Would assimilation into the 'British way of life' account for the language loss of some of the second-generation Moroccans living in Edinburgh? On the other hand, negative views about some aspects of British culture have probably been passed on by the parents to other members of the second generation and may be influential in the latter's desire to maintain their mother tongue, to which they feel more culturally akin than English.

The relationship between language and cultural identity is clearly a complex one, involving a whole range of perceptions, attitudes, and other influences. It is a fascinating subject for study, and one which the present writer hopes will form a focus for her further research in the future.

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NOTES

- 1 This research is based on my University of Edinburgh PhD thesis, *A Sociolinguistic Study of the Moroccan Community of Edinburgh* (1994), which was conducted under the supervision of Professor Yasir Suleiman. I am grateful to him and to my respondents for all the help they have given me.
- 2 Fishman follows Robert L. Cooper in defining domains as a "cluster of social situations typically constrained by a common set of behavioral rules" (1972b:54). See R. L. Cooper in L. G. Kelly (ed) *The Description and Measurement of Bilingualism* (1969:202).
- 3 That is, from dialectal to standard Norwegian grammar.

- 4 This was one of the findings of a questionnaire on 'language choice' that I had asked my respondents to fill out.
- 5 I say this because in her answers to the questionnaire (see the above footnote) S.A. claims to speak mostly in Moroccan Arabic with her parents.
- 6 Labov (1966) recognised casual speech by certain channel cues which were based upon his "general knowledge of these socially significant signs" (ibid:133). These channel cues were changes in tempo, pitch range, volume and rate of breathing, and also included laughter (ibid:110). He combined these channel cues with 'intuitive observations' in order to identify when casual speech was taking place.
- 7 In her study on German/Hungarian bilinguals in Austria, Gal (1979) was able to predict which language(s) would be spoken in any situation, on the basis that people always chose to speak the same language (or a mixture of both languages), to the same interlocutor (whatever the situation).
- 8 The findings of the questionnaire have been discussed more thoroughly in my thesis *A Sociolinguistic Study of the Moroccan Community of Edinburgh*, University of Edinburgh (1994).
- 9 Towards the end of my research, when funds began to run dry, one Moroccan family offered me free board and lodging, for an unrestricted period, on the condition that I help their two youngest children with their English reading and writing.
- 10 By 'members' Gumperz means bilingual speakers who form their own special linguistic group.
- 11 One notes here similarities with the study of domains: Bentahila found that his bilingual respondents associated the 'informal' domain 'home' with the speaking of Moroccan Arabic, and the more 'formal' domains 'education' and 'work' tended to be connected more with the speaking of French. See Bentahila, Abdelali (1983) *Language Attitudes Among Arabic-French Bilinguals in Morocco*.
- 12 Colloquial *aywa* ('yes') is also used.
- 13 A.A. sometimes omitted the phonemes /t/ /d/ and /z/ from his Moroccan Arabic speech.
- 14 This is my impression because I have witnessed her lack of self confidence on two or three occasions when she has counted aloud in my presence.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE ARABIC PROVERB AND THE SPEECH COMMUNITY: ANOTHER LOOK AT PHATIC COMMUNION

Ibrahim Muhawi¹

A Brief Linguistic History

In 1923 Malinowski proposed the name *phatic communion* (Gk. *phasis*, "utterance") for a complex type of speech activity "in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (emphasis added, 1956:315). Malinowski's presentation of the idea, as we shall see, was highly nuanced, covering a range of verbal forms (including some folklore genres) whose purpose he conceived to be the sharing of identity. The word *phatic* was later used by Jakobson (1960, further discussion to follow) to refer to one of the six functions in his taxonomy of discourse types: the phatic function is served when speech is oriented to the contact between addresser and addressee. Following Jakobson's lead, subsequent research has moved away from the notion of communion to a concern with function and discourse types in which the order of priorities is reversed. "An utterance," says Bakhtin, "is a link in the chain of speech communion" (1986:84). Rather than speaking subjects who use language to create bonds of union and identity with others, in the functional model language casts speaking subjects into roles as addressers, or senders, and addressees, or receivers, of information. Coupland et al summarize the situation thus: "... phatic communion remains an often appealed to but underanalyzed term in an implicit taxonomy of discourse 'types'" (1992:207). Current linguistic thought on the subject has diminished Jakobson's concept even further by focusing mostly on vacuous exchanges, small talk (Schneider, 1988) or casual conversation (Ventola, 1979). Coupland et al confirm this state of affairs: "In the many later [post Malinowski] uses of the term *phatic communion*, it is the negative valuation that

predominates, particularly when talk is analyzed to be referentially deficient and communicatively insignificant" (1992:207; see also their summary of the scholarship on this "consensus" definition of phatic communion, pp. 210-211, as well as Schneider's summary, 1988:23-39 and his "working model of small talk," pp. 39-40). In some cases the emphasis on the communicative content of speech acts has led to a total reversal of the original understanding of phatic communion as creating bonds of union. In Fawcett's model of communication, for example (1984:42), which divides all discourse into two types, straight and oblique, the function of creating solidarity and closeness (in our words "ties of union") is assigned to "straight" speech, which does not have a phatic component, as opposed to "oblique" speech, which does (1984:44). There are of course exceptions, the most important being Leech and Halliday. Leech also attributes to Malinowski the understanding of phatic communion as "the activity of talking *merely* to preserve sociability" (emphasis added, 1983:141), but in postulating a "metalinguistic maxim of politeness," which he calls the "Phatic Maxim," he accords phatic communion a higher status in the pragmatics of communication than others I have so far cited. The significance of this maxim is that it stresses the act of communication, with the implication that it is the most fundamental aspect of language use. Leech rightly perceived that silence poses a problem when human beings are in social contact. Hence the phatic maxim, formulated in its positive form as "Keep talking," or in the negative as "Avoid silence" (1983:141). Halliday is in substantial agreement with this understanding of phatic communion as a significant aspect of human language use: "Perhaps our most purely operational language activity is phatic communion, the language of the establishment and maintenance of social relations" (Halliday 1964:91, cited in de Joia and Smith, 1980:48). With the exceptions to be discussed at the end, folklorists too appear to have accepted the interpretation of phatic communion as small talk with no relation to the traditional expressive genres that form the subject of their inquiry, and have largely ignored it.

Phatic Function vs. Phatic Communion: Intersubjectivity and the Linear Model

Our view of phatic communion in this research is more in accord with Bakhtin's understanding of an utterance as a "link in the chain of

human communion" (1986:84), which also seems to have been Malinowski's understanding of it. I propose to return to Malinowski's original formulation here in order to study the manner in which one type of discourse, the proverb, was used to create "ties of union" among members belonging to two different dialect groups within the larger Arabic speech community, described in earlier work as an "organization of diversity" (Hymes' formulation, see Muhawi, 1996:51). The question of what constitutes phatic communion came into sharp focus for me as a result of a session in which a group of Arab language professionals composed of Tunisians and Palestinians passed many hours in exchanging and talking about proverbs. In a certain sense we were metaphorically sitting around the village fire, duplicating the conditions Malinowski says give rise to phatic communion:

When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the day's tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work . . . it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation (1956:313).

(The context of situation of course has since become a founding concept in Jakobson's functional model, and I shall have more to say about it below.) With time on our hands and nothing else to do, our conversation was oriented to keeping alive the contact between us, but given the semantic import of proverbs and their rhetorical power, what took place at that session was a far cry from phatic communion understood as a ritualized exchange of small talk (cf. Laver, 1975:233-236). In the research cited earlier (Muhawi 1996) it was noted how the members of one speech community (Tunisians) use a genre of Arabic verbal art, the ethnic joke, to create an identity boundary between themselves and those belonging to another speech community (Libyans), even though both groups are part of the larger community of Arabic speakers. Here the proverb will be seen as providing what we might call a linguistic and cultural identity-bridge between different groupings of the larger Arabic speech community, namely, Tunisians and Palestinians. Normally, proverbs are used rhetorically to give advice, to comment on an event, or to encapsulate a story. Yet here was a situation that contravened the accepted norms of proverb use as well as received wisdom about what constitutes phatic communion. Rhetoric enters the scene both synchronically and diachronically; the former

because proverbs by definition are rhetorical structures, and the latter because the session itself, which started out as an innocent exchange of proverbs with a phatic intent of passing the time amiably, took on the dynamics of a rhetorical genre as the element of performance entered the scene. What gradually emerged came close to what might be described as a verbal duel between the two members of the group who knew the greatest number of proverbs, Rashad and Abdulhamid.

Our intention in this research is therefore to use the proverb as a means of exploring the question of phatic communion from a sociolinguistic perspective that combines rhetorical and folkloristic considerations. This perspective, which puts the emphasis on the relation of the proverb to the speech community, is in harmony with the founding thought of de Saussure, who always insisted that language was a social bond (1966:13) that belongs to the collectivity and is not the property of an individual - "speech has both an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without the other" (p 8); and again, "for language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity" (p 14). The model of communication generally accepted in the discipline seems to us to be a projection into the sociolinguistic domain of the linear movement of syntax and sound in articulated speech. We find this outlook fully spelled out in Hockett's recent work: "In speech you can only move in one direction: from earlier to later. The syntax of speech is not only unidimensional but also UNIDIRECTIONAL (emphasis original). When . . . we characterize speech as LINEAR (original emphasis), we shall mean just this combination, unidimensionality and unidirectionality" (1987:6). It may be argued that there is no necessary contradiction between de Saussure's perspective and Hockett's statement or Jakobson's model, and as far as it goes this argument is valid. However, what is ignored is the discursive relationship between initial assumptions and final conclusions. If one starts out from the assumption that language is univocal and linear then the emphasis on the sender/addressee and receiver/addressee would naturally seem to follow. If on the other hand we start from the assumption of the collectivity of language, then the phatic aspect of speech, which highlights the intersubjective environment necessary for all communication, will receive a higher priority in any functional taxonomy of speech acts than either the sender/addressee or the receiver/addressee.

Phatic Communion: Proverbs in And out of Context

The formal occasion for the session under discussion was the Fourth Conference of Labour Ministers of Non-Aligned And Other Developing Countries (a good example of "United-Nationese"), held in Tunis Nov. 20-23, 1990, with Arabic, English, French and Spanish as working languages. On the evening before the conference, the ILO (International Labour Organization) representative gathered us for an orientation session. As he droned on about how important it was for us locals to get hold of available conference documents and consult his expert team, one of my fellow translators said, "There are now too many people in this profession, not all of them know what they're doing. As we say in Tunisia, *fahham wijhak, twalli fahham* 'Blacken your face with soot, and you'll turn into a charcoal maker.'" He explained that the proverb was used for newcomers, particularly those who have not mastered their profession yet. That evening, when I looked at the models the Geneva Office had provided, I was appalled by the linguistic level of both the Arabic and English. Soon afterwards, there was a phone call from Amin, another Palestinian translator at the Conference. "What do you think of those translations they handed out? After listening to that fellow from Geneva talking down to us I thought there was something to it." "But you know," he continued, *hassabna il-basha basha, tili il-basha zalame* "We thought the Pasha was a Pasha; it turned out the Pasha was [only] a man." Given the preoccupation of folk culture with the disparity between appearance and reality (about which I will have more to say later), perhaps it was not entirely coincidental that both proverbs should have to do with impersonation, though they were not spoken in reaction to the same situation. The first proverb in effect says "you are who you pretend to be," or rather, "people will take you for who you say you are," while the second enacts the reverse side of this thought, with people feeling betrayed for having put faith in the appearance. But then that is the kind of coincidence that leads us to think of proverbs as sociolinguistic archetypes which are used rhetorically to encapsulate different kinds of social attitudes into a limited, albeit large, number of stylized utterances.

The following day there were no documents to translate. Several of us sat chatting and feeling somewhat bored. To pass the time, I asked if anyone knew a Tunisian equivalent to the Palestinian proverb about the Pasha. I had no sooner asked the question than Rashad and

Abdulhamid both popped up with, *il-'ism il-'ālī, w-il-marbaṭ il-khaālī* "The high name, and the empty stable." This proverb reminded me of one I had heard about a month before at the Gifts and Exchanges section of the Tunisian National Library after it had been moved from ramshackle but spacious quarters to a magnificent villa. Their space, however, had shrunk to two small rooms, one of them without a window. In showing it to me, Madame Sharifa, the Directors' assistant, extended her arm and cried out, *shūf, ustādh, shūf, il-hay'a hay'it inlūk, w-il-hāla, halit sardūk* "Look, professor, look: 'The appearance is that of kings, but the condition is that of a rooster.'" Both Abdulhamid and Rashad agreed that all three proverbs - about the pasha, the rooster, and the empty stable - were equivalent, but not necessarily exchangeable. For Madame Sharifa to have used the proverb about the high name and the empty stable would have implied that she looked at the world from the perspective of the nobility, which would have been unsuitable to her situation.

After this, I asked if anyone knew the meaning of the proverb uttered the night before, "Blacken your face with soot, and you'll turn into a charcoal maker." Rather than explain, Abdulhamid came up with another proverb: *ijlis ma' il-'aṭṭār t-nāl 'utro; w-ijlis ma' il-faḥām t-nāl swādo*. "Sit with the grocer, you'll gain the aroma [of his spices]; and sit with the charcoal maker, you'll gain his blackness." He explained that one is like the company one keeps. I wanted to know whether this one was exchangeable with the widely known proverb in Standard Arabic, *'inna al-ṭuyūra 'alā 'ashkālī-hā taqā'u* "Birds of a feather fly together," but he insisted they were not because the element of intention was missing from the latter. Someone said the proverb was used to give advice: if you want the aroma of spices, keep company with the grocer, but if you want to blacken your face, sit with the charcoal maker. Abdulhamid admitted he had remembered the proverb because of the reference to the charcoal maker, and not necessarily because it was similar in meaning to the one about blackening one's face with soot. The next proverb, *kif il-bāb, kif is-sukkāra* "As the lock, so the door," came from Rashad, who said that the lock must suit the door. "A tent and an electronic lock," he explained, "don't go together." Proverbs, as we see from this exchange, and for reasons I shall explore later, are echoic: one proverb recalls another. This is confirmed in what Abdulhamid had just said about remembering the proverb about the charcoal maker, and by the one Rashad came up with next: *kif sādī, kif jwāro* "As my master, so his neighbors." The similarity in form is what

undoubtedly brought this one to his mind. The present proverb, he said, applies to people, whereas the one about the lock and the door is used mostly for things. When I asked if the proverb meant to say good things about the master and the neighbors, Rashad said there was no good in either of them, which I took to mean that the proverb was normally used with pejorative intent.

Context as Rhetorical Construct

As it progressed, the session took on the aspect of a friendly verbal duel between Rashad and Abdulhamid, with others around the table contributing comments but no proverbs. It was now clear that, aside from bringing us together in phatic communion, the session was also achieving its own dynamic in relation to the personalities involved. Abdulhamid and Rashad could not have been more different as individuals. Abdulhamid was an ebullient personality, an oud player who liked to smoke, drink, and sing at parties, while Rashad appeared more serious and much less inclined to verbal exchange. He had been politically active on the Left and had spent many years in prison. As Abdulhamid was getting more in stride, Rashad seemed to feel challenged to respond in kind, and that in turn enriched the exchange. A propos of no particular subject Abdulhamid came up with this obscure proverb, *mā jā l-'āyit min il-Sars, illa ma t-t-akhdh-āt li-Hmādā* "The crier did not arrive from Sars, until Hmada had already fallen." No one could recognize the reference to *Sars* and *Hmada*, but the narrative situation described in the proverb, in which help comes too late to be of any use, enables its interpretation and to some degree illustrates how some proverbs enter general use as speech acts after having been used descriptively in relation to a particular situation. Rashad's response was another proverb that also seemed out of context: *il-'amsha fi dār il-'umyān ti-t-samma khīlt li-hdāb* "The squint-eyed woman in the house of the blind will be known as the [beautiful] one with kohl on her eyes," whose meaning is easily understood, there being equivalents for it in English (In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king).

Proverbs, Performance, and the Speech Community: Keys and Frames

Proverbs illustrate most clearly de Saussure's notion of collectivity, for they are the linguistic and cultural property of the speech community. As such a proverb is intertextual, or as I said earlier, echoic; in uttering it an individual brings to mind other proverbs, other speakers, and other contexts in which it may be used, as we have just seen in relation to proverbs involving soot and charcoal. In the performance of any genre of verbal art, language is used in a particular key, or within a recognizable frame that lets listeners know how to interpret what they hear. If the proverb is to have its import, both speaker and audience must be aware that the speaker is assuming a different voice than his or her own, a collective voice whose archetypal style represents an idealized form of the speech of the community. The phatic element arises from the fact of performance, from the use of the proverb as a speech act in which contact between interlocutors is foregrounded precisely because of the stylized performance. The proverb about roosters and kings, for example, clearly functions rhetorically as a speech act to comment upon the situation, perhaps also to explain the extended absence of the disenchanted Director of Gifts and Exchanges whom I came to see in the first place. But the rhetorical intent was contaminated with a desire for phatic communion as well, not in the sense of making small talk but rather as a way of creating a community of sympathy. Indeed Madam Sharifa succeeded in doing so more eloquently than if she had recited a litany of complaints. The phatic and the rhetorical are inextricably woven in proverb use, regardless of context, for communion by definition is an act of sharing, or holding in common, a participation in which speaker and hearer share not only information but a linguistic and cultural understanding that unites them in an identity. Even in "small talk" something much more important than information may be shared. It is frequently the experience of travellers, for example, that communication does take place, though no information as such is exchanged, among interlocutors who may have only a few words of each other's language or dialect. Travel to foreign lands would be impossible if phatic communion (understood as an experience of intersubjectivity) were not one of the most pervasive ways in which human beings use language.

Phatic Communion and Expressive Genres: Re-reading Malinowski

The conception of phatic communion as "small talk" seems to us to be an ideological interpretation of what is essentially an oral process in terms of a literacy that conceives of communication solely as a commodity called information. To some extent Malinowski's original formulation suffers from this kind of literalization, but at the same time it rises to the level of a vision of phatic communion as a sharing of subjectivity. The connections being established here between phaticity, genre, and performance, I believe, already existed *ab ovo* in Malinowski's original formulation, and a re-examination of it will repay the effort. Proverbs provide a good avenue back because they are the clearest examples we have of situated discourse; unless they are themselves the subject of the conversation, as was the case with us, they always arise out of, or within, a particular context of situation. Now the context of situation is the fundamental conceptual tool Malinowski uses to distinguish between phatic communion and other types of speech activity. Briefly, in attempting to translate bits of discourse from the Trobriand language, Malinowski observed that it was not sufficient to know the grammar because meaning was always anchored within a context of situation and was used pragmatically with reference to this context. It was therefore necessary to be intimately familiar with the context of situation in order to understand the speech, let alone translate it. And on the basis of this relationship between speech and context of situation Malinowski distinguished what he called primitive languages, where speech is used pragmatically to act upon the world, and language use in advanced civilizations which have developed abstract modes of discourse that do not depend for their meaning on a particular context:

We have to realize that language originally, among primitive, non-civilized peoples, was never used as a mere mirror of reflected thought. The manner in which I am using it now, in writing these words . . . is a very far-fetched and derivative function of language. In its primitive use language functions as a link in connected human activity, as a piece of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection (1956:312).

Clearly, Malinowski was the first "ethnographer of speaking," and his thought here serves as a precursor for the subsequent revolutions in

sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and speech act theory. He conceived of words as tools, and the meaning of a tool, as Sampson says, is its use (1980:224). Yet it would not be entirely correct to assume that in 1923 Malinowski had resolved the question whether phatic communion was rhetorical or not. In one place he endows it with a rhetorical function, defining it as "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (1956: 315). And a few sentences following this definition, he reiterates the same idea: "Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other." Yet a couple of pages earlier, he denied it the pragmatic value of establishing a social bond. Small talk, he says, "inquiries about health, comments on weather . . ." is exchanged "not in order to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought." "It would be even wrong," he continues, "to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse" (p 313). In the final analysis Malinowski makes clear that the definition of phatic communion hangs on whether meaning is communicated or not, whether words are used as symbols of their referents in the world outside the discourse situation or as tools for binding people together. His conclusion seems to be that in phatic communion no meaning is communicated because the discourse situation creates, or is itself, the context of situation: "The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically" (p 315). The apparent contradiction here, whereby phatic communion is defined as a speech event which does and does not have the ability to act upon the world by creating and not creating bonds of sympathy and union at the same time, is based on the assumption of an equation between "phatic communion" and "small talk." Yet this may not be necessarily the case. The confusion will immediately disappear if we disengage these two concepts, as indeed we do in this research. Tough this separation is not made explicit in Malinowski's discussion, it nevertheless underlies his entire discourse on the subject.

Turning now to the question of genre, we note that Malinowski's discussion of the types of speech activity that belong to the domain of phatic communion is also characterized by generic fuzziness. His basic classification, as indicated above, rests on the conceptual tool of the context of situation: discourse that had no direct relationship outside the context of situation was phatic communion, while other genres of speech acts were not. Yet it is also clear from a careful reading of his article that he entertained some doubts about this division as well. In a

passage in which he allows us to overhear a dialogue with himself, he wonders about the genres of speech used in play and in ritual:

"Yet even they [the "primitives"], it might be urged, have fixed texts in their songs, sayings, myths and legends, and most important, in their ritual and magical formulae. Are our conclusions about the nature of language correct, when faced with this use of speech; can our views remain unaltered when, from speech in action, we turn our attention to free narrative or to the use of language in pure social intercourse; when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end in itself?" (p 312).

Several observations are worth noting here. First, that the types of speech activity he mentions are all genres of folklore, including the proverb or, as he calls it, the saying. Second, that the activities brought together do not fit together; the use of "language in free social intercourse" is not the same as its use in ritual, where the object is definitely to achieve some aim. Third, that, since he does not answer the questions he raises, he intends us to conclude from the final question in the series that the expressive activities singled out do belong to the domain of phatic communion, there being no aim behind them beyond the exchange of words as an end in itself. Malinowski seems to be hedging his bets here also, for immediately following the passage just cited, he singles out narrative for special discussion, pointing out that though narrative serves a phatic function by creating bonds of sympathy among the listeners, within the situation in which a narrative is told it also constitutes a form of action: "In every case, narrative speech as found in primitive communities is primarily a mode of social action rather than a mere reflection of thought" (p 313). The story to which he was referring was a narrative of personal experience which today we would classify as a folklore genre under the label of personal narrative, yet myths and legends, which he does mention in his list, are also narratives. Aside from the objection that narrative by definition does not serve as a vehicle of mere reflected thought in any culture, it is untenable to maintain that expressive genres serve as forms of phatic communion without acting upon the world. Certainly, all these genres differ from mere small talk in that they have referents outside the immediate context of situation. But as he proceeds in his argument, Malinowski gradually shifts away from these types of speech activity and focuses on "small talk," which then assumes center

stage for the rest of the discussion. As indicated, subsequent research on phatic communion took its clue from Malinowski here, ignoring the hesitations, nuances, and generic mixture that we see in the quotation given above.

Context of Situation and Context of Culture

It may be helpful to consider proverbs in Goffman's terms as formal utterances which are "anchored in the ongoing surrounding world" (1986: 500). How utterances "take up a place in the world" Goffman says, is by influencing individuals, who "act upon what is said to them, and these actions in turn become inextricably part of the ongoing world" (pp. 500-501). Much Arabic speech use is conscious of its possible effect upon the real. One has only to think of all modal parentheticals which crop up frequently, even in the speech of educated people. Expressions like *in-shā-llā* "God willing!", *b'id 'an-kum* "May it be distant from you!" ("May it never happen to you!"), *min ghēr sharr* "Evil stay away!" - these constitute an acknowledgment that speech, even when used phatically and ritualistically, has the power of acting upon the world. One could bring into being an unintended effect merely by mentioning it. (On the pragmatics of *inshālla* as a "discourse conditional" see Farghal, 1995.) I think there is no question that proverbs also take up a place in the world and act upon it by influencing the behaviour of individuals. The problem seems to lie in the rather restricted framework that Malinowski defines as the context of situation, for traditional expressive forms are metaphorical constructs that do not always have direct reference to the immediate context of situation. Legends, myths, personal narratives, and certainly proverbs, among other forms, embody or articulate a world view or a system of belief or any other aspect of culture that may lie outside the immediate context of situation. The resolution of this apparent contradiction was provided by the London school, most notably Firth. Halliday summarizes the debate on this question as follows:

Malinowski's notions were further developed and made explicit by Firth (. . .) who maintained that the context of situation was not to be interpreted in concrete terms as a sort of audiovisual record of the surrounding "props" but was, rather, an abstract representation of the environment in terms of certain general

categories having relevance to the text. The context of situation may be totally remote from what is going on round about during the act of speaking or writing (1978:109)

In 1935 Malinowski himself coined another phrase, "context of culture," which has a wider frame of reference than the context of situation and in some ways includes Firth's elaboration. I shall therefore adopt "the context of culture" here, distinguishing between it and the context of situation on the basis of reference. What the proverb as speech act refers to is the context of situation, but what it refers to as a grammatical (that is, meaningful) unit of discourse is the context of culture. If we were to pause for a moment to consider the proverbs about roosters and kings, the charcoal maker, and the spice merchant in terms of the context of culture, we would observe that all of three reflect the Arab cultural concern, whether in the Mashreq or the Maghreb, with the difference between appearance and reality. Many *Juhā* stories and other types of anecdotes, as well as several score proverbs, illustrate this concern. One very common Palestinian proverb that comes readily to mind here is, *min barra rkhām, u-min juwwa shkām* "From the outside, marble; from the inside, soot." It is also possible, on the basis of the difference in these two types of context, to distinguish between a proverbial and a metaproverbial situation. In ordinary proverb use, that is, in a proverbial situation, the context of situation takes precedence over the context of culture because proverbs are used spontaneously in relation to an immediate context, as was the case with the proverbs about roosters and kings, about the charcoal maker, and about the spice merchant. In ordinary proverb use, as indicated earlier, the phatic is rhetorical because of a proverb's discursive relationship to its context of situation as commentary, advice, or whatever. In the metaproverbial on the other hand, as in our session for example, the context of culture took precedence since proverbs were cited and discussed as linguistic and cultural artefacts belonging to the entire Arabic speech community. A metaproverbial situation is to some extent a contradiction in terms, given the rhetorical power of proverbs and their pragmatic significance in Arab culture. Indeed, this rhetorical power asserted itself at our session in a most unexpected manner, and what was fascinating to me as a spectator was to observe the subtle way in which a metaproverbial suddenly slid into a proverbial situation with reference to the immediate context of those sitting around that table. The result could have been potentially

embarrassing, had it not been for the mastery exhibited by both Rashad and Abdulhamid of what we have already alluded to (and will discuss later) as keys that circumscribe ambiguity.

Context as Metaphorical Construct: Ambiguity of the Real

Sitting at the table with us was a person who was obviously taken with himself. In between our conversation about proverbs he was telling the story of his life in a highly elaborate Standard Arabic, and for this reason I shall refer to him as "the pompous gentleman." He was responsible for the translation of documents into Spanish from Arabic, and he had been carrying on about how the Spanish did not acknowledge their Arab heritage, but on the contrary held racist views against Arabs. He knew, he went on, because he had worked in the Arab League office in Argentina, where Carlos Menem, of Arab and Muslim origins, had collaborated with the American effort against Iraq. After Argentina he was transferred to Spain, but was now back working as a teacher of Spanish in Tunisia. No sooner had he finished, than Abdulhamid (who apparently had known him from before) addressed him with the proverb: *rij 'it Ḥalima la- 'ūdīt-ha l-qadīma* "Ḥalima has gone back to her old habit" as a way of encapsulating what he had said. But the result was electric. He reacted as though he had been slapped in the face and started defending his return to Tunisia as if the proverb had somehow implied he had done the wrong thing. The proverb was not maliciously intended by Abdulhamid. At worst, he may have wanted to chide this gentleman for being so taken up with himself, and also perhaps for an excessively protested nationalism. It might, for example, be said of someone who had gone back to smoking after having quit.

In terms of our central thesis, it is possible to see the difficulty here as arising from the ambiguity of the proverb as a speech act. Though Abdulhamid's manner was friendly and his intention was clearly phatic in our sense of the term, the pompous gentleman chose to interpret it rhetorically, ignoring the phatic intention altogether. Yet the following proverb, which on the surface seems to have carried more bite, did not seem to rouse his ire: *ḥatta šāḥb it-tāj ya-ḥtāj* "Even a king [lit., the one wearing the crown] has needs." It was addressed to him directly by Rashad after he ended up accepting a ballpoint pen he had refused earlier, before he searched his pockets in vain for his fountain pen. It is

difficult to understand why he had taken offense at Abdulhamid's but not at Rashad's proverb; perhaps he felt somehow feminized by the comparison with a woman (Ḥalima). In any case it was becoming evident that the phatic frame was very subtly being violated, as the playful verbal duel seemed to be taking a rhetorical turn. The context of culture had become the context of situation, and under the pretense of sharing the Tunisian proverbs they knew, Rashad and Abdulhamid were using the inherent ambiguity of the situation to deliver a message, as we can see from the proverbs which follow. *Šnuwwa sh-ishshū, wi-šhiyya mriqtu* "What's the braggart, and what's his stew?" ("What kind of a braggart is this, and what kind of stew can he offer?") This one was uttered by Abdulhamid, who explained that it is used for someone who brags about his abilities but who is of limited means. *Il-ḥamām il-maksūr y-ḥuṭṭ 'ala l-burj il-khālī* "The pigeon with the broken wing [lit., 'the broken pigeon'] lands in the empty dove-cote." I am not sure whether the broken pigeon referred to the pompous gentleman and the empty dove-cote to his vacuous intellectuality. In any case, Rashad explained that the proverb applied to someone who is defeated and has lost his ability to resist.

The following proverb, which was Rashad's response to Abdulhamid's proverb about Ḥalima, has been taken out of sequence for the purpose of the discussion: *'azūza w-shaddat sārīq* "An old woman, and she got hold of a thief." When the group of translators had gotten together in the morning, Rashad did not say a single word the whole time. As noted earlier, in speaking proverbs he was not using his private voice, but the public voice sanctioned by the culture. To the extent that uttering a proverb constitutes a ritual event, Rashad was taking advantage of his mastery of this verbal ritual to affirm a personal identity without at the same time asserting himself. In this case I would agree with Laver's insight that phatic communion is indexical, in the sense in which he adapts the use of this term to mean a sign that reveals something about the personalities of the participants (1975: 217), but I would tie indexicality here to performance. Rashad's behaviour is best understood in terms of obliqueness as articulated in the Fawcett model alluded to earlier. The oblique, as we saw, comprises the categories of play and ritual, and the latter in turn may be ceremonial or phatic (1984: 42). It is not necessary to agree entirely with the model to find the notion of an oblique communicative purpose useful, for it provides a pithy description of what was actually taking place at the session. What I referred to earlier as ambiguity arose from the obliqueness of

the communicative purpose. I was sure Abdulhamid understood Rashad's reference to the old woman and the thief, but it was too oblique for me though I suspected it had something to do with the unspoken encounter with the pompous gentleman. Someone explained that there was this sex-starved old woman, and she caught a thief in her house. "What do you think?" he asked humorously, "Was she going to let him go?" This explanatory question led me to believe that the proverb had to do, not with an old lady but with what was going on around the table that very moment, with Rashad and Abdulhamid not letting go of the pompous gentleman once they had gotten hold of him. The question itself made me realize that others around the table were aware of what was going on - that in fact, the gentleman himself may also have been aware that he was the target of these proverbs but was taking advantage of the inherent ambiguity of the situation and the obliqueness of the communicative purpose to ignore them, or pretend they had nothing to do with him.

The following proverb, uttered by Rashad as he was giving me a ride home late that evening, serves as a coda to the set of proverbs touching on the pompous gentleman: *Isān-ak iḥṣān-ak, in sunto sār-ak w-in khun-to khān-ak* "Your tongue is your horse, take care of it, it will take care of you; betray it, it will betray you." It confirmed my suspicion that the last several proverbs were in fact meant to be taken rhetorically in relation to that gentleman. Sometime during the afternoon he had launched into a story about a Kuwaiti friend who had lent him his home. But instead of expressing gratitude he had nothing but negative things to say about this friend and the excessive luxury in which he lived. When I asked Rashad why he had all of a sudden uttered this proverb, he explained that it was about that gentleman because he had defamed the friend who had done him a favour by inviting him and his family to stay in his palatial home by the seashore for a week. "The fact of the matter," Rashad said, "is that the pompous fellow, in defaming his friend, was in reality defaming himself. His tongue had betrayed him."

Proverbs, Speech Acts, and Social Metaphors

On the descriptive level, a proverb remains a sentence, or grammatical unit of discourse, but, as we have seen, ambiguity arises when it is used rhetorically as a speech act. The sources of the ambiguity are poetic

and grammatical at once. In sociolinguistic terms, proverbs represent a social use of metaphor (cf. Seitel, 1994), and metaphors are ambiguous by their very nature, even when not applied to a social situation. In linguistic terms, the ambiguity arises from the modal use of verbs and the metaphorical use of the imperative mood in particular. In the proverb about the grocer and the charcoal maker, for example, does one sit with the grocer because one wants something from him - the aroma of his spices? Was the proverb urging us to sit with the grocer? Some around the table thought opportunism was implied, while others maintained the proverb was merely descriptive because, who would want the blackness of the charcoal maker? And the proverb about becoming a charcoal maker is not literally asking us to blacken our faces with soot - a reprehensible action, given the Arab equation between the colour black and loss of face or honour. In short though there is no problem with proverbs understood as grammatical units of discourse, or sentences, there was difference of opinion when they functioned performatively as speech acts. Hymes analyzes this type of contextual ambiguity in terms of the concept of the key, the "factor of social meaning" which lies beyond the dimension of presupposition that normally provides clues how speech acts are to be interpreted (1974:181). Those who have mastered proverb use, like Rashad and Abdulhamid, have not only mastered a linguistic medium but also the discourse keys through which ambiguity is channeled, as we have already seen in relation to the exchange with the pompous gentleman.

Emergent Quality of Performance: Fixed Text, Novel Context

Earlier, I attributed the convergence of the contexts of situation and culture to the rhetorical power of the proverb, but equally important in understanding this fusion is also the fact of performance, which always has an emergent quality (Bauman, 1977:37-45). What the folklorist or the ethnographer of speaking calls "the emergent quality of performance" is described in linguistics in terms of negotiating an event, as Coupland *et al* indicate in the title of their article, "Negotiating Phatic Communion," where phaticity is understood as a "matter of on-the-ground negotiation by participants as talk proceeds." (1992:214). Whether or not Jakobson's assertion (upon which depends his classification of speech acts in terms of function) that "the verbal structure of a message depends primarily on [its] predominant

function" (1960:353) is valid in relation to other forms of discourse, it certainly does not apply to the proverb, whose form is frozen regardless of its function. In terms of Halliday's taxonomy, the proverb represents the textual function par excellence. The textual function, says Halliday, "is intrinsic to language: it is the function that language has of creating text, of relating itself to the context—to the situation and the preceding text" (1978:48). What is unique about the proverb as a form of discourse is that it is a fixed text that as a speech act has the power of interacting with or negotiating completely novel contexts. Without a context, a proverb remains incomplete, a frozen form waiting for the context to become a rhetorical speech act. This creative interaction of the fixed with the novel (arising from the potential meaning inherent in the proverb as social metaphor) accounts for the proverb's emergent quality. And in the final analysis it is precisely the emergent quality of performance that brings about phatic communion by arousing and maintaining the audience's interest.

One Proverb, Many Voices: Context and Heteroglossia

As already noted, the semiotic status of the proverb as a form of discourse depends on and arises from the complexity of the phatic/rhetorical dynamic in its use in face-to-face encounters. In the following example, we can observe how a complex emerging quality arises from performance in a change of intonation that could turn a flat statement into a complex modal structure with consequences in real life. During the course of the conversation, someone whose name I did not know came up with this saying: *niuma mā kḥab-tū-nā; wa-ḥna mā 'iēnā-kum* "You didn't come asking for the girl's hand, and we didn't give her to you." This translation assumes a falling intonation at the end which turns the expression into a factual statement, but as we shall see in a moment, the meaning of the proverb becomes more complex and sociolinguistically much more interesting if it is uttered with stress on the initial pronoun, followed immediately by a juncture and a rising intonation at the end. The story associated with the proverb concerns a barber who, razor in hand and about to shave the Bey, asks why Beys do not allow their daughters to marry barbers. On the spot, the Bey came up with the saying. Later, however, to teach all barbers a lesson, he ordered that the head of the barber be chopped off. Translating this expression into English poses similar problems to those faced by

Malinowski in translating from the Trobriand, for the meaning of the expression as a speech act depends on elements absent from it as well as the proposed change in its articulation. First, in regard to structure, in ordinary speech the negative - *sh* morpheme would normally be attached to both verbs (*mā kḥab-tū-na-sh*, *mā 'iēnā-kum-sh*, as we shall see from an example that will occur later). Its inclusion would have had the force of a past perfect, with the action completed and the expression serving merely as a statement of fact. Its removal, which does not sound abnormal to a native speaker in this case, affects the status of the verb, endowing it with an anticipative aspect that completely alters the function of the coordinate conjunction *wa*, turning it into a modal auxiliary that links both parts of the structure not in terms of a series of actions but as two modally interrelated actions. With such a reading, whose validity is confirmed by the absence of the negating - *sh*, the first negative particle *mā* coming after the juncture would negate every following predication about the subject. Such a reading changes the pragmatic force of the utterance from a flat assertion to a modal structure that falls somewhere between an exclamation and a question, and its pragmatic intent would be to undermine its own surface meaning. An accurate translation is impossible but some possible approximations are, "Can you say you came asking and we didn't give you the girl's hand?" or "Can it possibly be true that you came asking and we didn't give?" or, even more insidiously, "Why blame me? It's not as if you came asking and we didn't give you." These are more likely readings than our initial translation because the flat statement is neither phatic nor rhetorical, while the new readings hold out something for the barber by possibly including him in the social circle of the Beys.

The narrative about the Bey and the barber also illustrates well the relationship of language to social life, for the story enacts the power relations in the society. The contest was unequal from the start: the Bey with his sword had no fear of the barber with his razor, and his power is confirmed in his rhetoric, his manipulation of the language to save face for both himself and the barber, and to lay the blame for a transaction - asking for the girl's hand - that never occurred (and never could occur for that matter) on the barber in the first place. We might say that he won the battle of words first through a sly insinuation of phatic intent, before going on to confirm his power by having the head of the barber chopped off. The rhetorical power of this proverb arises from its heteroglossia (in the Bakhtinian sense), due to which we can

perceive several different voices speaking in and through the proverb at once. The heteroglossia itself is based on the proverb's complex modality, and both in turn give rise to the irony which characterizes it. The power of irony is equivalent to the power of the sword; it is itself (if we are permitted a hackneyed metaphor) a kind of sword which the Bey wields before resorting to the actual sword.

The types of structure represented by this proverb have been labeled "counter-factual conditionals," except that ours should properly be labeled a "negative counter-factual conditional." Steiner has a stimulating discussion of this structure which bears upon our analysis here, though he casts it in philosophical rather than rhetorical terms (1975:214-217, see also the bibliography on conditionals provided in Fn 2, p 214). If we compare the example he gives ("If Napoleon was now in the field, the business in Vietnam would take a different turn.") with our proverb here, we can see the degree of complexity introduced into our example as a result of its being a negative formulation, which I believe is where its rhetorical power (heteroglossia and irony) lies. Steiner observes that this type of structure opens a significant space for the "dynamics of human feeling" and constitutes an "elbow-room of the mind" (1975:216). He goes on to cite Ernest Bloch to the effect that "counter-factuals and conditionals make up a grammar of human renewal" (p 217). To some extent, our ability imaginatively to project a future (which in the case of our proverb would be more like projecting or creating a world of possibility in a past that never happened) is based on our ability to think in terms of this type of structure: "We hypothesize and project thought and imagination into the 'ifness', into the free conditionalities of the unknown. Such projection is no logical muddle, no abuse of induction. It is far more than a probabilistic convention. It is the master nerve of human action" (1975:217). These claims may be too large and too general to make for any linguistic structure whatever its form, and the formulation may have got somewhat carried away with itself, but from our own example we cannot deny the world of possibility which the Bey was able to create for himself by the judicious application of the structure we have been describing.²

Tuning Text and Context: Further Intrusions of the Real

It was now the second night of the conference. There was much work during the day, leaving us little time for jawing. A core of translators and secretaries were asked to forego dinner in order to work overtime. Around two o'clock in the morning it was becoming clear that no documents were to be issued from the sessions being held that night, and it turned out the whole evening was spent in pleasant chatter. Rashad was not there that evening, and the excitement of the verbal duel was gone. What I am calling the conclusion to the session began with the proverb by Abdulhamid which encapsulated for me the entire experience and eventually gave me the idea for this paper: *t-'add-ât il-lêla fi taq'id il-'ûd* "The whole night passed in tuning the oud." Abdulhamid, who as noted earlier is an excellent amateur musician, explained that some oud players spend more time tuning their instruments than actually playing them. As a metaphor for the session this proverb could not have been more apt, for, as the phatic was modulating into the rhetorical, the relationship of the proverbs to the immediate context was getting more in tune with each proverb uttered. Getting food on the night of the overtime, for example, was not at all easy, because someone other than a translator had to be found who was willing to go out and find a sandwich place or a restaurant open after ten o'clock at night. As everyone was hungry, the food, when it finally arrived, was quite welcome. One person, however, rushed at it before waiting for the others, and Abdulhamid whispered this proverb in my ear: *qal-lo bakkar, kôl is-sfinj; şalla li-'shâ w-jâ* "He said, 'Come early [in the morning], and eat pastries'; the other finished evening prayer and came right over." The proverb refers to someone who is so anxious to leech off others that he cannot wait till morning to enjoy his host's hospitality. The context in which the next proverb *y-ful lêl-ha, w-ti-'lif* "Her night will grow long, then she will eat her fodder," was almost the exact opposite of the previous one. Abdulhamid came up with it in relation to one of the typists. Suffering from boredom on that long night, she came into the translators' room to see if there was any work. When she saw the chips and the sandwiches, she took just one chip. Invited to eat, she refused. Abdulhamid explained that someone might refuse food at a certain time, but as the night gets longer and the person gets hungrier, he or she will ask for it themselves. I think he found a false restraint in her attitude, and his use of the proverb was not entirely free of irony.³

When the conference was nearly over, there was some doubt whether the Tunisian Ministry of Labour, which had acted as the official host, was going to pay the overtime. Abdulhamid came up with this proverb as a way of consoling us for the wasted effort: *'a'fī-nī qirtall-ti, mā hāj-ti bi-l-'inib* "Give me back my basket, I have no need of the grapes." In response to this, Amin, who had cited the proverb about the pasha, came up with a rhyming (and humorous) version in the Eastern Arabic dialect, *yā maḍraṭ-ann, la ta-ḥsab-ann, la ta-qbaḍ-ann* "You big fart, don't start counting until you've been paid." Within the context of this conversation two other proverbs came up, both with the meaning, "Don't count your chickens before they hatch." The first is the well-known Palestinian proverb, *ma t-qul fāl illa la-t-huṭṭ bi-l-'idāl* "Don't say 'it's fava beans' until the baskets are full [lit. until you put them in the basket]," and the second is a similar Tunisian proverb, *mā t-ṣaddaq illā ma t-'annaq* "Don't believe [or take it for granted] until you hold it in your arms." These last proverbs about getting paid, uttered on the last day while we were waiting around for the conference to end, represent a coda to what I have been calling a "session," though not all the proverbs cited in this research were uttered at the same sitting.⁴

Phatic Communion and Identity

If Abdulhamid's proverb about tuning the oud addressed itself so elegantly to the emerging fitness of the proverbs to the context of situation, then the last proverb that belonged to the session proper brought home to me another very important aspect of our get-together - the question of identity in phatic communion. In sharing their proverbs with me, my Tunisian colleagues were also sharing their cultural heritage. My reading of phatic communion as a sharing of identity is based in fact on the proverbs given here and my observation of the whole process as it was taking place. In addition to the playfulness, a certain amount of pride in one's heritage was evident among them, and it gave them pleasure to share it with the two Palestinians at the table. The linguistic aspect of this identity lies of course in the Tunisian variety of the Arabic language (on folklore, language, and identity, see Muhawi, 1996: 50-51). That this was what was taking place was confirmed in a proverb by Bechir, a colleague at the Faculty of Letters and one of the translators at the conference: *li-jbāl ma ti-t-lāqā-sh, wi-*

r-rjāl ti-t-lāqa (note the negative particle *-sh*) "Mountains don't get together, but men get together." As we were bored during the night of the overtime, he asked me how I came to be working in Tunisia. After I gave him a brief history that seemed to satisfy his mild curiosity, I think he found the story sympathetic, and the proverb was his way of saying, "you're welcome here among us," or, "You're one of us." This proverb, with its phatic intention and its affirmation of cultural identity, beautifully brings together the points I have been trying to make. In it the context of situation and the context of culture are united; for in terms of the immediate context of situation its rhetorical intention was to be phatic, and in terms of context of culture the phatic purpose was to affirm the sharing of a cultural identity. Hence the context of culture and the context of situation exist in a dynamic mutuality wherein the cultural substratum reinforces the phatic communion in affirming the identity.

Phatic Communion and Speech Act Theory

We cannot fail to notice in Malinowski's reflections on phatic communion the beginnings of speech act theory, but the apparent confusion in his presentation stems from two sources, I believe. The first has to do with his rather narrow definition of meaning as a commodity, and the second stems from the range of speech activities he wanted to fit under the rubric of phatic communion. Since we are addressing ourselves to a rhetorical genre our concern has been with the second of these, but it will repay the effort if we pause for a moment to consider the first. By putting the emphasis on the speech act and the conditions of its performance, modern speech act theory has exploded the classical notion of meaning. It is not my intention to delve into the abstruse question of what constitutes meaning and its place in speech act theory, but what is of interest to us is Austin's use of the word *phatic* in a different sense from Malinowski's. Austin devised three ways to describe saying something: the phonetic act, which he calls the *phone*, the phatic act, or *pheme*, and the rhetic act, or *rheme*. The phone is "merely the act of uttering certain noises"; the pheme is the uttering of certain "vocables or words . . . belonging to, and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming of a certain grammar"; and the rheme is the act of "using vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference" (1962: 93). Thus for

Austin the question of meaning is tied up with the rhetoric aspect of the act, while the mere fact of using the shared system of symbols that we refer to as language renders the act phatic. We note the complexity in the definition of the phatic act: it must not only consist of an utterance belonging to a certain lexicon and conforming to a certain grammar but also *as* belonging to that lexicon and *as* conforming to that grammar. Undoubtedly, when he used the label *phatic* Austin was aware he would be echoing Malinowski, and no doubt his use of it here was deliberate, the effect being to shift the emphasis from the mystical notion of communion to the pragmatic notion of communication. Communication does not take place with the phonetic act, which is the mere utterance of certain noises; it occurs with the phatic because the utterance must not only belong to a certain lexicon and conform to a certain grammar, which is what the speaker puts into it, it must also be perceived as belonging to a certain lexicon and as conforming to a certain grammar. If it is not so perceived, it is not a phatic act. The clearest illustration of this is hearing an utterance in a foreign language; the utterance is made to belong and conform to a certain lexicon and grammar but, but if the listener does not understand, it remains for him or her a phonetic act. Halliday, we recall, refers to phatic communion as "our most purely operational language activity." Hence, if we are interpreting Austin correctly, all language use that results in communication is by definition phatic. Austin's procedure here can only be described as dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense, because he has very subtly introduced the listener, or the speech community, into the process of the utterance as it is being uttered by the speaker.

Speech act theory has revolutionized thinking about meaning by bringing context into consideration but it put the emphasis on the semiotic nature of individual speech acts, while sociolinguistics has taken for its domain the relationship of types of discourse to the relevant social context, and folklore adds the dimension of identity.⁵ Austin does not necessarily deny the possibility of phatic communion; it simply does not interest him, or we can say that he would consider it to be a fault: "the theme is a unit of *language* (emphasis original): its typical fault is to be nonsense--meaningless." But the theme is a unit of *speech* (emphasis original); its typical fault is to be vague or void or obscure" (p 98). What is sacrificed in speech act theory's approach to such issues as phatic communion is precisely its significance as communion rather than communication, what Coupland *et al* call "the human embeddedness" of the discourse, the fact that human beings use

speech to avert the fear of silence in sharing an ethnolinguistic, cultural, and human identity. Yet what Austin can provide is a needed corrective to the prevailing assumption that phatic communion consists only of semantically empty talk. Also useful to our discussion is his delineation of a generic taxonomy of speech acts along an arc that casts his definitional net in wider circles to cover higher levels of linguistic organization from phonetic act (units of sound) to the phatic (units of language) to the rhetoric (units of speech). Considered from a folkloristic perspective, Austin's tri-partite description is potentially extendible to higher levels organization that include the domain of expressive rhetorical forms. A proverb on this understanding is phonetic by virtue of being composed of certain noises; it is phatic on two counts, first by belonging and conforming to a certain semiotic system or rhetorical genre and secondly in being used and perceived as belonging and conforming to a particular genre; and it is rhetoric, which I shall read as rhetorical, by virtue of its communicative potential.

Conclusion: Phatic Communion and Folkloristics

The object of our analysis has not been to take issue with Malinowski or find fault with his presentation. Rather it was to show that the creative confusion which characterizes it stems from a profound insight into the role of language in society; and it is for this reason that we are using it as a point of departure in our study of the proverb exchange which forms the subject of this research. The most important part of this insight for us is his attribution of phaticity, understood as a sharing of identity, to traditional expressive genres that fit under the umbrella of folklore. The question we asked is whether these genres serve solely as phatic communion, and the only viable conclusion was that Malinowski wanted to have it both ways: they serve this function while at the same time acting upon the world, or at least upon the context of situation in which they are performed.

Phatic communion, we saw, arises from the fact of performance (since performance is always tied to a particular context), from its emergent quality, and (as we shall see in more detail below) from the rhetorical relationship that the genre itself establishes between performer and audience. We have focused here on the proverb, but in principle all oral expressive genres can provide us with the enabling frame for seeing phatic communion as a sharing of identity rather than

the vacuous exchange of small talk. Yet despite this, phatic communion has not received much attention in folklore studies, and among those who have addressed themselves to it directly, Jakobson's functional model prevails over what I have here taken to be Malinowski's intersubjective approach. Babcock (1977) alludes to the phatic function within the framework of her analysis of metanarrative devices, those devices in oral narrative which draw attention to the fact of the story, whether explicitly as in opening and closing formulas or implicitly in the use of various stylistic devices like onomatopoeia, repetition, rhyming, pronoun shifts, or what have you. Within Jakobson's functional taxonomy, metanarration, she says, serves the metalinguistic (more accurately, *metalingual*), the phatic, as well as the poetic functions. Jakobson's discussion of the phatic function in terms of what he calls the "set for contact," which he delineates as follows: "There are messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works . . . to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention." "This set for contact," he continues, "or in Malinowski's terms phatic function, may be displayed by a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas, by entire dialogues with the mere purport of prolonging communication" (1960: 355). It should be noted in passing that Jakobson here adapts Malinowski to his own use. Though the notion of function is not alien to Malinowski, he never collocates *phatic* with *function*, preferring under all circumstances the collocation *phatic communion* for the type of speech activity we have been discussing. (As we saw, however, Malinowski never entirely resolves the question of what constitutes phatic communion as such, preferring instead to leave his discussion with the kinds of ambiguities pointed to above.) Returning now to Babcock, we note that her understanding of the phatic function is limited to the medium: "a focusing on the medium of communication, the channel" (1977: 68). Admittedly, the phatic function is incidental to her argument, rating no more than a mere mention, yet had she included the other elements in Jakobson's "set for contact"—the speaker and the listener—her extensive and useful discussion of metanarrative devices, which clearly belong to the esthetics of reception, could just as easily have led her in the direction of phatic communion, for all the metanarrative devices she mentions serve to create "bonds of union" between narrator and audience rather than simply to "focus on the channel." The problem as I see it stems from the point made earlier about initial assumptions leading to certain

kinds of conclusions. When applying a linguistic model to areas of verbal art like folklore and literature we should be careful to remember that these fields are animated by internal laws which give them shape and endow them with coherence and organic unity. What I have been arguing for in this research is a way of seeing phatic communion as a vital bridge between folklore and sociolinguistics. However it is understood in linguistics, in folklore phatic communion pertains to the law of genre, an eminently rhetorical category that defines and is defined by the esthetic relationship between performer and audience. Genre serves to organize the esthetic experience by alerting listeners to the kind of speech activity coming their way, thus keeping them in touch with it and holding their attention as it progresses, and, perhaps most importantly, creating bonds of union and cultural and linguistic identity between performer and audience.

Despite its title Knorrinda's study of Romanian narrative ballads (1978) does not take full advantage of its own data to develop a consistent theory linking performance and phatic communion. Knorrinda is aware that she is working within the framework of the esthetics of reception; nevertheless, the same remarks concerning initial assumptions and final conclusion apply here as well, for it seems to me that tying herself down theoretically to the functional perspective of Jakobson's model was more restrictive than liberating. The poetics she explores for what she calls "the oral style" go a long way to establishing the sought-for link between genre, phatic communion, and the emergent quality of performance. Among the devices she explores in terms of their phatic import are formulas, repetitions, redundancies, parallelisms, marked oppositions, apostrophes/interjections and deictic forms (1978: 50). Along with some others, these features go to make up what she calls the "affective style." Whereas Babcock ties phatic communion to the two formal functions within Jakobson's model—the poetic and the metalingual—Knorrinda ties the affective style to those associated with the human subjectivity of the speaker/oral poet (emotive function) and the listener/audience (conative function): "The phatic function is directly related to both the emotive and conative functions; moreover, any attempt to engage the audience will be more successful if the singer shows himself to be involved [in the narrative]" (1978: 59, my translation). This I think constitutes a fruitful use of Jakobson's model, and if developed further could lead to the understanding of phatic communion as an intersubjective sharing of identity through performance.

Finally, Glassie has written a superb work about social life in a small community in Northern Ireland (1982), with transcripts of sessions that include dialogue, songs, folktales and personal narratives. This work is perhaps the most outstanding example we have of phatic communion in action, a sharing of identity through speech and performance. Though the word *phatic* never occurs (the book tends to privilege description over analysis), the case for phatic communion is beautifully put in these words: "Passing the time in entertainment is more than momentary distraction, it is heartsome, not lonesome, an epitome of *connectivity*. The ceiling is a model of how to be happy: happy and in society. Saying life is a little ceiling is not a joyous conclusion, but neither is it melancholy. It is accurate and encouraging enough to give the quick visitor a reason to continue while waiting" (1982:472, emphasis added). Short of a more appropriate label, Glassie classifies his work as an "existential ethnography," and I think this is an appropriate label for our research here as well, except that we would have to think of it as a form of "existential sociolinguistics."

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NOTES

- 1 My participation in the Third (1997) University of Edinburgh Symposium on Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa was made possible in part by a grant from the Andrew Mellon Foundation through the good offices of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the Centre's support of my tenancy at Berkeley from 1994 to 1997. I am also pleased to thank the Conference organizer, Professor Yasir Suleiman, for support which helped defray the cost of my participation. Additionally, I have benefited from the astute comments of Nadia Yaqub (to whom I am indebted for the Knorringa reference) on earlier versions of this work. Thanks are also due to Sonia Shiri and Sharif Kanaana.
- 2 The negotiation of performance emerges from the following proverbs as well, which are included for the sake of ethnographic accuracy and completeness. Since the conference was going to be addressed by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the security presence was heavy. About a quarter of an hour before the arrival of the president and during his entire speech, we were not allowed to leave our working area, not even to take care of natural functions. As a commentary on this situation, Rashad came up with this proverb, which was familiar to all the Tunisians around the table: *il-'arūs y-'arras, wi-li-mshūm yi-t-harras* "The bridegroom is getting married, but the one taking care of the arrangements is getting

ground down in the mortar and pestle." He explained it in relation to the anxiety of the ever-vigilant security people about the safety of the president and the ministers attending the conference. The context of culture here refers to Tunisian weddings, which, like weddings in other Arab countries, are extremely elaborate and very costly affairs. Abdulhamid also came up with a proverb with a similar theme: *ikhdim ya tā'is 'ala r-rāqid in-nā'is* "Serve, you miserable one, the one lying down feeling sleepy." This one highlights the difference between the lazy rich and the hard-working poor, or those in power and those who serve them.

3 The ironic use of proverbs we have encountered so far invites inquiry into two ancillary areas of investigation that do not fall within the scope of our argument - viz., the role of irony as a contributing factor in phatic communion, as for example was the case in relation to the "pompous gentleman," and the more general question of the structural relationship between irony and orality.

4 To put the above proverbs in context, it is important to keep in mind that getting paid on time, or even getting paid at all, usually gave cause for anxiety among conference translators, who, as a result of bitter experience, had learned not to trust the bureaucrats controlling the purse strings. At a conference held in Istanbul in May 1994 of one of the branch committees of the Islamic Conference Organization, Abdulhamid recalled that during the final session of the summit meeting of that organization held in Casablanca in 1984, King Hassan II had summarily declared the conference closed when he could not get the Pakistani delegation to commit itself on the spot to his resolution on Jerusalem. Consequently, the Moroccan foreign ministry refused to pay the translators' hotel bills on the grounds that the conference had been officially declared closed by the king. Abdulhamid's expressive mastery manifested itself on this occasion as well, for he came up with two proverbs by way of commentary on the events in Casablanca. The first shows the helplessness of the individual in relation to natural forces, *t'arak ir-rīḥ wi-li-bḥar, jā t-takṣīr fi l-markab* "The wind and the sea got into a fight, but it was the boat that was torn apart," and the second shows the injustice of the law when it must find a scapegoat, *t'arak Sa'd u-S'adallah, shaddu Baraka la-l-ḥabs* "Sa'd and Sa'dallah got into a fight: but they [the authorities] hauled Baraka off to prison."

- 5 For a disciplined critique of, and engagement with, Austin's speech act theory, readers are referred to Derrida's essay, "Signature Event Context" and the polemic that follows it in *Limited Inc* (sic).

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
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